



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**AN ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF CONTINGENCY  
CONTRACTING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND  
AFGHANISTAN: CAPTURING CRITICAL CORPORATE  
KNOWLEDGE FOR THE FUTURE**

by

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December 2012

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CONTRACTING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:  
CAPTURING CRITICAL CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE FOR THE  
FUTURE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this research is to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for two primary reasons. The first reason is to document the history and evolution of CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC); and the second, to use the consolidated lessons learned to shape recommendations to improve future contingency contracting operations. In this study, we focused on senior-level leadership within the DoD, both from the acquisition and non-acquisition communities, to capture strategic-level lessons learned. Our research relies on qualitative data received via interviews with senior leaders.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>PURPOSE.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION OF REPORT .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>CONTRACTING IN INDUSTRY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
	1. Introduction.....	5
	2. Evolution of Industry Perspective .....	5
	3. Purchasing Process, Objectives, and Responsibilities .....	6
	4. Industry Policies, Procedures, and Organization .....	9
	5. Integrative Strategy Development.....	11
<b>C.</b>	<b>CONTRACTING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.....</b>	<b>11</b>
	1. Introduction.....	11
	2. DoD Contracting Roles and Responsibilities.....	11
	3. DoD Contracting Organizational Structure.....	14
	a. <i>DoD Contracting Authority .....</i>	<i>14</i>
	b. <i>Department of the Army Contracting Organization.....</i>	<i>14</i>
	c. <i>Department of the Navy Contracting Organization.....</i>	<i>15</i>
	d. <i>Department of the Air Force Contracting Organization.....</i>	<i>15</i>
	e. <i>Acquisition Planning within the DoD.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<b>D.</b>	<b>CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE DOD.....</b>	<b>16</b>
	1. Introduction.....	16
	2. Definition .....	17
	3. Types of Contingency Contracting Support and Organizational Structures.....	18
	a. <i>Types of Contingency Contracting Support.....</i>	<i>18</i>
	b. <i>Types of Contingency Contracting Organizational             Structure .....</i>	<i>19</i>
	c. <i>Service Theater Support Contracting.....</i>	<i>22</i>
	4. Contingency Contracting Support Phases.....	24
	5. Evolution of Theater Contract Support.....	25
	6. Evolution of the Present Day Battlefield.....	29
	a. <i>Historical Overview of Contracting on the Battlefield .....</i>	<i>29</i>
	b. <i>Contractors Accompanying the Force .....</i>	<i>31</i>
<b>E.</b>	<b>CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT.....</b>	<b>33</b>
	1. Introduction.....	33
	2. Joint Organizational Structure.....	33

	a.	<i>Department of Defense .....</i>	34
	b.	<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense.....</i>	34
	c.	<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff.....</i>	35
	d.	<i>Military Departments .....</i>	35
	e.	<i>Combatant Commands.....</i>	36
	f.	<i>Types of Command Authority.....</i>	38
	g.	<i>Command Authority vs. Contracting Authority.....</i>	40
	3.	<b>Joint Operations.....</b>	41
	4.	<b>Joint Operation Planning .....</b>	43
F.		<b>MAJOR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES' OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS.....</b>	52
	1.	<b>Introduction.....</b>	52
	2.	<b>DoD Office of Inspector General .....</b>	52
	3.	<b>Government Accountability Office .....</b>	54
	4.	<b>Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan...55</b>	
	5.	<b>The Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.....</b>	58
	6.	<b>The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction...60</b>	
G.		<b>MAJOR DOD INITIATIVES.....</b>	60
	1.	<b>Introduction.....</b>	60
	2.	<b>Task Force on Wartime Contracting .....</b>	61
	3.	<b>Contracting Intelligence .....</b>	62
	4.	<b>Operational Contract Support.....</b>	63
	a.	<i>Operational Contract Support Overview.....</i>	63
	b.	<i>Doctrine and Policy.....</i>	65
	c.	<i>Integration of Operational Contract Support Into Joint Planning .....</i>	69
	d.	<i>Roles and Responsibilities .....</i>	70
	e.	<i>Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office .....</i>	72
	f.	<i>Operational Contract Support Planners at the Combatant Commands.....</i>	76
H.		<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	78
III.		<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	79
	A.	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	79
	B.	<b>KEY ORGANIZATIONS .....</b>	79
	C.	<b>INTERVIEW DESIGN .....</b>	80
	D.	<b>INTERVIEWEE SELECTION PROCESS.....</b>	81
	E.	<b>REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONS.....</b>	81
	F.	<b>FRAMEWORK.....</b>	82
	G.	<b>ANALYTICAL PROCESS .....</b>	82
	H.	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	83
IV.		<b>FINDINGS.....</b>	85
	A.	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	85
	B.	<b>EVOLUTION OF THE C-JTSCC FROM 2003 TO 2012 .....</b>	85
	1.	<b>Early History of Joint Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan .....</b>	85

2.	The Establishment of JCC-I/A .....	87
3.	The Emergence of C-JTSCC.....	93
4.	C-JTSCC Today.....	94
C.	MAJOR FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS .....	96
1.	Doctrine: The Way the DoD Conducts Operations .....	96
2.	Organization: The Way the DoD is Organized to Conduct Operations .....	97
3.	Training: How the Department of Defense Prepares our Forces to Fight .....	98
4.	Materiel: The Necessary Equipment Needed by our Forces to Fight and Operate Effectively.....	99
5.	Leadership and Education: The Way DoD Prepares our Leaders to Lead and Conduct Contract Operations .....	100
6.	Personnel: The DoD's Availability of Qualified Personnel for Peacetime, Wartime, and Various Contingency Operations .....	101
7.	Facilities: The DoD's Property, Installations, and Industrial Facilities That Support our Forces to Conduct Contracting During Contingencies .....	102
8.	Policy: The DoD's Existing Policy That Supports (or Doesn't Support) the Current Practices .....	102
9.	Six-Phase Contract Management Process .....	103
a.	Procurement Planning.....	103
b.	Contract Administration .....	104
c.	Contract Closeout.....	105
D.	ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS.....	105
E.	SUMMARY .....	106
V.	ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION OF CONTRACTING AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTO JOINT PLANNING .....	107
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	107
B.	DOTMLPF-P ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING INTEGRATION.....	107
1.	Introduction.....	107
2.	Doctrine.....	108
3.	Organization.....	116
a.	Placement of Contracting .....	117
b.	Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office .....	121
4.	Training .....	124
5.	Materiel.....	125
6.	Leadership and Education .....	125
7.	Personnel.....	126
a.	Personnel Authority Level and Experience .....	127
8.	Facilities .....	132
9.	Policy .....	132
C.	SUMMARY .....	133
VI.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	135

A.	INTRODUCTION.....	135
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS .....	135
C.	RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH.....	136
1.	Introduction.....	136
2.	Recommendation 1: Operationalize Contracting by Recognizing it as a Line of Effort .....	136
3.	Recommendation 2: Do Not Treat Operational Contract Support as a Separate Distinct Function .....	137
4.	Recommendation 3: Ensure the Appropriate Personnel Are in the Right Place at the Right Time to Integrate Contingency Contracting Into Joint Operation Planning .....	139
5.	Recommendation 4: Reorganize the DoD to Acknowledge and Elevate the Importance of Contingency Contracting.....	140
a.	Introduction.....	140
b.	Create a J10 Directorate.....	141
c.	Begin Filling the Deputy Director J4 Positions with Contracting Personnel.....	143
6.	Recommendation 5: Ensure the Military School Systems Incorporate OCS Education .....	144
D.	SUMMARY .....	145
VII.	SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .....	147
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	147
B.	SUMMARY .....	147
C.	CONCLUSION .....	148
D.	AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	149
APPENDIX A. DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENT SECTION 854 OF THE JOHN WARNER NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007 .....		151
APPENDIX B. SECDEF MEMORANDUM, <i>STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT (OCS) AND WORKFORCE MIX</i> (SECDEF, 2011).....		153
APPENDIX C. CJCS MEMORANDUM, <i>IMPLEMENTATION OF SECDEF MEMORANDUM ON STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT AND WORKFORCE MIX</i> .....		157
APPENDIX D. DODI 3020.41, DECEMBER 20, 2011, ENCLOSURE 4 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011).....		161
APPENDIX E. OCS ANALYST AND PLANNER SKILL SETS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (FROM JOINT STAFF J4, 2012) .....		175
APPENDIX F. OCS COMPETENCY MODEL (JOINT STAFF J4, 2012).....		179
APPENDIX G. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.....		183
APPENDIX H. LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS .....		187

<b>APPENDIX I. INTERVIEWEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DOD.....</b>	<b>193</b>
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>197</b>
<b>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....</b>	<b>205</b>

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## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Purchasing's Roles and Responsibilities: Strategic vs. Tactical (From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 42).....	7
Figure 2.	Purchasing's Communications Flows and Linkages (From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 120) .....	9
Figure 3.	Purchasing at Different Organizational Levels (From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 169) .....	10
Figure 4.	Examples of Military Operations (From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011b, p. I-15) .....	18
Figure 5.	Example JTSCC Organizational Structure (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 37).....	22
Figure 6.	Four Contracting Phases of a Contingency (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 112) .....	24
Figure 7.	Integration Cell Architecture (Future State-Notional) (From Blake, 2012, p. 24) .....	28
Figure 8.	Historical Perspective of the Battlefield (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010, p. 3) .....	30
Figure 9.	Contractors in Contingency Operations (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a, p. 4).....	32
Figure 10.	Organization of the Department of Defense (From Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning, 2012).....	34
Figure 11.	Combatant Command Reporting Organization (From Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 144).....	37
Figure 12.	Traditional Combatant Command Joint Staff Organization (From Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 125) .....	38
Figure 13.	Command Relationship Synopsis (From CJCS, 2011b, p. III-3) .....	40
Figure 14.	Contracting Command Versus Contracting Authority (From Scott, 2012 .....	41
Figure 15.	Operational Art (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-2).....	43
Figure 16.	Joint Planning and Execution Community (From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-12) .....	44
Figure 17.	National Strategic Direction (From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-5) .....	45
Figure 18.	Levels of Planning Detail (After CJCS, 2011a, p. II-24).....	46
Figure 19.	Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison (From CJCS 2011a, p. II-30) .....	48
Figure 20.	Developing the Operational Approach (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-3).....	49
Figure 21.	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure System Analysis (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-10) .....	50
Figure 22.	Notional Operation Plan Phases (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-39) .....	51
Figure 23.	Contractor Support within Tier I Joint Capability Areas (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a, p. iv) .....	68
Figure 24.	OCS SECDEF Action Memo (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011, p. 4).....	71
Figure 25.	Original Organizational Makeup for the CASO (After Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base, n.d., p. 7) .....	73

Figure 26.	JCASO Evolution (From Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, 2012, p. 3) .....	74
Figure 27.	JCASO Support Configuration During Contingency Operations (From CJCS, 2011c, p. A-5) .....	75
Figure 28.	Joint Contracting Command—Iraq Organizational Chart (From Cunnane, 2005, p. 52) .....	88
Figure 29.	Contracting Command and Control as a Result of FRAGO 09–117 (From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012).....	89
Figure 30.	JCC-I/A Support Structure (From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012) .....	91
Figure 31.	JCC-I/A Theater Support—January 2010 (From W.N. Phillips, personal communication, 2012) .....	93
Figure 32.	2012 C-JTSCC Structure (From C-JTSCC, 2012b) .....	95
Figure 33.	List of Iraq/Afghanistan Contracting Commanders.....	96
Figure 34.	Contracting is More than Writing Contracts (From Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 94) .....	111
Figure 35.	Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations (From Yoder, 2005, p. 17) .....	129

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACC	U.S. Army Contracting Command
ADUSD (PS)	Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense (Program Support)
AMC	U.S. Army Material Command
AO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASA-ALT	Assistant Secretary of the Army–Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
AT&L	Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics
BG	Brigadier General
BPLAN	Base Plan
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulation
C2	Command and Control
CAF	Contractors Accompanying the Workforce
CAP	Civilian Augmentation Program
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CASO	Contingency Acquisition Support Office
CBP	Capability-Based Planning
CCAS	Contingency Contract Administration Services
CCDR	Combatant Command Commander
CCO	Contingency Contracting Officer
CDR	Commander
CENTCOM	Central Command
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFAR	Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSN	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice
CJIATF	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
CJOA	Combined/Joint Operations Area
C-JTSCC	CENTCOM–Joint Theater Support Contracting Command
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA-IG	Coalition Provisional Authority’s Office of Inspector General
CPO	Chief Procurement Officer
CSB	Contracting Support Brigades

CUL	Common User Logistics
CWC	Commission on Wartime Contracting
DA&M	Director of Administration and Management
DASD (PS)	Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Program Support)
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
DCCH	Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOM	Directorate of Management
DoS	Department of State
DOTmLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities–Policy
DPAP	Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy
DUSD	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
DUSD (IP)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy)
EA	Executive Agent
EBC	Effects-Based Contracting
ECC	Expeditionary Contracting Command
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FCIB	Functional Capabilities Integration Board
FO	Flag Officer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GAO	U.S.Government Accountability Office
GCC	Geographical Combatant Command
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEN	General
GO	General Officer
HCA	Head of Contracting Activity
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
HSC	Homeland Security Council
HSS	Health Service Support
IG	Inspector General
IPE	Integrated Planner and Executor
IRRF	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JAC	Joint Acquisition Command
JCA	Joint Capability Area

JCASO	Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JCC	Joint Contracting Command
JCC-I	Joint Contracting Command–Iraq
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration Development System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JETD	Joint Exercise and Training Division
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JLPSB	Joint Logistic Procurement Support Board
JOA	Joint Area of Operation
JOPEs	Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JOPP	Joint Operational Planning Process
JP	Joint Publication
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTSCC	Joint Theater Support Contracting Command
KO	Contracting Officer
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
LOE	Line of Effort
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOO	Line of Operation
LTG	Lieutenant General
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAJCOM	Major Command
MAWS	Money as a Weapon System
MSEL	Master Scenario Event List
MG	Major General
MICC	Mission and Installation Contracting Command
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps–Iraq
MNF	Multi-National Forces
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces–Iraq
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MST	Mission Support Teams
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NSC	National Security Council

OCS	Operational Contract Support
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFPP	Office of Federal Procurement Policy
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OND	Operation New Dawn
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPORD	Operations Order
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PARC-F	Principle Assistant Responsible For Contracting–Forces
PARC-R	Principle Assistant Responsible For Contracting–Reconstruction
PCO	Project Contracting Office
PMO	Program Management Office
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Execution
RADM	Rear Admiral (Upper Half)
RCA	Root Cause Analysis
RCC	Regional Contracting Center
RDML	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)
SCO-A	Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan
SCO-I	Senior Contracting Official–Iraq
SCO-Q	Senior Contracting Official–Qatar
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SME	Subject-Matter Expert
SPO	Special Plans and Operations
TACON	Tactical Control
TCN	Third Country National
TF	Task Force
TFWC	Task Force on Wartime Contracting
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
U.S.	United States
U.S.C.	<i>United States Code</i>
UJTL	Uniform Joint Task List
USA	United States Army
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USF-I	United States Forces–Iraq

USFOR-A	United States Forces–Afghanistan
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UTC	Unit Type Code
VCJCS	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
WOG	Whole of Government
YTTM	Yoder Three-Tier Model

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. BACKGROUND**

As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved over the past 11 years, so too have contingency contracting operations. Not only have there been changes to the scope of what is expected from contingency contracting officers, but there has been a paradigm shift regarding the use of contracting as a battlefield enabler.

The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and reductions left many capability gaps, and the increased need for contracted support. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) only magnified the Department of Defense's (DoD's) reliance on contracted support, and forced needed focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of contingency contracting activities. What was once viewed as administrative purchasing execution is now recognized as a non-kinetic weapon requiring significant planning, integration, and synchronization throughout all phases of operations.

In 2004, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) was created as the unifying effort for all contracting activities within Iraq and Afghanistan (Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA], 2006). In 2010, JCC-I/A was re-designated as the Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC). Since its inception, the organization has been commanded by general officers from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force and is responsible for awarding over \$758 billion in contracts (Commission on Wartime Contracting [CWC] in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2012). As operations come to a close in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is imperative that we capture the contracting lessons learned from the senior contracting and operational stakeholders responsible for operations.

## **B. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this research is to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for two primary reasons. The first reason is to document the history and evolution of

CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC); and the second, to use the consolidated lessons learned to shape recommendations to improve future contingency contracting operations.

Significant amounts of research and documentation encompassing all areas of contingency contracting, from individual training to strategic planning, have been published. However, no consolidated publication exists that captures lessons learned from the strategic leaders who have overseen the evolution of contingency contracting operations and doctrine during Iraq and Afghanistan. This research captures those lessons learned, evaluates them compared to current doctrine and policy, and determines if changes are needed to better support future contingency operations, regardless of the scale.

As learning institutions, it is imperative that we reflect on our experiences during the past 10 years to assess the impact and understand both our strengths and weaknesses. This is necessary to see ourselves so we can determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last decade. This will enable us to promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define us as a profession, and develop our future leaders. (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3)

### **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The primary research question is, what conclusions and recommendations can be derived from assessing strategic lessons learned from contracting operations in OIF, OND, and OEF to improve contingency contracting operations in the future? The secondary research question is as follows: How did the organization and operations of C-JTSCC evolve since its inception in 2004?

### **D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS**

We wrote this research with the assumption that the reader has a basic understanding of the military's organization and structure, to include the basic functions of each staff element. Additionally, we assume the reader understands contracting's relevancy on the battlefield, and the need for research and improvement based on the DoD's increasing reliance on contracted support.

With this research, we focus primarily on lessons learned from strategic leaders involved with contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary focus is on preparatory contracting functions required for the execution of contingency operations. This research does not focus on “how” contracts were executed, but rather on the strategic oversight and management of contingency contracting operations.

The results of our research uncovered many areas of improvement. Regrettably, resource and time constraints required us to limit our primary focus to specific trend areas. While we focused on identifying the common themes in the data, we did not fully analyze all of them, nor did we make recommendations about each theme. The common themes not explored in detail in this paper are submitted as recommendations for further research.

## **E. METHODOLOGY**

In conducting research for this project, we used multiple forms of data. First, we completed a literature review of academic sources, DoD doctrine and publications, policy, government and third-party reports, websites, and articles relating to contracting, contingency contracting, operational contract support (OCS), and joint operations. The literature review provided the framework for representative interview questions relating to contingency contracting and OCS. Second, we conducted interviews with previous commanders of CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC), senior contract officials, supported commanders, Secretariat staff, Joint Staff J4 (OCS), commissioners, and other supporting agencies.

We utilized two basic frameworks to categorize our data. First, for findings related to other than contract-actions, we used a common DoD problem-solving construct used to evaluate non-materiel solutions for the DoD comprised of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPP-P). And second, for findings related to contract actions, we utilized the six-phase contract management process to categorize the data. Further information regarding the interview process and data analysis is presented in Chapter III, Methodology.

## **F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT**

The organization of this report is presented in what we believe to be a logical manner. In Chapter I, we outline the structure and direction of the report. In Chapter II, we provide a literature review, laying the foundation for the direction of the research. We discuss an industry perspective of contracting versus the DoD perspective, the evolution of contingency contracting, findings of multiple federal agencies regarding contingency contracting, and the current status of each DOTmLPF-P element. In Chapter III, we provide details on the methodology used for interviews and data analysis. Chapter IV includes a presentation of the findings, beginning with a history of C-JTSCC, followed by the findings for each of the DOTmLPF-P and six-phase contract management process categories, concluded with a root cause analysis. In Chapter V, we provide a detailed analysis of the integration of contracting and operational contract support into the joint operation planning process. In Chapter VI, we present our recommendations. And our summary, conclusion, and areas for further research are found in Chapter VII.

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we provide a foundation in how contracting influences organizations, both within industry and the DoD, and explore published research and documents regarding contracting and operational contract support. First, we present an industry perspective of contracting and how it is integrated into strategic and operational planning and execution. Second, we evaluate the same elements from a DoD perspective. Third, we analyze published reports from federal and federally directed agencies that evaluated contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, we outline the existing DoD doctrine, policies, organizational structures, and training. By building our literature review in this fashion, we provide a current snapshot of contracting and the environment in which it exists within industry, the DoD, and, ultimately, the battlefield.

### **B. CONTRACTING IN INDUSTRY**

#### **1. Introduction**

Industry has understood, for many years, that contract management can positively (or negatively) affect an organization's bottom line. Many successful models of contracting support, processes, and integration have been developed by industry. As a result, multiple U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) reports, Inspector General (IG) reports and third-party studies have been conducted regarding the application of commercial practices within the DoD. It is important to understand that successes within industry can be applied within the DoD to create a more effective organization. Many initiatives to bring commercial acquisition processes have been supported by the DoD and are finding success. One area receiving little focus in the application of commercial practices is contingency contracting

#### **2. Evolution of Industry Perspective**

The past decade has seen a significant shift in how industry views purchasing. Industrialization, multiple conflicts, and globalization led to an increased focus on the

value of purchasing in regard to operational success. A common theme regarding today's purchasing environment is that "purchasing must continue to become more integrated with customer requirements, as well as with operations, logistics, human resources, finance, accounting, marketing, and information systems" (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, & Patterson, 2011, p. 27).

It is important to understand the basic purchasing principles within industry. Purchasing is not only a functional activity, but a functional group found on the organizational chart. The purchasing group is responsible for many aspects of purchasing outside of the day-to-day operations of procurement. Supply management, which is "a strategic approach to planning for and acquiring the organization's current and future needs through effectively managing the supply base, utilizing a process orientation in conjunction with a cross-functional team to achieve the organizational mission" (Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 10–11), is the responsibility of the purchasing group. Supply management requires the purchasing department not only to focus on purchasing activities, but to apply a strategic orientation to accomplishing the organization's mission.

### **3. Purchasing Process, Objectives, and Responsibilities**

Industry takes a holistic approach to purchasing, incorporating not only tactical objectives but strategic objectives into the mission of the purchasing group. *Purchasing & Supply Chain Management* (Fifth Edition; Monczka et al., 2011) defines the purchasing process as a process "used to identify user requirements, evaluate the user needs effectively and efficiently, identify suppliers who can meet those needs, develop agreements with those suppliers, develop the ordering mechanism, ensure payment occurs promptly, ascertain that the need was effectively met, and drive continuous improvements" (p. 41). During the process, consideration is given to not only the satisfaction of internal customers with the product or service, but also their satisfaction with the process. The objectives of the purchasing group have grown beyond simply obtaining goods and services, and, instead, the purchasing group now has multiple objectives relating to the overall success of an organization. Purchasing objectives now include maintaining supply continuity, managing the sourcing process efficiently and

effectively, developing supply base management, developing aligned goals with internal stakeholders, and developing integrated purchasing strategies that support organizational goals and objectives (Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 42–44).

As previously stated, the purchasing group has both tactical and strategic responsibilities. Figure 1 provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities identified for the purchasing group. These roles and responsibilities outline how purchasing has become a key player in enabling an organization's competitive advantage and improving success. In fact, a significant number of companies have added a chief procurement officer that reports directly to the chief executive officer (Nelson, 2006).




Figure 1. Purchasing's Roles and Responsibilities: Strategic vs. Tactical  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 42)

Supply base management is identified as one of the responsibilities of purchasing and is achieved with supply integration. Supply integration is a complex endeavor

requiring the management of both suppliers and internal customers. “Integration spans a number of areas, including operating strategy development, finance, engineering, logistics, service operations, production, new-product development, and customer service” (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 117). This integration includes synthesizing both internal and external stakeholders. One of the key internal stakeholders for supply management is the operations group. The development of global operations strategy is a critical link between supply management and operations. Supply management strategy must be aligned with operations strategy and plans. Because of this link, supply management often reports directly to operations. Integration with the other organizational groups is important as well. Figure 2 shows purchasing’s communications flows and linkages. These are essential to understanding how important it is to fully integrate supply management within an organization.




Figure 2. Purchasing's Communications Flows and Linkages  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 120)

#### 4. Industry Policies, Procedures, and Organization

Similar to the DoD, industry creates and implements policies and standard operating procedures. Industry policies outline items such as those defining the roles of purchasing, the conduct of personnel, social and minority business objectives, buyer-seller relationships, and operational issues. Specifically, those policies related to the roles of purchasing outline the lines of purchasing authority, objectives of the group, and responsibilities of each level of the purchasing group (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 92). These policies provide guidance regarding how and where purchasing is placed within the organization, and give insight into the value that the organization places on purchasing as part of its overall strategy.

Purchasing can be an upper-level function, a second-tier function, or a lower-level function. One study found that “having a higher-level procurement officer who makes regular presentations to the president or chief executive officer is the design feature that correlates highest with the achievement of procurement and supply objectives” (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 168). This study supports the idea that the relative importance of purchasing’s impact on organizational goals is reflected in its location in the organizational structure. Figure 3 shows purchasing at different functional levels.




Figure 3. Purchasing at Different Organizational Levels  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 169)

## **5. Integrative Strategy Development**

As discussed, several factors impact how purchasing is integrated into organizational strategy development. There are several different layers of strategy within an organization. Corporate strategies define the business the company is involved with and how resources are acquired and allocated within the different business units. Business unit strategies outline the scope of each business unit, how it links with the overall corporate strategy, and how each unit will gain competitive advantage. And finally, functional strategies identify how the unit will support the business-level strategies and how the function will complement other functional strategies. When corporate strategies are filtered to all levels of functional planning and used as the basis for individual strategy development, this process is considered to be integrative planning. Integrative planning ensures that those people responsible for the implementation of the corporate strategies have significant input into them (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 193).

## **C. CONTRACTING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

### **1. Introduction**

As profit-driven organizations, the commercial industry recognizes the significance of integrative planning for purchasing activities. The savings recognized are directly related to an increase in the bottom line. As a public agency, the DoD does not have this direct correlation between savings and the bottom line, leaving purchasing or contracting often viewed by the operational community as an administrative function necessary to accomplish certain outcomes. However, in recent years, the importance of contracting has become apparent, due to the DoD's heavy reliance on contract support during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this section, we provide an overview of the roles and responsibilities of DoD contracting within the DoD, the organizational structure, and command versus contracting authority.

### **2. DoD Contracting Roles and Responsibilities**

While commercial companies formulate contracting policies and procedures to support their overall mission and vision, DoD contracting is governed by the Federal

Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2012) System. The FAR System includes the FAR and all agency-issued FAR supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS; 2012). The FAR (2012) is chapter 1 of Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), and the DFARS (2012) is chapter 2.

The FAR identifies slight nuances regarding specific roles and responsibilities within the acquisition community. It is important to understand these in order to understand current operations.

Acquisition, as defined by FAR 2.101 (2012), is

the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.

On the other hand, contracting is defined as

purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contracting includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. (FAR, 2012, 2.101)

There is a slight nuance in the definitions that has significant implications. Contracting is not responsible for determining requirements; the requiring activity is. However, contracting does carry some of the responsibility for defining the validated requirement. Requirements definition is a team effort, comprised of the requiring activity, contracting, and other organizations as necessary. The team works in concert to define, validate, contract, inspect, accept, and pay for requirements. The FAR (2012) states that defining the “acquisition team” is important to ensure that all participants are identified. The team is identified as all those involved, starting with the customer through to the

contractor that is providing the item or service. It also states that members must be empowered to make acquisition decisions within their realm of responsibilities and that authority and accountability should be delegated as far down in the system as possible. In addition to using law and regulations to guide decisions, the team must also use sound business judgment (FAR, 2012). FAR 1.102–4(e) specifically states, “contracting officers should take the lead in encouraging business process innovations and ensuring that business decisions are sound.” This statement supports the newly developed path and identity that DoD contracting is facing.

DoD acquisition programs are governed by the Defense Acquisition System, as directed in the DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000 series, which provides for a structured management process. Dedicated program offices are authorized, and a program manager retains responsibility for the success or failure of the program. In contrast, contracting efforts for day-to-day operations and maintenance of the force are not managed in this highly regulated and directed manner. At military installations, it is common for the contracting officer to act as the central coordinator (pseudo program manager) for the acquisition process. Per FAR 1.602 (2012), contracting officers (KOs) are appointed in writing by the agency head, and are responsible for “ensuring performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and safeguarding the interest of the United States in its contractual relationship.” The interpretation of “all necessary action for effective contracting” impacts the role of KOs within the organization.

Historically, contracting has been viewed as an administrative function, not critical to mission success. KOs were process oriented and risk adverse, focusing on the fundamental processes of contracting. However, with the DoD’s increased reliance on contractors, the expectations placed on the KO have changed, and KOs are now expected to act as business advisors, integrating their functions with the goals and objectives of the organization (Nelson, 2006). This shift required the DoD to begin approaching contracting as a core competency (Kelmen, 2001). To evaluate this new paradigm, it is important to understand the organizational structure of DoD contracting.

### **3. DoD Contracting Organizational Structure**

#### ***a. DoD Contracting Authority***

The authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States is considered an inherently governmental function that requires explicit written authorization (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], 2011). Per FAR 1.601 (2012), the authority and responsibility to contract is vested in the agency head, which in the case of the DoD is the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This authority flows from the SECDEF to the heads of the departments and agencies. DFARS 202.101 (2012) contains a list of current contracting activities within the DoD that have been delegated contracting authority. Each department and agency head is authorized to delegate contracting authority within their applicable activity.

This delegation flow is how KOs receive their express authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the DoD. FAR 1.601 (2012) states that agency heads formally delegate contracting authority through a formal chain of command (Smith, 2005). It is important to understand that there is a difference between the contracting authority chain of command, and the command and control chain of command, which will be discussed later in this literature review. For purposes of this review, we will focus on the flow of contracting authority for military agencies responsible for contracted mission and installation support, as well as contracted expeditionary support.

#### ***b. Department of the Army Contracting Organization***

DFARS 202.101 (2012) identifies 18 different contracting activities within the United States Army (USA). Each of these activities performs authority delegation through individual chains of command to the assigned KOs. USA contracting underwent a major organizational restructuring in 2008 as a result of the findings in the final report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (2007), also known as the Gansler Commission.

In 2007, the Secretary of the Army assigned an independent commission to evaluate Army acquisition operations. The intent was to provide recommendations for the future development of the workforce and improve effectiveness and efficiency. The

final report became known as the *Gansler Report*, and it identified four key improvement areas (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management, 2007). They are the following:

1. Increase acquisition workforce, both military and civilian;
2. Restructure the organization to support home station and contingency operations;
3. Develop a training program for contingency contracting operations; and
4. Obtain policy and regulatory assistance to improve contracting effectiveness.

The report stated, “The Army is the DoD ‘Executive Agent’ for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is unable to fill military or civilian contracting billets, in either quantity or qualification” (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management, 2007).

In response to the recommendations, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) was established as a subordinate command to U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). ACC is composed of two subordinate commands—the Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) and the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). MICC is responsible for installation contracting, while ECC is responsible for expeditionary contracting (ACC, 2012). Since its inception, ACC has grown substantially. The *Gansler Report* served as a wake-up call to the Army, and many changes were implemented to improve its acquisition workforce.

***c. Department of the Navy Contracting Organization***

DFARS 202.101 (2012) identifies 12 contracting activities for the U.S. Navy (USN), including two U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) activities. The organizational structure of the USN contracting activities supports the expeditionary nature of the USN and USMC missions.

***d. Department of the Air Force Contracting Organization***

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has 19 identified contracting activities in DFARS 202.101 (2012). The Major Commands (MAJCOMs) are identified, and

installations and programs are assigned to the MAJCOM. The MAJCOM is then responsible for the majority of all buying activities for all identified installations within its command.

*e. Acquisition Planning within the DoD*

Planning for acquisitions in the DoD can take different forms based on the requirement. FAR 2.101 (2012) defines acquisition planning as

the process by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall strategy for managing the acquisition.

There are three key processes that work in concert to plan and integrate acquisition programs within the DoD: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); the Defense Acquisition System; and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). The JCIDS process is used to identify, assess, validate, and prioritize capability requirements. The DoD 5000 series governs the Defense Acquisition System, which is the management process that guides all DoD acquisitions programs. And the PPBE is the process by which the DoD allocates resources. These three processes form the framework to deliver timely and cost-effective capabilities to the warfighter (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2012).

Planning at the operational level for day-to-day mission support is less formal and guided by the FAR, DFARS, and individual department procedures. This guidance does not focus on integrating contracting into strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level mission planning.

## **D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE DOD**

### **1. Introduction**

Now that we have laid the foundation for contracting within industry and the DoD, we shift our focus to contingency contracting. While there are differences, it truly is the same processes in a different environment with different challenges. Contracting in contingency operations is not a new concept; however, the past 11 years of operations

have opened the aperture to the importance of fully understanding how to effectively integrate contract support into contingency planning. In this section, we define contingencies, describe the types of contingency contracting support and organizational structures, and discuss the phases of contingency operations and the evolution of theater contract support.

## **2. Definition**

Contracting, as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2012), is obtaining supplies or services from non-federal sources. This definition encompasses everything from the refinement of the requirement to the administration of the contract. Contingency contracting encompasses the same responsibilities; however, the governing regulations, environment, and available resources are modified. A contingency can either be declared or non-declared (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2012b). The FAR 2.101 (2012) defines a declared contingency as,

A military operation that—

- (1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or
- (2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of 10 U.S.C., chapter 15 of 10 U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.

The formal declaration of a contingency is important to a contingency contracting officer (CCO) because it is a trigger for increased thresholds and accessibility to more flexible and streamlined acquisition processes to respond to the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of contingency operations. While CCOs also support non-declared contingencies, they are not afforded the use of the same regulatory relief as in a non-declared situation (DPAP, 2012b). Figure 4 provides a list of examples of military operations, all of which CCOs are called to support.



Figure 4. Examples of Military Operations (From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011b, p. I-15)

In addition to the multiple types of operations that CCOs may support, the contracting environment can be either mature or immature. A mature contracting environment is characterized by an established supply chain that can rapidly respond to changes and has a vendor base with an understanding of the federal contracting process. An immature contracting environment has little to no infrastructure established and very few vendors capable of supporting requirements (DPAP, 2012b).

### **3. Types of Contingency Contracting Support and Organizational Structures**

#### ***a. Types of Contingency Contracting Support***

For the different type of operations, the size, scale, and nature of applicable tasks and objectives will determine whether a single-Service force can accomplish the mission or if a joint force headquarters is required (CJCS, 2011a). Due to the fact that contract authority follows a separate flow than command authority, similar standards apply to the contracting support organization of an operation. Before we discuss the types of contract support organizations, it is important to distinguish between the different types of contract support commonly provided during a contingency. There are three categories of support contracts: external support contracts, systems support contracts, and theater support contracts. As previously discussed, contracting authority flows through the Services and is not typically associated with the contingency being directly supported. This means multiple Head of Contracting Activities (HCA) may have

contracts supporting a contingency, thus increasing the difficulty of management and oversight of contingency planning and support (DPAP, 2012b).

External support contracts are awarded outside of theater and are owned by a specific Service. The contracts are awarded under the contract authority of the owning Service or agency, and can vary in type and scope. Civilian Augmentation Program (CAP) contracts owned by the Services are an example of external support contracts. Other examples are construction support contracts written by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE), and fuel contracts awarded by the Defense Energy Support Center. These contracts are typically used to provide logistical support and selected non-logistical support to the joint forces (DPAP, 2012b).

Systems support contracts provide technical support, maintenance, and, at times, repair parts for military weapons and support systems deployed into theater. These contracts are owned by the acquisition program management office (PMO), and fall under the HCA authority assigned to the particular PMO. These contracts are typically awarded with the original system award and are often not considered when planning for contingencies (DPAP, 2012b). An example of a systems support contract is a field service representative accompanying units to provide support to newly fielded weapons systems, to include aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated C2 systems (Joint Staff, 2008).

Theater support contracts are the only contracts awarded by contracting officers within the area of operation under the contracting authority assigned to the particular operation. For declared contingencies, these contracts are typically awarded utilizing expedited contracting authority and provide supplies, services, and construction from local and global commercial sources. These contracts are typically considered contingency contracts (DPAP, 2012b). Examples include contracts written to procure supplies, services, and construction in the operational area (Joint Staff, 2008).

#### ***b. Types of Contingency Contracting Organizational Structure***

Now that we have explained the different types of contingency support contracts, we will explain the three different contracting organizational structures

available for theater support contracts. Based on the scale of the mission, there are three contracting organizational structure options that may be utilized: a Service component provides support to its own forces; a lead Service component is designated as the component responsible for theater support contracting; or the most resource-demanding structure, a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, is established. Currently, these options generally would apply only to the joint task force (JTF) level, not to a geographic combatant command (GCC). While there is currently not one preferred option, it is possible that the organizational needs may evolve during the operation. The DPAP, Contingency Contracting, Additional Text website ([http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/html/additional\\_text.html](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/html/additional_text.html)) identifies factors considered when determining the organizational option:

- size, primary mission, and expected duration of the joint operation;
- scope criticality and complexity of the theater support contracting requirements;
- need for enhanced JFC control of the theater support contracting mission;
- location of supported units when compared to available commercial vendor base; and
- dominant user and most capable Service considerations. (DPAP, 2012a)

For smaller scale operations that are expected to be short in duration, the GCC normally allows Service components to provide contract support to their own forces. This organizational structure is also applicable to operations in which different Services will be operating in geographically separated areas. This structure limits the potential of competition among the Services for the same vendor base (DPAP, 2012b).

However, in joint operations where Services are working within the same area of the joint operations area (JOA) and theater support contracts are more complex, the designation of a lead Service component responsible for contracting may be more appropriate. This option will typically be used for long-term operations in which there is a need for the JFC to have consolidated contracting efforts. The lead Service maintains command and control of other identified Services, receives manning augmentation from the other Services, and is typically the Service responsible for common user logistics (CUL) within the JOA (DPAP, 2012b).

When operations become larger and more complex, the JFC may require more synchronized oversight that cannot be afforded by the previously explained organizational options. The establishment of a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) may become necessary when operational conditions are the following, although these conditions are not a requirement:

- an extremely complex operation that requires direct control of theater support contracting by the JFC commander;
- a mission of long-term duration;
- a mission that is beyond the capability of a single Service;
- a mission that requires significant coordination of contracting and civil–military aspects of the JFC’s campaign plan; and
- significant numbers of different Service forces operating in the same area or joint bases served by the same local vendor base.

When a JTSCC is established, it assumes command and control authority over designated theater support contract organizations within a designated area of operations. While the JTSCC performs the same function as a lead Service agency, the JTSCC reports directly to the JFC Commander versus the Service Component (DPAP, 2012b). DoD Directive 5101.1 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Administration and Management [OSD DA&M], 2002) defines a DoD Executive Agent (EA) as

the Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD components. The nature and scope of the DoD Executive Agent responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall

3.1.1. Be prescribed at the time of assignment.

3.1.2. Remain in effect until the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or supersedes them. (para. 3.1)

The JTSCC received HCA authority from one of the Services, typically the lead Service or executive agent for CUL (DPAP, 2012b). The EA for theater support contracting can be issued as well, in which case the EA will provide HCA authority to the

JTSCC (DoD, 2009). While no approved formal organizational structure for a JTSCC has been established, Figure 5 depicts a typical JTSCC structure.




Figure 5. Example JTSCC Organizational Structure (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 37)

Regardless of which contracting support organization is selected for a particular operation, planning for the preferred organizational structure should be considered and planned for prior to a contingency operation (DPAP, 2012b).

### c. *Service Theater Support Contracting*

When considering which organizational structure to utilize for a particular operation/mission, it is important for the JFC commander to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each Service in regard to theater support contracting capabilities. Each Service approaches the development, training, and deployment of its contracting personnel uniquely.

The U.S. Air Force has a large capacity for theater support contracting. Enlisted and officer military contracting professionals are developed early in their career and are afforded the opportunity to gain a significant depth of experience by spending the

majority of their careers in the contracting field. Individuals gain experience at installation contracting support offices, augmented by contingency contracting training. The force is structured to deploy under modular skill and capability mixes called unit type codes (UTCs). Considerations for AF deployment packages are typically based on skill levels versus rank. The enlisted contracting force is robust and very experienced (DPAP, 2012b).

As previously stated, the U.S. Army recently underwent a major contracting organizational restructuring. The new contingency contracting structure is a modular approach. Noncommissioned and commissioned officers are assigned to Contract Support Brigades (CSB), which are subordinate to Expeditionary Contracting Command. The CSBs are composed of contingency contracting battalions and contingency contracting teams. Department of the Army civilian contracting specialists are also utilized to augment the contingency contracting force structure (DPAP, 2012b).

The U.S. Navy does not have a dedicated contingency contracting force structure. As operations require support, naval officers and civilians assigned in contracting positions are deployed. Due to the expeditionary nature of the USN, it has a global logistic chain that it leverages to provide support to its forces (DPAP, 2012b).

The U.S. Marine Corps maintains a small number of CCOs to deploy as part of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The assigned CCOs develop a contract support plan identifying the number of personnel to be deployed (DPAP, 2012b).

As previously discussed, theater support contracting agencies are not the only contracting agencies providing support to the JOA. Two primary combat support agencies provide contracting support during contingencies, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

The DLA is responsible for providing worldwide logistics support during times of peace and war. The DLA maintains its own contracting authority and reports to the OUSD(AT&L) through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. In addition, the DoD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) under the DLA, to be discussed later in this review.

The DCMA is responsible for ensuring the cost, schedule, and performance of major DoD acquisition programs. The DCMA's primary responsibility during contingency operations is to provide contingency contract administration services (CCAS) for delegated contracts, whether they are external support, systems support, or theater support contracts.

#### 4. Contingency Contracting Support Phases

Four typical phases of contracting support occur during a contingency: mobilization and initial deployment, buildup, sustainment, and termination and redeployment. Research indicates the need for an additional phase, which is further discussed later in this review. Priorities and requirements are different for each phase, and the amount of time spent in each phase varies based on the operation. Figure 6 depicts the four phases, major requirements occurring during each phase, and areas that CCOs should focus attention on.




Figure 4. Phases of a Contingency

Figure 6. Four Contracting Phases of a Contingency (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 112)

Phase I, *mobilization and initial deployment*, is characterized by controlled chaos. Operations tempo is high and CCOs are typically focused on assessing available resources and obtaining required facilities and services to provide contracting support. Requirements focus on life-support items required to beddown initial forces, and expedited contract vehicles are frequently used (DPAP, 2012b).

Phase II, *buildup or joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration* (JRSOI), comprises the reception and beddown of the main force. Typically, additional contracting support arrives to assist with theater contract support. Priorities continue to focus on basic life support; however, efforts to establish command and control, requirements processes, and coordination should be a priority (DPAP, 2012b).

Phase III, *sustainment*, is characterized by the stabilization of contracting operations. Contracting support expands to enhance quality of life and more permanent facilities and services. In this phase, business practices, policies, and procedures should be active, and more emphasis should be placed on transitioning from short-term expeditious contracts to long-term contract vehicles. Efforts should be focused on expanding the vendor base and utilizing reach-back contracting capabilities when appropriate (DPAP, 2012b).

Phase IV, *termination and redeployment*, is characterized by the urgency to redeploy forces out of the JOA. New requirements continue, but shift focus to services and supplies supporting the redeployment of equipment and forces. CCOs must negotiate the termination of existing contracts, follow up on any open payments, and close out all contracts and claims. Preparation for Phase IV should be a consideration during Phase III by including the appropriate terms and conditions in contracts written to support the contingency operation (DPAP, 2012b).

## **5. Evolution of Theater Contract Support**

Historically, theater contract support provided basic logistics, life-support-type supplies and services, and minor construction. Contracts were often reactive to a need arising during operations and were rarely integrated into the planned phases of the operation. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan brought a

paradigm shift to contingency contracting and the role it plays in the potential success or failure of particular COIN missions. Joint Publication 1-02 (Joint Staff, 2010) defines COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” (p. 71). As operations progressed, strategic leaders recognized contracting not only as a key component to stabilizing the economy, but also as an enabler to successful kinetic and non-kinetic missions. Generals David Petraeus and James Amos formalized contracting’s role in tactical operations in FM 3-24, “Counterinsurgency,” published in December 2006 (Headquarters [HQ] Department of the Army). COIN requires not only fighting, but also rebuilding efforts. It combines offensive and defensive operations with stability operations, and varies depending on the specific mission. Contracting elements are identified as one of the key U.S. military capabilities in COIN operations, along with dismounted infantry, human intelligence, language specialists, military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical units, logistics support, and legal affairs. Economic development is a key logical line of operation (LOO) vital to restoring stability in an area, and contracting efforts can directly impact the growth of an economy through theater support contracts. CCOs have become a critical component of the combat forces and help to support tactical operations through the appropriate expenditure of funds for rebuilding efforts (HQ Department of the Army, 2006).

As the COIN manual was issued, the focus of contracting efforts on the ground was evolving. Effects-based contracting became a cornerstone of contracting strategy during the “enable civil authority phase” of operations in Iraq. The key to effects-based contracting is to ensure contracting representatives are incorporated early in the planning process for tactical operations (Poree, Curtis, Morrill, & Sherwood, 2008). Maj Gen (USAF Ret.) Darryl Scott stated, “synchronizing contract execution with a commander’s intent requires the contracting process to be an active part of operations/mission planning so that the desired operational and tactical goals are understood and translated into effective contracting actions” (DCMA, 2006, p. 26). The fact that contracting efforts were now considered to be “commander’s business” was reiterated with the publication of the COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance, issued on September 8, 2010

(Commander, International Security Assistance Force [COMISAF], 2010). GEN Petraeus' directive stated, "I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it." Contracting was recognized as a powerful enabler, representing both an opportunity and a threat (COMISAF, 2010). This possible threat underscored the need for integration of contracting into operational planning.

During his time as the Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan (SCO-A), Brigadier General Casey Blake took direct action to ensure contingency contracting operations were adapted in relation to the changes in battle-space conditions. In his article, *Putting Contracting on the Offensive in Afghanistan* (2012), Brig Gen Blake identified the need to implement new policies and procedures that account for the shift in the acquisition landscape. During the transition of operations from U.S./International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) to Afghan National Forces, senior maneuver commanders recognized the importance of the SCO-A mission. Additionally, contracting has become a "key force enabler" during the demobilization of the maneuver force. "In this capacity, contracting cannot abdicate its roles and responsibilities to better integrate the kinetic and non-kinetic battle-space; it is the catalyst for success" (Blake, 2012, p. 22).

To apply a quasi-DoDI 5000 approach to contracting operations, Brig Gen Blake created integration cells within the two largest regional command centers. The cells were comprised of a contracting officer, program manager, Afghan business advisor, and contractor support (primarily focused on minor works construction). "The primary focus in creating the integration cells was to provide acquisition advisory assistance to help better integrate kinetic and non-kinetic battle-spaces" (Blake, 2012, p. 23). Brig Gen Blake recognized there is a fundamental difference between kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Kinetic operations are governed by doctrine and nearly every aspect of offensive operations is accounted for in the governance. On the other hand, the non-kinetic is more difficult to synchronize and manage. Comprised of economic capacity building, stability operations, governance, the elimination of corruption, and many other

factors, the non-kinetic environment requires careful planning and preparation to ensure operations create the intended effects.

The integration cells provided an interim solution; however, Brig Gen Blake recommends that a program executive officer (PEO) be responsible for non-kinetic battle-space operations. This will provide the same effect and focus as the maneuver force. Figure 7 outlines the notional architecture for the management of the non-kinetic battle-space.




Figure 7. Integration Cell Architecture (Future State-Notional)  
(From Blake, 2012, p. 24)

## **6. Evolution of the Present Day Battlefield**

### ***a. Historical Overview of Contracting on the Battlefield***

Contingency contracting is not a new concept to military operations. References to the procurement of logistical support date back to 1775. Some early attempts to contract for logistical support ended in failure, but contingency contracting has been a key enabler since World War II (Luse, Madeline, Smith, & Starr, 2005). What has changed over time is the complexity and duration of services being contracted, as well as an increased reliance on contractors to support the logistic tail of military operations. One clear indicator of this heavy reliance is the contractor-to-military ratio during military operations (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a). Two trends have led to a high degree of reliance on contractors: the downsizing of military forces, and a trend toward shifting performance of government functions to the private sector (Dunn, 2005). Additionally, the increasing contractor-to-military ratio can be attributed to other factors including the shift to an all-volunteer force, increased reliance on technically complex weapon systems and equipment, and decreasing budgets (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a). Figure 8 provides a historical view of the ratio for previous conflicts.




Figure 8. Historical Perspective of the Battlefield  
 (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010, p. 3)

The extended duration of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provided the DoD the first view of the full effect of this increased reliance. Contractors are a force-multiplier that are now being used to fill critical capability gaps when it is considered not cost effective to create the organic capability (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a). Contractors are no longer supporting only logistics; instead, contract support now spans the spectrum of combat support and combat service support. At times, the decision to contract services, such as security, has been directly related to congressionally mandated ceilings governing the number of military forces in the operational area. Some research shows that contract support has become the default solution during contingency operations due to the ease of use and quick fulfillment of immediate needs.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century total force represents a shift from traditional military operations (Commission on Wartime Contracting [CWC] in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b). Today's total force is comprised of active and reserve military components, civil servants, and contractors. Considerations for the employment, deployment, and support of the new total force must be taken into consideration during operational planning (DoD, 2006).

The DoD has been required to increase focus on the robust nature of what is now being called the *fifth force* (contractors). At times during contingency operations, the fifth force may equal or exceed its military counterparts. This brings about the need to plan support and management of contract personnel as part of the total force.

#### ***b. Contractors Accompanying the Force***

A full discussion of the implications of relying heavily on contracted support in contingency operations is too large for the scope of this research; however, we provide a brief overview of the overarching implications of having contracted support entering the JOA and the considerations for the CCDR and JFC CDR. Contractors accompanying the force (CAF) include employees of defense contractors and applicable

subcontract personnel, to include third country nationals (TCNs) and host nation (HN) personnel (OUSD[AT&L], 2005). Figure 9 depicts the current overview of contractors in contingency operations.




Figure 9. Contractors in Contingency Operations (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a, p. 4)

Deploying contractors and having them support military operations brings about special considerations. The contract between the defense contractor and the DoD provides the only source of the legal relationship between the parties. Different contracts provide for different types of government-provided sustainment and life support. Life support includes items such as medical support, housing, morale support, legal assistance, mortuary affairs, food services, and so forth. Generally, theater support contractors receive life support from local sources, system contractors are deployed to multiple locations within the JOA and receive life support from the unit they are assigned to, and external support contractors obtain life support from the Service Component Command or support themselves. The extent of the provided services is included in the contract

terms and conditions (Combined Arms Support Command, n.d.). Ensuring commanders at all levels understand the relationship with contractor personnel is an important aspect of managing contractors on the battlefield.

## **E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT**

### **1. Introduction**

Due to Service-unique capabilities and expertise, contingency contracting operations have become a joint endeavor. As such, it is important to understand the fundamental concepts associated with planning for and executing joint operations. In this section, we provide the basic framework for the joint organizational structure, joint operations, and joint operation planning.

### **2. Joint Organizational Structure**

In response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the DoD reorganized to enhance the effectiveness of military operations, which provided the foundation for today's organizational structure. Implementation of the act is an ongoing process that emphasizes the joint force continuing to be key to operational success and "the most effective force must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically" (CJCS, 2000 p. 2).

Figure 10 shows the current organization of the DoD and the span of control and influence of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).




Figure 10. Organization of the Department of Defense (From Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning, 2012)

**a. Department of Defense**

DoD Directive 5100.01 (OSD DA&M, 2010) identifies the functions of the DoD and its major components. The SECDEF is responsible for all functions of the DoD, which is comprised of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of the Inspector General (IG), the combatant commands, the military departments, the defense agencies, and the DoD field activities.

**b. Office of the Secretary of Defense**

The OSD is the principle staff element providing support for policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal and program evaluation and oversight, and interface with other U.S. government (USG) departments and international governments and agencies. The OSD also provides oversight of the defense agencies and DoD field activities (OSD DA&M, 2010).

*c. Joint Chiefs of Staff*

The JCS cooperates and coordinates with the OSD to provide staff assistance and is the immediate military staff of the SECDEF. The JCS is comprised of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the Military Service Chiefs. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, SECDEF, National Security Council (NSC), and Homeland Security Council (HSC). The CJCS also provides the communication link between the President and SECDEF and the commanders of the combatant commands (OSD DA&M, 2010). The advice provided by the CJCS represents the advice and opinions of the members of the JCS and combatant commanders (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The Joint Staff provides assistance to the CJCS in conducting its assigned responsibilities. The Joint Staff is comprised of military members from each military department and is directed by the CJCS. Directorates of the Joint Staff are responsible for translating the staff's planning, policies, intelligence, manpower, communications, and logistics functions into military support action. Each directorate has specific roles and responsibilities (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The directorates are as follows:

- Director of the Joint Staff,
- DOM—Directorate of Management,
- J1—Personnel and Manpower,
- J2—Intelligence,
- J3—Operations,
- J4—Logistics,
- J5—Strategic Plans and Policy,
- J7—Joint Force Development, and
- J8—Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment.

*d. Military Departments*

For all purposes other than operational direction, the chain of command for each military department runs from the President, to the SECDEF, to the military

department secretaries, to the chiefs of the Services. The Service chiefs are also members of the JCS under the CJCS and Vice Chairman of the JSC (VCJCS). Though dual-hatted, the responsibilities to the JCS take precedence. Each military department is led by a civilian secretary, with the authority and responsibility to manage the affairs of their respective Service. These responsibilities include recruiting, training, organizing, supplying, and equipping (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The military departments are also responsible for performing functions necessary to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands, including assigning forces (OSD DA&M, 2010).

*e. Combatant Commands*

Prior to the 1986 reorganization of the military in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (1986), the JCS maintained operational control of the military. Today, responsibility for conducting military operations flows from the President to the SECDEF, directly to the commanders of the unified combatant commands. Combatant commands are established by the President, through the SECDEF, and are responsible for performing assigned missions (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). Combatant commanders (CCDRs) are responsible for exercising authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) defines the command authority of the CCDR to give authoritative direction to subordinate commands to include the following:

- prescribing of the chain of command;
- organization of the commands and forces;
- employment of forces necessary for assigned missions;
- coordination and approval of administration, support, and discipline; and
- exercising of authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff.

A full list of CCDR functions is found in DoDD 5100.01 (OSD DA&M, 2010). Military departments assign forces to the combatant commands, while all unassigned personnel remain under the command authority of the military department. There are currently nine combatant commands, six geographical commands, and three functional commands (see Figure 11; Feickert, 2012).




Figure 11. Combatant Command Reporting Organization (From Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 144)

CCDR staffs closely reflect the directorates of the Joint Staff, but differ slightly depending on the specific mission. Figure 12 reflects a typical CCDR staff organization.




Figure 12. Traditional Combatant Command Joint Staff Organization (From Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 125)

#### *f. Types of Command Authority*

It is important to understand the different types of command authority in order to grasp the complications with contracting authority, discussed later in this paper.

Title 10, U.S.C., Section 164 (2012) provides CCDRs with combatant command authority (COCOM), which is not transferable or shared within the lower echelons in the chain of command. COCOM is the authority over assigned forces and is only exercised by the CCDRs. COCOM provides authority for the CCDR to perform functions such as organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over military operations, joint training, and logistics deemed necessary to support assigned missions. The authority to direct logistical support enables the CCDR to execute operations efficiently and

effectively, while minimizing duplication of effort among the Services. During peacetime, the CDR exercises appropriate authority, but refers disputes to the military departments for resolution. During crisis or war, the authority and responsibilities are expanded to include the use and direction of all facilities and supplies of all the forces assigned under the CDR's command (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011).

Operational control (OPCON) is another common level of authority utilized during joint military operations. The CDR may delegate OPCON authority to lower echelons. OPCON is typically delegated by the superior CDRs to CDRs of subordinate commands and joint task forces (JTFs) of assigned or attached forces. OPCON provides full authority to organize forces and assign tasks and objectives to accomplish an assigned mission. The CDR may retain or delegate OPCON or tactical control as necessary, and it can be limited by time, function, or location. OPCON does not include the authority over matters associated with administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011).

Tactical Control (TACON) is defined as “the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned” (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 99). By virtue of having COCOM or OPCON of Service-assigned or other combatant command-assigned capabilities, TACON can be delegated further down the chain within the same organization.

Figure 13 shows the chain of command and control relating command authority for a typical operation within a combatant command.




Figure 13. Command Relationship Synopsis  
(From CJCS, 2011b, p. III-3)

Further discussion in Chapter V outlines the correlation between the chain of command and control, flow of contracting authority within joint operations, and the associated joint planning considerations.

**g. Command Authority vs. Contracting Authority**

It is important to understand there is a difference between command and contract authority. Unifying and synchronizing contingency contracting activities in an area of operation becomes challenging due to different activities deriving their contract and command authorities from different organizations. Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) faced significant challenges early in its establishment due to this issue. Figure 14 provides a snapshot in 2006 of the command versus contract authority. Each head of

contracting activity is designated via a red line, and the assigned command or coordination authority is color coordinated in accordance with the key.




Figure 14. Contracting Command Versus Contracting Authority  
(From Scott, 2012)

### 3. Joint Operations

Joint doctrine provides a common framework for planning, training, and conducting military operations. Per Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine “represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right” (CJCS, 2009, p. ix). All JPs must be approved by the CJCS and serve as authoritative guidance to be used by the Joint Staff, CCDRs, subordinate unified CDRs, JTF CDRs, subordinate CDRs, and the military Services (CJCS, 2009, p. A-1). JP 1 is the capstone doctrine and provides “the overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States” (CJCS, 2009, p. I-1).

A fundamental principle identified in JP 1 is the fact that the U.S. conducts military operations as a joint force, and the document goes on to say,

“Joint” connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of military forces in joint operations, including matters relating to (1) national military strategy (NMS); (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; (3) command and control (C2) of joint operations; and (4) unified action with the U.S. interagency and intergovernmental communities, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and multinational forces (MNFs) and organizations. (CJCS, 2009, p. I-2)

The DoD has shifted toward capabilities-based planning (CBP) for force planning, which is a subset of joint strategic planning (CJCS, 2009, p. I-11). The framework and language forming the foundation for CBP is comprised of joint capability areas (JCAs). “JCAs are collections of like DoD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment, decision-making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning” (CJCS, 2009, p. I-11). JCAs are tiered, starting from a very broad category down to more specifically focused capabilities. There are nine Tier 1 JCAs: force support, battle-space awareness, force application, logistics, command and control, net-centric, protection, building partnerships, and corporate management (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a).

JP 3-0, Joint Operations (CJCS, 2011b), identifies three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. In regard to military operations, the strategic level provides “a set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (CJCS, 2011b, p. I-13). Operation level refers to the link between national and military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. And the tactical level is the “employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Joint doctrine focuses this term on planning and executing battles, engagement, and activities at the tactical level to achieve military objectives assigned to the tactical units or task forces (TFs)” (CJCS, 2011b, p. I-14). Leaders at the operational level utilize operational art to design, plan, and execute operations. Operational art refers to commanders and their staffs utilizing creativity, supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience, to design strategies and employ military forces. As part of operational art, operational design is

“the conception and construction of the intellectual framework that underpins joint OPLANs and their subsequent execution” (CJCS, 2011b, p. II-4). The operational approach is determined by combining operational art and operational design. Figure 15 depicts the essence of how operational art and operational design are utilized to determine the operational approach. “Together, operational art and operational design strengthen the relationship between strategy and tactics” (CJCS, 2011b, p. II-4).





Figure III-1. Operational Art

Figure 15. Operational Art (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-2)

#### 4. Joint Operation Planning

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (CJCS, 2011a), provides guidance to CCDRs and their subordinate joint force commanders for planning activities associated with joint military operations in response to contingencies and crises (p. I-1). All entities involved in joint operation planning are known collectively as the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Figure 16 identifies the participants in the joint planning process. Strategic guidance is provided by the President and the SECDEF.



**Figure II-4. Joint Planning and Execution Community**

Figure 16. Joint Planning and Execution Community  
(From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-12)

Joint operation planning takes place within Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX). APEX is “the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX is supported by communications and information technology that is used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, and executive mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations” (CJCS, 2011a, p. I-3). APEX supports the iterative nature of joint planning, and facilitates collaborative planning between the different echelons of command (CJCS, 2011a). Figure 17 shows the relationship between the different levels and products produced by each.



Figure II-1. National Strategic Direction

Figure 17. National Strategic Direction (From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-5)

“In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staff blend operational art, operational design, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) in complementary fashion as part of the overall process that produces the eventual plan or order that drives the joint operation” (CJCS, 2011a, p. I-5). JOPP is an analytical decision-making process consisting of seven logical steps: (1) planning initiation, (2) mission analysis, (3) course of action (COA) development, (4) COA analysis and wargaming, (5) COA comparison, (6) COA approval, and (7) plan or order development (CJCS, 2011a, p. IV-1).

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is part of APEX and is the system technology utilized to develop the plans and orders. Joint operation planning results in multiple planning and execution products that are created during deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning encompasses the planning efforts for non-crisis situations, and is used to develop theater and global campaign plans, along with a broad range of contingency plans. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions and should provide the framework for a seamless transition to CAP if a crisis arises. There are four levels of planning detail for contingency plans (CJCS, 2011a, pp. II-21–II-23). Figure 18 outlines each level in detail.

<b>Planning Detail</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Product</b>
<b>Level 1</b>	Least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to address a contingency	Commander's Estimate
<b>Level 2</b>	Describes the concept of operations (CONOPS), major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. Normally does not include annexed or a TPFDD.*	Base Plan (BPLAN)
<b>Level 3</b>	Acts as an abbreviated OPLAN. Will likely require considerable expansion or alteration to convert into an OPLAN or operation order (OPORD). Will typically have Annexes A, B, C, D, J, K, S, V, and Z. May have a TPFDD produced.	Concept Plan (CONPLAN)
<b>Level 4</b>	Is the complete/detailed joint plan. Contains the full description of CONOPS and all applicable annexes and a TPFDD. Can be quickly developed into an OPORD	Operation Plan (OPLAN)

\*Time-phased force and deployment data: The time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan or operation order, or ongoing rotation of forces

Figure 18. Levels of Planning Detail (After CJCS, 2011a, p. II-24)

Crisis action planning (CAP) takes place when an incident or situation occurs quickly and sets the conditions for the commitment of U.S. military forces and resources. There may be very little warning and these situations require expedited decision-making. CAP involves the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs. Deliberate planning is typically conducted for anticipated events, whereas CAP is based on the condition that exists during the planning (CJCS, 2011a). Figure 19 shows a comparison of deliberate and crisis action planning.

Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison			
	Deliberate Planning		Crisis Action Planning
Time available	As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6+ months)		Situation dependent (hours, days, up to 12 months)
Environment	Distributed, collaborative planning		Distributed, collaborative planning and execution
JPEC involvement	Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.)		Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.)
APEX operational activities	Situational awareness Planning		Situational awareness Planning Execution
APEX functions	Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment		Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment
Document assigning planning task	CJCS Issues: 1. JSCP 2. Planning directive 3. WARNORD (for short suspense planning)		CJCS Issues: 1. WARNORD 2. PLANORD 3. SecDef-approved ALERTORD
Forces for planning	Apportioned in JSCP		Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD
Planning guidance	CJCS Issues JSCP or WARNORD CCDR Issues PLANDIR and TPFDD LOI		CJCS Issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD CCDR Issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD and TPFDD LOI to subordinates, supporting commands, and supporting agencies
COA selection	CCDR selects COA and submits strategic concept to CJCS for review and SecDef approval		CCDR develops commander's estimate with recommended COA
CONOPS approval	SecDef approves CSC, disapproves or approves for further planning		President/SecDef approve COA, disapproves or approves further planning
Final planning product	Campaign plan Level 1–4 contingency plan		OPORD
Final planning product approval	CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for review and SecDef for approval		CCDR submits final plan to President/SecDef for approval
Execution document	Not applicable		CJCS Issues SecDef-approved EXORD CCDR Issues EXORD
<b>Legend</b>			
ALERTORD	alert order	JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution	LOI	letter of instruction
CCDR	combatant commander	PLANDIR	planning directive
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	PLANORD	planning order
COA	course of action	OPORD	operations order
CONOPS	concept of operations	SecDef	Secretary of Defense
CSC	commanders' strategic concept	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
EXORD	execution order		
JPEC	joint planning and execution community	WARNORD	warning order

Figure II-8. Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison

Figure 19. Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison  
(From CJCS 2011a, p. II-30)

The operational approach allows commanders to begin describing the possible combinations of actions needed to achieve a desired end state given the knowledge and understanding of the operational environment and the description of the tensions that describe the problem. This reflects the fact that the operational approach provides the framework behind the combination of tasks that describe the CONOPS for a particular end state (CJCS, 2011a). “The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of effort throughout the echelons of command and partner organizations” (CJCS, 2011a, p. III-15). Figure 20 depicts the process of developing the operational approach.




Figure III-2. Developing the Operational Approach

Figure 20. Developing the Operational Approach  
(From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-3)

Joint publication 5-0 (CJCS, 2011a) states, “The operational approach may be described using lines of operations (LOOs)/lines of effort (LOEs) to link decisive points to achievement of objectives” (p. III-16). Commanders synchronize activities along complementary LOOs to get to the end state. “A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions” (p. III-28). LOEs are an extremely

valuable tool to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multi-national forces and civilian organizations where unity of command is impractical. LOEs may cross more than one instrument of national power to support interagency coordination during execution. LOOs and lines of effort may be used together to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The combination of the two allows commanders to include nonmilitary activities into operational design. Figure 21 depicts decisive points, nodes, and links between the instruments of national power. The complex challenges faced by the U.S. require commanders to embrace the reality that interagency and multinational partners must be synchronized to create a coherent operational approach. Commanders make the determination when and how to incorporate these outside organizations, and must understand that the operational approach may end up being a consensus-based product (CJCS, 2011a).




Figure 21. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure System Analysis (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-10)

When planning operations, CCDRs apply a phasing model. JP 5-0 (CJCS, 2011a) outlines a notional phasing model comprised of six phases, distinct in time, space, and/or purpose. While activities during each phase may overlap, there should be clear conditions set for transition between the phases. Figure 22 provides a notional operation plan phasing model and the associated activities and levels of military effort during each phase.




Figure 22. Notional Operation Plan Phases (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-39)

Commanders are the central figure in creating operational design. They possess the experience to make judgments and decisions necessary to guide staff through the

process. As the complexity of a problem increases, the commander's role in early planning becomes more critical. Commanders understand that solutions must be tailored to each situation and draw on their own knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to generate a clear understanding of the conditions needed for success.

Additional information regarding joint operation planning can be found in JP 5–0 (CJCS, 2011a). While the information provided in this section is not a comprehensive discussion of the joint operation planning process, it provides a basic foundation to analyze the integration and synchronization of OCS and contingency contracting into the joint planning process.

## **F. MAJOR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES' OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS**

### **1. Introduction**

The increased reliance on contracted support early in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly increased the need for oversight and audit of contract operations. Approximately \$159 billion was awarded via contract or grant by the DoD, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development between 2002 and 2011, magnifying the need to ensure that appropriate management regulations were in place to avoid fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. A wide range of oversight controls and committees have been established to monitor operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 11 years. The vast number and nature of the reports makes it impossible to provide a thorough overview of all agencies and findings. In this section, we discuss major findings and observations made by the DoD Inspector General (IG), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

### **2. DoD Office of Inspector General**

There are numerous DoD IG reports evaluating contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, for the purpose of our research, we focus primarily on DoD IG Report No. D-2010–059, *Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform*, published

in 2010. This report was written to provide information to key players regarding systematic contracting issues identified within a three-year window (2007–2010). The report was a comprehensive evaluation of 32 DoD IG reports, two Special Plans and Operations (SPO) reports, and 19 Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) investigations, all conducted between October 2007 and April 2010. The DoD IG (2010) looked for systematic issues with contracting operations and identified five areas of needed improvement:

- **Requirements:** Agencies must ensure that they begin the acquisition process effectively by clearly defining what the requirements are. Unclear and changing requirements cause significant cost increases and administration issues.
- **Contracting Pricing:** CCOs failed to follow FAR (2012) requirements when establishing whether prices were fair and reasonable. The documentation maintained did not reflect proper competition or research to make these determinations.
- **Oversight and Surveillance:** Several examples were found identifying a lack of contract oversight and surveillance. Many contracts did not have a Quality Assurance and Surveillance Plan included, outlining what performance would be evaluated and how surveillance would be conducted.
- **Property Accountability:** As expenditures increased, so did the amount of government property in theater. CCOs were not monitoring property records, and many items have not been accounted for. The sheer volume and value of the property in theater requires active management and oversight.
- **Financial Management:** CCOs have not maintained appropriate control of vendor payments. Overpayments and outstanding payments have grown significantly.

While these challenge areas had been previously identified, this report provides a singular document covering the most common problems identified within contingency contracting operations. Despite the identification of issues, the covered reports had repeat findings year to year, leading one to believe that the corrective measure taken may not have been successful (DoD IG, 2010).

### 3. Government Accountability Office

The GAO, also known as the “congressional watchdog,” is a non-partisan independent organization assigned to Congress. The intent of the GAO is to evaluate how taxpayer dollars are spent and, based on findings, provide recommendations and advice to lawmakers and agency heads to improve operations. The GAO issues hundreds of reports and products per year (GAO, 2012). A quick advanced search of the GAO website reveals 139 GAO products related to some aspect of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the purpose of this research, we focus on a general overview of a few key areas for the GAO and some key findings from recent reports.

The GAO recognized the DoD’s reliance on contractors to support contingencies in the early 1990s and has since made many recommendations to improve contract planning, oversight, and management. In GAO-03–695, *Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans*, the GAO (2003) stated that the DoD utilized contractors with a wide variety of skills due to the limitation of forces and the lack of skill in areas such as communication services, interpreters, base operations services, intelligence analysis, and oversight over other contractors. In the report, the GAO (2003) made six executive recommendations:

- Enforce compliance with DoD Instruction 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DoD Contractor Services During Crises* (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy [ASD(FMP)], 1996).
- Develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DoDI 3020.37.
- Develop DoD-wide guidance on the use of contractors.
- Require the use of standardized deployment language in contracts that could potentially support deployed forces.
- Develop training for CDRs and other senior leaders deploying to areas with contract support.
- To provide visibility to CDRs, the Financial Management Regulations should identify the services provided and a list of contractor entitlements, and identify all contracts supporting contingency operations.

The GAO again highlighted the increased use of contractors in GAO-08–572T (2008), *Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine its Extensive Reliance on*

*Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight.* The GAO stated that the DoD's primary challenge with regard to the heavy reliance on contractors in contingency operations was the ability to provide effective management and oversight. The report specifically stated,

Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the appropriate role and management and oversight of contractors in the federal workforce—particularly DoD—and I have identified 15 systemic acquisition challenges facing DoD. ... Since 1992 we have designated DoD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition workforce, including contract oversight personnel. (GAO, 2008)

These findings represent only a partial look into the major challenges faced by the DoD, but provide good insight into the fact that, while contractors are a force multiplier, there are inherent challenges that come with over-reliance on contract support to provide key support functions critical to contingency responses and operations.

#### **4. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan**

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Section 841 of Public Law 110–181, signed on January 28, 2008, established the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary goals of the CWC were to conduct a thorough assessment to identify systemic problems; identify fraud, waste, and abuse; and ensure accountability for those responsible for such acts. Congress instructed the CWC to make recommendations that would help to avoid recurring issues in future contingencies. The recommendations were to meet two primary criteria: 1) The recommendation must address the underlying causes of the poor outcomes of contracting, and 2) they must institutionalize changes so they have lasting effects. The findings of the CWC were reported in two interim reports, five special reports, and one final report prior to its decommission on September 30, 2011 (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2012).

Our research focuses primarily on two reports: the second interim report to Congress entitled *At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations* (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a) and the final report

entitled *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks* (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b). The Commission recognized the same issue as the DoD IG and the GAO: The federal government's reliance on contractors to support defense operations was at an unprecedented level and accompanied by several concerns and issues (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a).

The second interim report identifies several benefits of utilizing contractors in contingencies to include freeing up military personnel, providing flexibility in performing certain functions, and offering skills that the government lacks. However, there are also consequences, such as misconduct of contractor personnel and increased fraud and illegal activities, associated with the contracting process. The report states, "In the current setting of heavy reliance on contractors and clear weaknesses in federal planning and management, the Commission believes the United States has come to over-rely on contractors" (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a, p. 9). This conclusion was reached by considering the government's ability to preserve core capabilities, protect mission-critical functions, and balance mission requirements against the ability to provide the appropriate level of oversight for contracted support. The report made 32 specific recommendations categorized into five broad categories. The bullet list that follows presents the five categories identified in the report:

- New and expanded, often time-critical missions combined with ceilings on civilian and military personnel have led senior officials and commanders to rely on contractors as the default option.
- Existing agency cultures all too often relegate contracting to an afterthought, thereby inhibiting sound planning, resourcing, and management of contractors.
- Current interagency mechanisms and intra-agency resource allocations do not support the changing missions of agencies in contingency operations, resulting in greater reliance on contractors and less focus on contract outcomes.
- Without effective competition and accurate assessment of contractor performance during contingency operations, money is wasted, and the likelihood of fraud and abuse increases.
- Agencies' failures to effectively use contract suspension and debarment tools, and the U.S. government's limited jurisdiction over criminal behavior and limited access to records, have contributed to an

environment in which contractors misbehave with limited accountability (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a).

The final CWC report to Congress was issued in August 2011 and the CWC continued to identify weaknesses and areas of needed improvement within the federal government to manage the heavy reliance on contract support. While the CWC's second interim report stated that \$177 billion had been obligated by all federal agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan between the fiscal years 2002–2010, the final report stated that at least \$31 billion, and possibly as much as \$60 billion, had been lost due to fraud and waste during fiscal years 2002–2011. The commissioners determined that much of this loss could have been avoided (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).

The extended duration and continued growth of operations led to the over-reliance on contracted support. This resulted in significant increases of contracted personnel on the battlefield. Service contracts for security were common and came with a significant level of complication. The increased reliance on contractors for operational installation support increased the quality assurance workload on an already over-tasked force. These factors, along with operation tempo and turnover, further magnified contractor-related issues in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).

In the final report, the CWC offers 15 recommendations to improve current and future operations:

- Use risk factors in deciding whether to contract in contingencies.
- Develop deployable cadres for acquisition management and contractor oversight.
- Phase out the use of private security contractors for certain functions.
- Improve interagency coordination and guidance for using security contractors in contingency operations.
- Take actions to mitigate the threat of additional waste from unsustainability.
- Elevate the positions and expand the authority of civilian officials responsible for contingency contracting at the DoD, Department of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Elevate and expand the authority of military officials responsible for contingency contracting on the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders' staffs, and in the military Services.

- Establish a new, dual-hatted senior position at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and at the National Security Council (NSC) to provide oversight and strategic direction.
- Create a permanent Office of Inspector General for contingency operations.
- Set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency contracts.
- Improve contractor performance-data recording and use.
- Strengthen enforcement tools.
- Provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to protect the government's interests.
- Congress should provide or reallocate resources for contingency contracting reform to cure or mitigate the numerous defects described by the commission.
- Congress should enact legislation requiring the regular assessment and reporting of agencies' progress in implementing reform recommendations.

Based on the recommendations, the CWC further identified the need for a strategic approach to contingency operations, and recognized the importance of having the structure and organization in place prior to an event to effectively integrate contract support (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).

## **5. The Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**

A congressional amendment passed in 2004 established SIGIR. Prior to the creation of SIGIR, oversight of reconstruction was performed by the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General (CPA-IG). After initial operations in Iraq, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) was established, and those funds were utilized to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq. SIGIR reports directly to the State and Defense Secretaries, and submits quarterly and semi-annual reports to Congress (SIGIR, 2012). The SIGIR (2012) website outlines the organization's responsibilities as follows:

- Provide for the independent and objective execution and supervision of audits and investigations;
- Provide objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management of Iraq reconstruction programs and operations;

- Prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse;
- Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make appropriate recommendations;
- Maintain effective working relationships with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations regarding oversight in Iraq;
- Inform the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Congress of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies in operations, and track the progress of corrective actions;
- Report violations of law to the U.S. Attorney General and report to Congress on the prosecutions and convictions that have resulted from referrals; and
- Submit regular reports to Congress.

Multiple reports are available from SIGIR; however, in this research, we focus primarily on their publications regarding lessons learned from Iraq reconstruction efforts. In 2006, SIGIR released a compilation of lessons learned regarding acquisition entitled, *Lessons in Contracting and Procurement*. The report divided the lessons learned into two large categories: those related to strategy and planning, and those related to policies and processes.

The primary lessons learned regarding strategy and policy called attention to the need for early involvement of contracting personnel in strategic planning efforts. Clear definitions of roles and responsibilities, smaller projects in early phases of reconstruction, and avoidance of the use of sole-source and limited-competition acquisition strategies were also noted as strategic lessons learned. Key lessons regarding policies and procedures focused around the creation of standardized procedures, easily deployable procurement systems, and improvements in data collection, retention, and evaluation (SIGIR, 2006).

SIGIR provided six specific recommendations for the improvement of procurement operations during reconstruction efforts. Those recommendations are as follows (SIGIR, 2006):

- Explore the creation of an enhanced Contingency FAR (CFAR),
- Pursue the institutionalization of special contracting programs,

- Include contracting and procurement personnel at all phases of planning for contingency operations,
- Create a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel who are trained to execute rapid relief of reconstruction contracting during contingency operations,
- Develop and implement information systems for managing contracting and procurement in contingency operations, and
- Pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors with expertise in specialized reconstruction areas.

## **6. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction**

Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established SIGAR to “promote economy and efficiency of U.S.-funded reconstruction programs in Afghanistan and to detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse by conducting independent, objective, and strategic audits, inspections, and investigations” (SIGAR, 2012b). SIGAR reports quarterly to Congress on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the majority of items addressed are related to specific projects/services. In the July 30, 2012, report, SIGAR identified the need for “more aggressive, actionable recommendations” (SIGAR, 2012a). In his cover letter, the Special Investigator General discussed the need for SIGAR to move beyond just evaluating individual projects and to further evaluate systemic root causes behind deficiencies and provide recommendations to address those areas (SIGAR, 2012a).

## **G. MAJOR DOD INITIATIVES**

### **1. Introduction**

The increased reliance on contract support is not a new concept to the DoD and initiatives to better manage contractors have been taking place since the 1990s (GAO, 2008). However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan magnified areas of weakness and opened the aperture of areas to focus on. The combination of operational duration and complexity and increased use of contracts, not only to support operations but also to assist with the reconstruction of local economies, has driven the need for new approaches to manage contingency contracting operations. The DoD and the military departments have undertaken multiple initiatives to address contract support; however, we focus on

initiatives related to addressing the CWC recommendations, improving contract intelligence, and managing operational contract support.

## **2. Task Force on Wartime Contracting**

Upon the release of the CWC Interim Report, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) established the DoD Task Force on Wartime Contracting (TFWC). The task force was a joint effort with members from all Services. The purpose of the TFWC was to analyze the findings of the interim report and determine the actions that should be implemented to correct immediate items of concern. There were eight immediate concerns identified in the CWC Interim report (DoD, 2009):

1. Iraq drawdown,
2. Contracting Officers Representative (COR) resourcing and training,
3. Competition—Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III Transition,
4. Inadequate contractor business systems,
5. Subcontractor accountability—LOGCAP,
6. Afghanistan buildup,
7. Afghanistan Contracting Command, and
8. Training and equipping private security contractors.

The TFWC worked diligently to address as many areas as feasible to improve contingency contracting operations. The following are some of the most significant accomplishments:

- The finalization of Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, *Operational Contract Support*, published in 2008 (Joint Staff, 2008). JP 4–10 identifies doctrine and policies that serve as a groundwork for joint operations.
- The DoD took actions to reorganize in order to identify primary contacts for contingency operations. The Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy created a dedicated team to support deployed personnel. Additionally, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) engaged in contingency and operational contract support.
- To enable training, the DoD continued to revise the *Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook* (DPAP, 2012b) to support training and continuity

in operations. This handbook provides a framework for all stages of contracting and support elements.

- Formal training courses, continuous learning modules, and documentation were created to assist in the preparation of both contracting and non-contracting personnel. A COR course was created for individuals assigned as quality assurance personnel (DoD, 2009).

The TFWC determined that the DoD was proactive in acquisition reforms prior to the CWC. The TFWC identified that 94% of the observations made by the CWC were proactively being addressed by the DoD, while the other 6% found the DoD in a reactive state (DoD, 2009).

### **3. Contracting Intelligence**

Operations in Afghanistan proved to be significantly different than those in Iraq and required the Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to place special attention on the area of corruption. Several conditions created an environment that allowed corruption to flourish, to include “a fragile war economy sustained by international aid, security assistance, the narcotics trade; and a society fractured by three decades of war; and weak governance institutions” (Headquarters International Security Assistance Force [HQ ISAF], 2011). The high levels of corruption threatened the success of the ISAF’s mission, and, therefore, had to be addressed. In response, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Shafafiyat (CJIATF–Shafafiyat) was established in 2010. Led by Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, CJIATF–Shafafiyat (Pashto for transparency) integrated three existing task forces: CJIATF–Nexus, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010. CJIATF–Nexus was responsible for analyzing “the criminal patronage networks, the narcotics trade, and the insurgency as a basis for Afghan and coalition law enforcement and military efforts” (ISAF HQ, 2011). Task Force Spotlight and Task Force 2010 worked closely to increase coordination and oversight of contracting processes and ensuring that ISAF understood where funds were going. Task Force Spotlight was responsible for dealing with private security companies (ISAF HQ, 2011).

Task Force 2010 was originally established after surveys were released stating that corruption in Afghanistan had nearly doubled in three years. Task Force 2010 (TF2010) was initially led by RADM Kathleen Dussault, and was tasked with ensuring

that money spent in Afghanistan was meeting the counterinsurgency intent. Twenty individuals were to follow the flow of contracting dollars from prime to sub-contractors and perform financial forensics on contracts and contractors (Abi-Habib & Rosenberg, 2010). TF2010 enabled commanders and personnel to better understand who they were contracting with. TF2010 assisted in recovering over 180,000 pieces of equipment and identified over 120 vendors that the government would no longer do business with (Schwartz, 2011). Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight were integral to implementing COMISAF's COIN Contracting Guidance issued in September 2010. The guidance directed ISAF to

- understand the role of contracting in COIN;
- hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity;
- know those with whom we are contracting;
- consult and involve local leaders;
- develop new partnerships;
- look beyond cost, schedule, and performance; and
- invest in oversight and enforce contract requirements (ISAF HQ, 2011).

To fully implement the guidance, the link between the intelligence and the contracting community became critical. The primary challenge was that contracting networks lacked transparency since the privity of contracts remained with the U.S. government and the prime contractor. There was no system established to identify first, who the USG was contracting with at the prime level, and second, who the prime contractor was hiring (or subcontracting with) to perform the work (Lyons, 2012). Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight partnered with C-JTSCC and others to produce a process for vetting, suspending, and debarring numerous companies (ISAF HQ, 2011).

#### **4. Operational Contract Support**

##### ***a. Operational Contract Support Overview***

The increased reliance on contracted support and multiple recommendations from oversight committees forced the DoD to look closely at the integration of planning for contractors within military operations. Per the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support; DASD[PS]) website, DASD (PS) was established in 2006 by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Logistics and Material Readiness. DASD (PS) was created to establish a program management approach to operational-level contract support (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2012). The John Warner FY 2007 NDAA, Section 854 called for the DoD to place increased focus and organizational movement in three specific areas: requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting. DASD (PS), working with the Joint Staff J4, focused on implementing changes within the DoD to improve contract management and visibility of contractors, strengthen interagency cooperation, and prepare the non-acquisition military community for contracting duties (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2012)

Today, the DASD (PS) has become the central organization responsible for the oversight and management of what is now known as operational contract support (OCS). The DoD defines OCS as “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management functions” (Joint Staff, 2008). To fully understand the intent of OCS, the following definitions from JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) are important to understand:

Contingency Contracting: the process of obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of contingency operations ... is a subset of contract support integration and does not include the requirements development, prioritization, and budgeting processes. (p. vi)

Contract administration: a subset of contracting ... the oversight function, from contract award to contract close-out, performed by contracting professionals and designated noncontracting personnel ... during contingency operations is referred to as contingency contract administration services (CCAS). (p. vi)

Contractor management: the ability to manage and maintain visibility of contractor personnel and associate contractor equipment providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area. It is closely related to, but not the same as, contract administration ... includes both the

management of contractor performance in complying with contractor personnel-related requirements and the management of the government's responsibilities for life and other support when such support is required. (pp. vi–vii)

***b. Doctrine and Policy***

JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support, published by the Joint Staff in 2008, provides the doctrinal foundation for the integration, synchronization, and coordination of all matters relating to OCS. The publication is currently under revision, but has not been republished to date. JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) states that contract support is “delivered to the joint force through a process comprised of five key tasks: planning, requirements determination, contract development, contract execution, and contract closeout” (p. v).

JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) provides multiple definitions that are key to understanding the fundamental premise of operational contract support.

Contingency acquisition is the process of acquiring supplies, services, and construction in support of the operations. ... From the contracting aspect, contingency acquisition begins at the point when a requiring activity identifies a specific requirement...which includes proper funding support, contract award, and contract administration. (p. I-2)

Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management functions. Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contracted support and management of contractor personnel. ... Contract support integration is the coordination and synchronization of contracted support executed in a designated operational area in support of the joint force. Contractor management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment. ... While directly related, contract support integration and contractor management are not one-and-the same and both require significant JFC oversight. (p. I-2)

Contingency contracting is the process of obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources via contracting means ... [it] is a subset of contract support integration and does not include the requirements development, prioritization, and budgeting process. (p. I-2)

The intent was to provide guidance related to joint operations, not day-to-day operations typically conducted by the individual Services. Each Service has slightly different contracting procedures, which at times makes coordination between them difficult. JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) sets the guidelines for inter-Service and inter-agency coordination and identifies the applicable command structure associated with joint operations. JP 4–10 also calls for early integration of contracting operations with the overall joint force logistics support effort. This publication outlines the importance of strategic planning efforts for contracting (Joint Staff, 2008). JP 4–10 recognizes the difficulty of bringing contractors into contingency operations, while still realizing the need for them. JP 4–10 contains significant discussion on the need for proper contract administration by both contracting and non-contracting personnel (Joint Staff, 2008).

In March 2009, the OUSD(AT&L) issued DoDD 3020.49. The directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for program management for the preparation and execution of contingency operation acquisitions. The directive identifies OCS as “the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area” (OUSD[AT&L], 2009, p. 2). Additionally, program management in relation to OCS is identified as “the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts to meet the JFC’s objectives” (OUSD[AT&L], 2009, p. 2).

Since 2008, significant efforts have been made to institutionalize the importance of contract support and the integration of OCS in joint operations. In December 2008, the CJCS established the Task Force on Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations. The purpose of the TF was threefold:

- Evaluate the current range and depth of service contract capabilities in Iraq,
- Develop a standardized capabilities-based methodology to document linkages between Joint Operational Planning shortfalls and contract, and
- Identify policy issues that inhibit effective and efficient OCS planning processes and recommend changes. (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010b)

The task force phased the research and assigned three sub-task forces to conduct research in specific areas. To date, four major reports have been issued by the task force. Task Forces I and II evaluated the range and depth of service contract capabilities in Iraq in regard to both security and combat training and other support areas dependent on contracted support. The first two reports identified the increased reliance on contracted support, but found that the use of such support was appropriate. A key recommendation of the first report was to “evaluate operational plans to determine the range and depth of contracted capabilities necessary to support the joint force in contingencies” (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011).

Building on that recommendation, Phase II evaluated other key areas to determine the extent of contract support required to conduct contingency operations. Phase II mapped contractor support by Tier 1 joint capability area (JCA). The Phase II report also cross referenced JCAs to the Uniform Joint Task List (UJTL), which is a task library providing the foundation for capabilities-based planning across military operations. This cross reference was used to determine whether the contracted support was consistent with mission-derived tasks. The report noted that due to the high reliance on contracted support in certain JCAs, it is imperative that all echelons of commands enhance OCS planning efforts throughout all phases of a campaign (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011). Figure 23 shows the DoD dependency on contractor support by Tier 1 JCAs.




Figure 23. Contractor Support within Tier I Joint Capability Areas (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a, p. iv)

Phase III took on the task of meeting the CJCS goal of planning for contractors and contracted support in operational and contingency plans. The task force identified that, while contract support was recognized as an important capability, planning for deployment and use of contract support was not being recognized in the strategic or joint planning system. The final report identified the need for a culture change and made the following specific recommendations:

- Complete OCS planning change recommendations to guidance, policy, doctrine, and instruction;
- Develop repeatable processes and templates to enable OCS planning;
- Refine change recommendations to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) that enable OCS planning and execution;
- Refine, adjust, and optimize the Contractor Estimate Tool to develop an initial spreadsheet-based proof of concept;
- Revise and update the OCS UJTL;
- Develop processes and a systems design and development approach that “operationalizes” OCS.
- Determine functional and informational requirements of OCS planning and execution;
- Update Joint Publication 4–10 to reflect OCS lessons learned and to enhance joint doctrine;

- Develop and refine joint non-acquisition OCS training and education and ensure its inclusion in joint exercises;
- Identify and assign responsibilities to institutionalize OCS lesson development, analysis, documentation and use;
- Integrate OCS planning and execution in multinational and interagency forums and participate in validating events; and
- Develop the requirements for systems that measure, report, and monitor contractor readiness. (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011)

The results of the task force identified what the IG, GAO, CWC, SIGIR, and SIGAR had already identified: The need for contract support to respond to contingencies will not disappear and, as such, the DoD must take action to fully integrate contractors as part of the planning for the total force.

*c. Integration of Operational Contract Support Into Joint Planning*

JP 3-0 (CJCS, 2011b) identifies joint functions that are comprised of related capabilities and activities that assist JFCs in directing joint operations. Integration of the joint functions is key to mission success. Joint functions fall within six basic groups—command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment (CJCS, 2011b, p. III-1). As part of the sustainment function, logistics is the “integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to support the JFC’s CONOPS.” Logistics covers the following core capabilities: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support (HSS), logistics services, engineering, and OCS (CJCS, 2011b, p. III-35). Based on the core capability placement of OCS within logistics, the J4 staff element generally retains the responsibility for the integration and synchronization of OCS within CCDR planning products.

Multiple joint and Service organizations are involved with the integration of the two OCS constructs (contract support integration and contractor management) making it a very complex and challenging process. Increasing the complexity is the fact that the JOPES Annex W, entitled Contract Support Integration Plan, requires the input

and support from primary and special staff elements, many of which are unfamiliar with the contract support integration process and the associated contractor management challenges (Joint Staff, 2008, p. I-1). The revised Annex W format, in use since 2009, requires greater detail than previous versions such as the following:

- Greater planning detail regarding the type of support contracts;
- Required assignment of tasks to the staff directors, service components, and combat support agencies;
- Required mandatory instructions relating to OCS synchronization and execution administrative functions;
- Required Contractor Management Plan, which provides advisory directions to cover government-furnished support; and
- Required detailed contractor, contracting, and contractor management estimate by location, phase and capability area. (CJCS J4, 2010, p. 9)

***d. Roles and Responsibilities***

As previously stated, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 assigned responsibility for the development of joint policies relating to contract requirements development, contingency program management, contingency contracting during combat operations, and post-conflict operations to the DASD (PS). The DASD (PS) was to work in coordination with the JSC, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) retained responsibility for developing and implementing contingency contracting policies (OUSD, 2007). The memorandum can be found in Appendix A.

The findings of the CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force Phase III research resulted in direct action of the SECDEF. On January 24, 2011, the action memo entitled *Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support and Workforce Mix* was issued by the SECDEF. The memo stated,

The Department of Defense has been, and continues to be, reliant on contractors for operational support during contingency operations. ... I do not expect this to change now or in future contingency operations. ... Based on the CJCS Task Force's report findings and recommendations on contractor dependency, I consider it prudent to focus attention on OCS as

an emergent capability area and direct the Department to undertake the following actions regarding force mix, contract support integration, planning, and resourcing. (Office of the SECDEF, 2011, p. 1)

Figure 24 identifies the key roles and responsibilities identified in the action memo (which can be found at Appendix B)

*Figure 1. OCS SECDEF Action Memo—Signed 24 Jan 2011*




Figure 24. OCS SECDEF Action Memo (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011, p. 4)

Following the SECDEF memo, the Director of the Joint Staff issued a Director Joint Staff Memo 0380–11, *Implementation of SecDef Memorandum on Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and Workforce Mix* (Joint Staff, 2011). The memo identifies specific roles for the Joint Staff Directorates (Joint Staff, 2011). The full text of the memorandum can be found at Appendix C.

To solidify responsibilities and procedures for OCS, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011) was reissued in December 2011. The DoDI established policy, responsibilities, and procedures for OCS, to include program management, contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor personnel into contingency operations. Appendix D contains Enclosure 4 of the DoDI, entitled “Responsibilities.”

*e. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office*

As previously stated, the call to action to improve contractor oversight and the integration of contract support into contingency operations was longstanding. Lessons learned in the operational area and oversight reports led to the OSD establishing the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) in 2008, which ultimately became a business service center of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The JCASO website states that the JCASO “provides strategic and operational level Operational Contract Support (OCS) program management across DoD and the Whole of Government” (DLA, 2012b). The JCASO also provides support to CCDRs, as requested, to coordinate and plan for OCS program activities.

The premise of the JCASO dates back to 2006, when DUSD(Industrial Policy) prepared a concept paper on what was to be identified as the Contingency Acquisition Support Office (CASO). Per the draft concept paper, the mission of the CASO would be “the direct application of the economic instrument of national power towards meeting the objectives of the supported joint force commander” (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base, 2006). The initiative addressed a Deputy Secretary of Defense memo issued on January 22, 2006, tasking the USD(AT&L) to “design a new institution to exploit effectively our ‘Fifth Force Provider,’ the private sector” (DUSD[Industrial Policy], 2006). While designing the organization, it was identified that to be efficient and reduce the duplication of effort and skill sets, one central acquisition office should be the focal point for all joint acquisition program operations.

The concept emerged for a permanent, moderately-sized office...within U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) with strong competencies in contingency contracting and program management which could be deployed and expanded to become a JCC-like command for any given contingency operations, from initial deployment to the end of a conflict or emergency. (DUSD[Industrial Policy], 2006)

Figure 25 shows the initial organizational concept of the CASO found in the draft concept paper.




Figure 25. Original Organizational Makeup for the CASO (After Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base, n.d., p. 7)

The concept paper (2006) recommended that the CASO should be a staff element of JFCOM with the two star reporting directly to the JFCOM commander and should be dual-hatted as the HCA. Figure 26 shows the timeline of events for the stand-up of the JCASO.




Figure 26. JCASO Evolution (From Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, 2012, p. 3)

On December 20, 2011, the CJCS issued a notice regarding the CCDR employment of the JCASO. The notice identified the JCASO as an “on-call enabling capability providing OCS coordination and integration during peacetime and contingency operations” (CJCS, 2011). The JCASO can, as requested, provide a team during peacetime and contingency operations, to assist with OCS planning and program management. The organization is comprised of two divisions: Operations and Policy. The Operations division provides Mission Support Teams (MSTs) and planners embedded with the combatant command staffs. The MSTs augment other contracting functions to provide OCS expertise. The support configuration of the JCASO during a contingency operation is depicted in Figure 27.




Figure 27. JCASO Support Configuration During Contingency Operations  
(From CJCS, 2011c, p. A-5)

DoDI 3020.41 (OUSD[AT&L], 2005) identifies JCASO's responsibilities as follows:

- Provide OCS planning support to the CDR through Joint OCS Planners embedded within the geographic Combatant Command staff. Maintain situational awareness of all plans with significant OCS equity for the purposes of exercise support and preparation for operational deployment. From JCASO forward involvement in exercises and operational deployments, develop and submit lessons learned that result in improved best practices and planning.
- When requested, assist the Joint Staff in support of the Chairman's OCS responsibilities.
- Facilitate improvement in OCS planning and execution through capture and review of joint OCS lessons learned. In cooperation with United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), military Services, other DoD Components, and interagency partners, collect joint operations focused OCS lessons learned and best practices from contingency operations and

exercises to inform OCS policy and recommend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTmLPF) solutions.

- Participate in joint exercises, derive OCS best practices from after-action reports and refine tactics/techniques/procedures, deployment drills, and personal and functional training (to include curriculum reviews and recommendations). Assist in the improvement of OCS related policy, doctrine, rules, tools, and processes.
- Provide the geographic CCDRs, when requested, with deployable experts to assist the CCDR and subordinate JFCs in managing OCS requirements in a contingency environment.
- Practice continuous OCS-related engagement with interagency representatives and multinational partners, as appropriate and consistent with existing authorities.
- Participate in the OCS FCIB to facilitate development of standard joint OCS concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, plans, programs, tools, reporting, and training to improve effectiveness and efficiency. (OUSD[AT&L]), 2005)

***f. Operational Contract Support Planners at the Combatant Commands***

As discussed in this review multiple times, the increased reliance on contracted support heightened the DoD's interest in and attention to the need for planning and integrating contract support into operational planning. This intensified focus led to the DoD making significant changes to deliberate and crisis action planning through strategic guidance—the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* (GEF) and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP; Sweeney, 2011). The GEF is classified secret/limited distribution (SECRET/LIMDIS) and incorporates guidance for security cooperation, deliberate planning, global posture, global force management, and nuclear weapons planning (Sweeney, 2011). The JSCP provides CCDRs and JCS guidance on accomplishing tasks and missions based on military capabilities. The documents work in concert and now require CCDRs and military Services to plan for the integration of contracted support. The new requirements represent new mandates and work for the CCMD and military Services (CJCS J4, 2012). As shown in Figure 12 the CCMDs have an organizational staff structure broken down by function. OCS has been designated the responsibility of the J4, Director for Operations and Logistics.

CJCS J4 recently released an OCS manpower study in response to a SECDEF memo in which he “directed his staff and the CJCS to focus attention on OCS as an emergent capability area and to undertake actions regarding contract support integration, planning, and resourcing” (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. I-1). The study examined the demand signals from Congress, the DoD, CJCS, doctrine, military Service guidance and other sources, requiring well-trained OCS planning and analytical personnel. The CJCS J4 contacted the Joint Staff J1, J3, J4, J5, and J7; DCMA; JCASO; National Defense University (NDU); CCMD J4 staffs; the military Service’s manpower offices; and OCS functional proponents for inputs regarding current OCS-related force structure actions (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. I-4). To formulate a standardized manning template, USNORTHCOM and USCENTCOM J4 Contracting Division structures and subject-matter expert (SME) input were combined to create the following benchmark for OCS planning staff at the CCMD:

- 1 senior policy supervisory analyst,
- 3 analysts,
- 2 planners, and
- 1 military officer.

Currently, the two planner positions are filled by JCASO planners. The report recommends the JCASO planners be realigned to directly report to the CCDR. In addition to CCMD staffs, the report recommends personnel requirements for sub-unified commands, Service Component commands, and the Joint Staff J4 (Joint Staff J4, 2012). The report identifies a mutual skill set for planners and analysts: planning, acquisition, logistics or other JCA, and operations. There is a footnote in the report stating,

OCS does not require acquisition certification, but some level of acquisition knowledge is recommended in all OCS-related positions....because the OCS planner may at times advise...on how to best close an operational gap or implement a course of action with a contracting solution. (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. 4-9)

Appendix E provides the full list of identified responsibilities and skill, knowledge, and experience requirements for OCS analysts and planners. The study also outlines the OCS competency model identifying the competencies at the strategic and

operational level, this list can be viewed at Appendix F (Joint Staff J4, 2012). The conclusion of the study captures the essence of the OCS issues:

Without adequate force structure, OCS will remain fragmented. Efforts to improve oversight will fail because of a patchwork of organizational structures and manning that lacks proper skills or background. Past mistakes will repeat when the next conflict requires contract support to fill operational gaps. (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. 5–2)

## **H. SUMMARY**

In this literature review, we have attempted to provide a strong foundation for our research by reviewing the meaning of contracting—both in commercial industry and the DoD—the meaning of contingency contracting, the way in which the DoD’s organizational structure compliments contingency operations, the major findings of oversight committees, as well as major initiatives underway by the DoD to improve contingency operations and OCS management. Our research focuses on lessons learned from the strategic leaders responsible for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which cover a significant array of topics and subjects. In this review, we provided the informational foundation to support our analysis and recommendations.

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we explain how data were collected and analyzed to meet our research objectives and, ultimately, answer our research questions, which were introduced in Chapter I. Specifically, we describe our methods for choosing our first and subsequent groups of interviewees, formulating questions used during the interviews, grouping the results into a framework, and analyzing the results utilizing the groupings to determine recommendations.

Motivated by the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's call in *A Profession of Arms* to "reflect on our experiences during the past 10 years to assess the impact and understand both our strengths and weaknesses," and the necessity to, "see ourselves so we can determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last decade" (Dempsey, 2012), we were motivated to choose an area of research within contingency contracting that had the utmost relevancy and urgency within the Department of Defense. After conducting an extensive search of published documents on contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, we learned that the vast majority of studies and articles dated within the past decade only addressed issues during a specific "snapshot" in time, usually within a 12-month timeframe. Furthermore, we concluded from our search that nothing had been published that captured contingency contracting lessons learned from an executive DoD perspective within the past 10 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The absence of such a critical document is what ultimately led us down the path of our current research. Capturing the lessons learned from the current DoD leaders will assist in establishing the foundation needed to improve the DoD for future leaders and ensure the same challenges are not repeated.

#### **B. KEY ORGANIZATIONS**

Our intent with this research was to capture the DoD executive perspective regarding contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based upon the

purpose of our research, and its qualitative nature, we made the determination that we needed a wide variety of inputs to ensure we captured the true essence of the historical accounts.

As such, we determined the key organizations would be those responsible for the execution of contingency contracting operations, supported commands (customers), oversight commissions, and those responsible for management of operations. The selection of key organizations was expanded as we obtained data and additional information from interviewees.

We determined the initial set of key organizations to be the following: CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC, previously JCC-I/A), Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), and Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). After conducting the initial interviews and our research became more focused on operational contract support, the following were identified as key organizations: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) (DASD [PS]), Joint Staff J4 OCS Staff, and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and associated Service commands.

### **C. INTERVIEW DESIGN**

To collect lessons learned, we determined we would be conducting topical qualitative interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The purpose of these interviews was to capture what, when, and why things happened during contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how we can improve for the future. We recognized at the beginning the results of the qualitative interviews would shape the research design gradually and that focus areas that seemed important at the beginning of our research would potentially be of little consequence further in the study. As such, we remained flexible in our approach and selection of interviewees and interview questions. The interviews were conducted in an iterative process, meaning the results of each group were gathered, analyzed, and grouped, which led to the next group of interviewees (Rubin &

Rubin, 1995). Based on this process, we ultimately determined the primary focus of the later interviews was operational contract support and the integration of contracting into the deliberate and crisis action planning process.

#### **D. INTERVIEWEE SELECTION PROCESS**

To capture an executive-level perspective of lessons learned from the past 11 years of contingency contracting from OIF, OEF, and OND, we determined interviewees would be individuals who had served in a senior leadership capacity within one of the key organizations or who were responsible for a specific function within those organizations. Our interviews focused primarily on general/flag officers, senior executive service members, congressionally appointed commissioners, and senior contracting officials.

To capture lessons learned, the first logical step (after an extensive literature review) was to interview the past and present commanders of C-JTSCC (previously JCC-I/A), CWC commissioners, JCASO, and DPAP. To obtain different opinions of contingency contracting support we asked the commanders of C-JTSCC to provide names of general/flag officers they supported during operations, which formed the customer perspective foundation for our second round of interviews. As we continued our interviews, we identified emerging themes that led us to interview OUSD(PS), Joint Staff J4 OCS Staff, and USPACOM. A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix G.

#### **E. REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONS**

One of the primary goals in qualitative interviews is to obtain results that are deep, detailed, vivid, and nuanced. Depth refers to obtaining a thoughtful answer supported by significant evidence, while detailed refers to the ability to obtain particulars by refocusing questions and asking specifics. Vivid and nuanced are similar in that vividness is represented by obtaining the emotional feelings of the interviewee during a particular event, and nuanced refers to precision in description (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). In order to encourage detailed information, we created interview questions that encouraged in-depth discussion. The questions were not necessarily asked in the order presented;

however, the discussion led the order of the questions. All efforts were made to address all questions throughout the course of the interviews to ensure consistent discussions were held with each interviewee.

Because the interviewees were engaged with contingency contracting operations at different times, capacities, and levels, we tailored the questions slightly to each group of interviewees. We generated six lists of representative questions for each of the major categories of interviewees: contracting personnel, JCASO, Commission on Wartime Contracting, supported customers, DPAP, and Program Support. Representative interview questions are shown in Appendix H.

## **F. FRAMEWORK**

Once the data (literature review and interviews) were collected, we categorized the results and identified lessons learned using DOTmLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy) and/or the six-phase contract management process. Because we recognized early in our research that a joint non-materiel solution would most likely result from our analysis, the DOTmLPF-P provided us with the necessary framework to correctly analyze our recommendations in the same manner in which all joint non-materiel solutions are generated within the DoD. For all contracting-specific lessons learned, the resulting data were categorized within the six phases of the contract management process: procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout (Rendon, 2007). Between these two frameworks, we were able to successfully “bucket” the data that resulted from our interviews.

## **G. ANALYTICAL PROCESS**

We used an analytical approach to analyze the data collected from our interviews. Fully acknowledging that the results of our interviews would generate a wide range of lessons learned, our goal was to identify common threads within the interview groups, reveal those common threads, and recommend changes as necessary. Our assumption was that, because no other research publication incorporated as many senior leader/executive perspectives associated with contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,

any common threads identified among the interview groups would be significant. The results of the interviews did not disappoint and common threads were in fact identified, thus giving us a strong basis to provide recommendations based on conclusions made from the data.

## **H. SUMMARY**

In Chapters I through III, we provided the foundation for our research. In Chapter I, we introduced our research and established why the research is relevant. In Chapter II, we presented the results of an intensive literature review to provide a thorough foundation of how contracting is currently viewed within industry and the Department of Defense. Chapter II also introduced contingency contracting, major oversight findings and recommendations, and provided an overview of current operational contract support initiatives. And in this chapter we provided the method of data collection and analysis in terms of the interview design, selection of interviewees, and the analysis of the resulting data. In the next four chapters, we present our findings, analysis, recommendations, and areas for further research.

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## **IV. FINDINGS**

The transformation of contracting in Iraq is a textbook case where this new organization and concept of support needs to be incorporated into joint doctrine and not lost in the trash heap of good ideas. (Cunnane, 2005, p. 47)

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of our study was to gather lessons learned from strategic leaders associated with contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this chapter, we first present the evolution of C-JTSCC based on input received from commanders of the organization and our literature review to address our secondary research question: How have the organization and operations of C-JTSCC evolved since its inception in 2004? Next we present the findings resulting from an evaluation of the common themes identified in our data regarding lessons learned. These findings represent the senior-level lessons learned over the past 11 years. Finally, we explain the root cause analysis we conducted on the lessons learned to determine if there was one contributing factor that could have addressed many of the challenges faced during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our intent in capturing lessons learned was to obtain open and honest feedback from those responsible for operations. As such, the presentation of our findings does not specifically attribute provided quotes to individual interviewees; rather identification is made as to whether the individual was a contracting or non-contracting senior leader.

### **B. EVOLUTION OF THE C-JTSCC FROM 2003 TO 2012**

#### **1. Early History of Joint Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan**

“Contracting support, like every other aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s stabilization and reconstruction operations, had to evolve and adapt in order to meet the commander’s intent and support a mission that was under estimated in size, complexity, duration, and intensity” (Cunnane, 2005). The past 10 years of executive-level contracting leadership on the battlefield displayed essential and dauntless efforts to

evolve theater contract support to the warfighter, while simultaneously shaping the capabilities of the contracting command. The following paragraphs capture the history of the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command from the early days of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), to the inception of Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan, to how the organization stands in 2012.

Shortly after the initial invasion into Iraq in March 2003, MNF-I leadership discovered the immediate need for additional contracting officers and managers. On May 21, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)-type contracts and in-theater contracting were utilized to support combat operations. Initial Iraq reconstruction efforts were planned through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and later, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Project Contracting Office (PCO) was formed to provide direct contracting support to the CPA (Williams & Roddin, 2006). Early operations under the CPA were criticized for wasteful spending, limited oversight, and rogue CCOs conducting contracting operations with little direction (Cha, 2004).

By late 2003, the planned transfer to the Iraqi Interim Government eventually phased out the need for the CPA, but the efforts of the PCO continued. The demand for contract support in theater continued to increase. In June 2004, as the PCO continued to support contracting efforts for Iraq's reconstruction, the push to increase the CPA's contracting capability began by integrating program managers and contract managers. These construction efforts included the following: restoration of electrical services and power generation; water treatment and pumping facilities; sewage treatment and processing plants; health clinics and hospital refurbishment; roads and bridges; and schools. At the same time, multiple contracting activities were being established to provide theater contract support, none of which coordinated or communicated their efforts (Houglan, 2006a). Because contracting efforts were not synchronized, it was nearly impossible for the U.S. government to benefit from more efficient contracting

methods (i.e., strategic sourcing) that would allow contracting officers to leverage buying power and available resources. Instead, contracting officers often competed with each other for contracted resources. It became evident that a unified effort with one responsible organization was needed to improve contract operations (D'Angelo, Houghlan, & Ruckwardt, 2007).

## **2. The Establishment of JCC-I/A**

In November 2004, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) issued fragmentary order (FRAGO) 09-668, establishing Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) with the intent to consolidate contracting efforts within the country (D'Angelo et al., 2007), while providing contracting transparency to the warfighter (Houghlan, 2006b). JCC-I, a direct reporting unit to MNF-I, officially began operations on January 29, 2005. JCC-I began the consolidation of contracting efforts on the battlefield by combining the MNF-I Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Forces (PARC-F) and PCO Principle Assistance Responsible for Contracting-Reconstruction (PARC-R) efforts under a single command structure. PARC-R continued to support PCO and Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I), while PARC-F maintained responsibility for contracting support to MNF-I and MNC-I. JCC-I then began coordinating contract efforts with the II Marine Expeditionary Force, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Central Air Force. The staff's consolidation efforts resulted in regular meetings with the PCO, State Department, USAID, and JCC-I to attempt to promote focused contracting efforts and transparency. These meetings were conducted ad hoc, as efforts to officially include the PCO, State Department, and USAID as part of JCC-I were unsuccessful. Figure 28 represents the organizational structure of contingency contracting in 2004.




Figure 28. Joint Contracting Command—Iraq Organizational Chart  
(From Cunnane, 2005, p. 52)

In July 2005, USCENTCOM leadership wanted JCC-I to assume control of contracting operations in Afghanistan. As a result, CENTCOM FRAGO 07-790 was issued, which consolidated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan under the same command, resulting in JCC-I becoming JCC-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). JCC-I/A was now a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) to both U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) and Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A). With this FRAGO, the task of coordinating contracting efforts between both theaters began. The restated mission of JCC-I/A now reflected responsive contracting support to U.S. and coalition partners, both directly supporting the warfighter and the reconstruction of the applicable area of operations. Additionally, the leadership recognized the applicability of a joint command by stating, “The JCC model could easily serve as the contracting support template for future Combatant Command missions” (Houglan, 2006b, p. 20).

While the creation of JCC-I/A overcame many significant challenges faced by CCOs in theater, multiple problems still existed due to a lack of unity among the Service agencies and between the two AORs. FRAGO 09-1117 addressed these issues. Each

Service was required to update their contracting relationships with USCENTCOM to help build the needed continuity. The end state envisioned within the FRAGO had three main objectives (D'Angelo et al., 2007):

- Integrate warfighter campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects through contracting that further support the warfighters' objectives;
- Achieve unity of effort and economies of scale that exemplify best business practices, and serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
- Create synergy with economic activities in local private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst for economic growth and the resulting peace.

Figure 29 provides an overview of the resulting command and control authority resulting from FRAGO 09-117.




Figure 29. Contracting Command and Control as a Result of FRAGO 09-117  
(From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012)

With JCC-I/A established as a true joint contracting command, the focus turned to improving operations through Effects-Based Contracting (EBC) with the goal of linking the organization tightly to maneuver commanders to synchronize contracting resources and capabilities in time, space, and purpose in order to achieve the desired battlefield

effects. U.S. Air Force Major General Darryl Scott's intent behind EBC was to synchronize contract execution with a commander's intent by aligning JCC-I/A priorities with the combatant commander's theater priorities. This required the contracting process to be an active part of operations/mission planning so that the desired operational and tactical goals were understood and translated into effective contracting actions (DCMA, 2006). Regional Contracting Centers (RCCs) were realigned to better support operational planning and enabled the RCC to adapt and mobilize alongside their fast-paced and high OPTEMPO customer. Battlefield circulation to all FOBs and RCC locations was regularly conducted to ensure warfighters received the best contracting support. At the strategic level, JCC-I/A facilitated MNF-I's "Iraqi First Program," which supported the country's economic expansion. Overall, the command continued to focus on reconstruction efforts and building JCC-I/A's capabilities. Regional Contracting Centers were augmented as necessary within theater to support theater priorities. With the effects-based contracting ethos infused throughout the organization, and its effects closely tied to success on the battlefield, contracting was now being viewed as an enabler that was vital to mission accomplishment. Figure 30 provides an overview of the organization of JCC-I/A in 2006.




Figure 30. JCC-I/A Support Structure  
(From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012)

As the contracting environment began to mature in Iraq, so did the need for standardized internal control and management. In January 2008, in light of events involving contractor performance of security service contracts in theater, JCC-I/A focused on building JCC-I/A's contractor oversight and internal audit capabilities. This task involved increasing the capabilities and expertise of the Procurement Management Teams that conducted battlefield circulation to each FOB and RCC to ensure proper contractor oversight and contract administration of service contracts. The teams also conducted Procurement Management Reviews to ensure RCC compliance with statutory regulations. JCC-I/A also vastly increased its oversight capabilities by infusing the automated contract writing capability, giving the command an up-to-date common operating picture and standardization of contract actions throughout theater. The development of Procurement Management Teams and automated contract capability increased JCC-I/A's overall effectiveness on the battlefield.

By February 2009, JCC-I/A was an effects-based contracting organization that possessed a bolstered internal contract oversight capability. The Administration had

announced an 18-month withdrawal window for combat forces in Iraq and an increase of troop levels in Afghanistan. MNF-I shifted focus towards the drawdown of forces in Iraq, while USFOR-A was focused on preparing for surge operations. Contracting's immutable role in daily operations within both theaters made it imperative that JCC-I/A be involved in the planning process of MNF-I, USFOR-A, and CENTCOM to ensure a successful and responsible drawdown in Iraq, increased combat contracting capability in Afghanistan to support the surge, and the necessary relocation and restructuring of the Iraq-based contracting command. To ensure synchronization of planning efforts within the MNF-I, USFOR-A, and CENTCOM staffs, a strategic planning cell was established within the JCC-I/A staff. This strategic focus enabled JCC-I/A to not only focus tactical and operational contracting efforts towards the strategic objectives set forth in the Iraq First / Afghan First Programs, but also to, more importantly, plan one to two years ahead. This outward focus was vital to planning the movement and restructuring of JCC-I/A. The drawdown in Iraq meant the eventual culmination of MNF-I, JCC-I/A's (reporting) unit. With support to upcoming surge operations in Afghanistan in mind, as well as the lessons learned in Iraq still relevant, the decision was made to elevate JCC-I/A to a direct reporting unit under USCENTCOM with two subordinate contracting units, Senior Contracting Official-Iraq (SCO-I) and Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan (SCO-A). JCC-I/A would be relocated to Qatar and co-located with CENTCOM's deployed headquarters. Figure 31 provides a snapshot of JCC-I/A in 2010 prior to the reorganization to C-JTSCC.




Figure 31. JCC-I/A Theater Support—January 2010  
(From W.N. Phillips, personal communication, 2012)

### 3. The Emergence of C-JTSCC

With the announcement of the end of combat operations in Iraq on the horizon, JCC-I/A was still entrenched into the three main planning efforts of troop withdrawal from Iraq, troop surge in Afghanistan, and the relocation/reorganization of the headquarters. In concert with the troop withdraw and transition to full Iraqi control, OIF’s three major commands, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I, were merged in January 2010 to become the United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I), posturing to serve in the new advise, train, and assist role. Contracting’s role within the JLPSBs was key to synchronizing the responsible Iraq drawdown. CCO support capabilities were being contracted and expanded within Iraq and Afghanistan to provide continued support to COIN operations as needed. The headquarters relocation to Qatar was concurrently being initiated, marking the transition and organizational shift to provide support from USCENTCOM.

By January 2011, SCO-Iraq was now partnered with USF-I, SCO-A was partnered with ISAF, and the organization formerly known as JCC-I/A was now re-flagged as CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. The re-flagging to

C-JTSCC initiated the elevation of the Commander to O-8 / Flag Officer and SCO-I and SCO-A billets to O-7 / Flag Officers. This change gave the C-JTSCC Commander and subordinate commanders enough stature to sit at the “big table” to effectively represent the contracting command to focus on the strategic efforts of USCENTCOM, Operation New Dawn, and Operation Enduring Freedom. This change also facilitated an even further integration of contracting within all planning efforts. The integration of SCO-I was instrumental in USF-I achieving the president’s Iraq withdrawal deadline of December 2011. The integration of SCO-A within ISAF facilitated the successful implementation of COIN contracting and further complimented the efforts the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITF)–Shafafiyat. As the remaining U.S. forces departed Iraq, SCO-I was converted to SCO-Qatar and co-located with the C-JTSCC Headquarters to focus on providing support to theater contracting and capturing lessons learned.

#### **4. C-JTSCC Today**

Today, C-JTSCC provides responsive and effective theater contracting support to the Combined Joint Operations Areas (CJOA) of Afghanistan as well as coordination authority over all Department of Defense contracting activities operating in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Pakistan in order to provide unity of contracting effort and support USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation plans and activities (C-JTSCC, 2012c). This contract support aids NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country in order to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a haven for terrorists (NATO, 2012). In addition to orchestrating and synchronizing the provision of integrated contracted support to the USCENTCOM Commander, C-JTSCC coordinates the activities necessary to deploy, receive, manage, and redeploy contractor personnel, and has two subordinate commands: Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan (SCO-A) and Senior Contracting Official–Qatar. Figure 32 proves a recent organization chart that reflects C-JTSCC as it is organized today.




Figure 32. 2012 C-JTSCC Structure (From C-JTSCC, 2012b)

From its original inception in 2004, C-JTSCC has been known for its ability to adapt with the ongoing developments on the battlefield, playing a defining role in the reconstruction and drawdown from Iraq, to the continuing reconstruction and eventual withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. As USCENTCOM continues to be engaged throughout the AOR, C-JTSCC will remain vital to its overall mission success and accomplishment. Figure 33 provides a list of the commanders of contingency contracting for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

<b><u>CONTRACTING COMMANDERS IN IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN</u></b>			
<b>RANK / NAME</b>	<b>SERVICE</b>	<b>DATES</b>	<b>NOTES</b>
COL Anthony B. Bell	U.S. Army	Jul 2003 – Jun 2005	ORHA / CPA
BG Stephen M. Seay	U.S. Army	Jun 2004 – Jan 2005	CPA
Major General John M. Urias	U.S. Army	Jan 2005 – Jan 2006	JCC-I/A
Major General Darryl A. Scott	U.S. Air Force	Jan 2006 – Jan 2008	JCC-I/A
Rear Admiral Kathleen M. Dussault	U.S. Navy	Jan 2008 – Feb 2009	JCC-I/A
Brigadier General William N. Phillips	U.S. Army	Feb 2009 – Jan 2010	JCC-I/A
Brigadier General Camille M. Nichols	U.S. Army	Jan 2010 – Mar 2011	C-JTSCC
Rear Admiral Nicholas T. Kalathas	U.S. Navy	Mar 2011 – Feb 2012	C-JTSCC
Major General Robert M. Brown	U.S. Army	Feb 2012 – present	C-JTSCC

Figure 33. List of Iraq/Afghanistan Contracting Commanders

### **C. MAJOR FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS**

As outlined in Chapter III, we categorized the lessons learned from interviews into the DOTmLPF-P or six phases of the contract management process based on whether the data were contract execution related or not. After compiling the individual lessons learned, we evaluated the data in each category to determine the common trends within each category. In this section, we present these common trends of our findings to address our primary research question. Further analysis of each area regarding the integration of OCS and contingency contracting for each DOTmLPF-P category is also found in Chapter V.

#### **1. Doctrine: The Way the DoD Conducts Operations**

The majority of interviewees identified the lack of doctrinal guidance on how to effectively perform joint contingency contracting operations as a major challenge to effectively managing operations early on. The JTSCC construct has been a result of hard lessons learned and growing pains.

Our greatest contribution to those that will follow in our footsteps is to ensure that the lessons learned today are properly incorporated into Joint Doctrine so that mistakes and inefficiencies are not repeated in the future. (DCMA, 2006, p. 29)

Interviewees also identified the need to recognize contracting as more than writing contracts. Contingency contracting has become a catalyst of mission success during stability and reconstruction operations. Helping operational commanders understand how to effectively utilize contracting as an enabler is key to improving contracting operations in the future.

It became way more than just writing contracts and supporting through contracting. There was a real change that took place there, but there wasn't really any doctrine at that point. We just knew we had to be relevant and be more value added than just writing contracts. (Interviewee I)

I think that our COCOMs still need to recognize that contractors and contracting are very important to them in the warfighting environment, that they truly can't do anything unless they have a contracting officer there with them. I think that organizationally our leaders need to appreciate that and instead of fighting it, we need to learn how to embrace it and really use it as a tool. (Interviewee G)

The memo that General Petraeus provided back in September 2010 said...for the first time, "Hey, you guy...there is a strategic construct here at play and contracting is a big deal." To have the father of the counterinsurgency doctrine for the Department of Defense put that in writing...wow! (Interviewee H)

## **2. Organization: The Way the DoD is Organized to Conduct Operations**

At the onset of combat operations, contingency contracting capability was task organized directly to the units they supported. No organization existed that provided unity of effort to contracting efforts on the battlefield. It is critical to have the organizational structure in place on day one of execution, not years later.

With the recognition of contracting as a key enabler resulting in non-kinetic effects, many interviewees question the placement of contracting. Historically, contracting has been nested with the J4 community on the Joint and combatant command staff. This should be addressed to improve the integration of contracting in the future.

I guess overall the theme I would say is we were really trying to get inside the operational decision cycle and MNF-I and MNC-I to provide operational contract support planning to their staff, which they didn't have. (Interviewee I)

I think contracting being...buried in the J4, it loses its value...Although you could say that anything with sustainment is in fact in the J4. That's kind of a stretch, because our warfighters don't see it that way when [contracting] is buying linguists ... intel analysts ... cell phone support. (Interviewee Q)

Organizational changes have been implemented recently to address concerns raised early in operations. However, there seems to be disagreement on the future effectiveness of those changes. Specifically, concerns were raised regarding the creation, placement, and mission of the JCASO. Further discussion is provided in Chapter V.

### **3. Training: How the Department of Defense Prepares our Forces to Fight**

Interviewees agreed that there is serious need for the DoD to figure out the appropriate construct to ensure contingency contracting is incorporated into joint exercises. Ensuring the plan for theater contract support is executable before operations begin is imperative to success. Contracting often exercises outside of the joint exercise construct, which segregates it from the operational community. There must be exercise inputs that integrate the warfighter with contingency contracting. This should happen not only for the execution of contingency contracting, but also for contract administration and oversight.

Marker number two [for success of integration of OCS into the culture of the DoD] will be on joint exercises, how many MSELs [master scenario events lists] that you have as part of the exercise that...include the contractor component. (Interviewee AL)

If you are going to exercise a contractor, you have to change how you write that contract to put that in there as a requirement. And, oh, by the way, who's paying for it? (Interviewee AC)

If we put into our exercises more of the OCS construct based on the history that we have documented for each COCOM, then we have got the COCOM prepared. (Interviewee D)

#### **4. Materiel: The Necessary Equipment Needed by our Forces to Fight and Operate Effectively**

Leaders expressed the need for a network/database that captures all critical contracting information in theater that would assist in planning and decision-making. The database would provide a common list of vendors, a list of debarred vendors, types of contracts executed within each area of operation, and their associated contracting officer representatives. Additionally, the database should provide other critical information that provides leaders a common operating picture of contract operations within their battlespace.

They had set up a contracts database where all the active contracts in Iraq were being kept. You could see who the COR was, how many people, what locations were associated with each contract, when they expired, when they were stood up, and so we used that. Then, during the rehearsals, they could show you the drawdown of contractors over time based on when these services ended, and then we could go in and figure out why this contractor wasn't ramping down as quickly as he should. (Interviewee AF)

We don't have the suite of automated tools that we need to really make this [speaking on integrating contingency contracting execution and contractor management] happen. There are really three pieces to this whole package. There is the operational contract support piece...which is the execution. That is the fact we have been concentrating on because we have been in the fight and we have had to improve the way we do business and we have had to avoid wasting money. ... There are two other pieces...the contingency program management piece, which is the integration of everything...[t]hen the other piece that is even further up front, and that is the requirements definition process. (Interviewee L)

In addition to having a common operating picture, tools and resources to improve contract oversight should be pursued. Contract administration was difficult with the lack of experience of government personnel and qualified contracting officer representatives. Having tools in place to support improved contract administration and oversight is key to combating fraud, waste, and abuse.

We are trying to get our hands over the automated tools that were created during the fight...we're trying to sort out what we need to keep. (Interviewee AL)

## **5. Leadership and Education: The Way DoD Prepares our Leaders to Lead and Conduct Contract Operations**

The majority of interviewees agreed that ground commanders did not understand contracting at the onset of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the initial years of operations, contracting was not a major consideration during planning. Most non-contracting interviewees stated that their first experiences with contracting did not occur until they arrived in theater, and that pre-deployment exposure would have been extremely useful in preparing them for what they experienced. Significant credit was given to U.S. Army General (Retired) David H. Petraeus' *COIN Contracting Guidance* (COMISAF, 2010) and *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapon System* (CALL, 2009) as instrumental in advocating the importance of contracting's effects on the battlefield.

Educating the entire force on the importance of contracting and the role each member plays in the process is imperative, not only to improved contingency contracting operations but also to ensure that commanders understand their role in managing contractors on the battlefield and providing oversight of contracts. Contracting out a requirement does not alleviate the need to manage it. Commanders must understand this.

We [the DoD] create a requirement, just because we contract is out, it doesn't get rid of the fact that it's still our requirement. We contract it out and we have to oversee it, so it doesn't disappear out of a commander's purview. (Interviewee X)

But, to me, the biggest single thing is one of education and training, and it's not education and training of the contracting officer that I'm worried about. (Interviewee M)

A lot of times it was commanders not understanding the degree to which the way they do contracting and the way they spend money in their area, either to reinforce or undermine their mission. So, you know, the contracting officer knows the cost, schedule, performance, but really the commander has to look at the effect of that contract on the local area and in regard to contracting in any kind of the military operation. We write this in, obviously, to the Contracting Guidance saying his commander did this and so forth and to treat it like an operation and everything else. I think that's what continues to be the problem. (Interviewee AI)

It keeps coming back to education. I honestly think we need to start at the academies, all the way up through the senior war colleges, and educate on how you manage a workforce on a battlefield that is comprised of military, civilian, and contractor employees. Contracting Official (Interviewee M)

**6. Personnel: The DoD's Availability of Qualified Personnel for Peacetime, Wartime, and Various Contingency Operations**

There were three primary areas identified in regard to personnel. First, interviewees identified the need to have trained and qualified CCOs available to adequately support the full range of contingency contracting support. Second, to provide contract oversight there must be qualified and trained contracting officer representatives available. And finally, in order to effectively integrate contracting into the operational tempo, there must be a senior-level advocate to gain appropriate access to other senior leaders.

A common thread identified in regard to personnel was the overall lack of qualified CCOs to support the demand signal generated during combat operations. At the onset of the war, the Air Force possessed the majority of qualified CCOs, and, in essence, provided the majority of the workforce. While the Army and Navy made enormous strides on building contingency contracting capability, the Air Force continued to provide the additional contracting forces. Interviewees also cited that the recently produced workforce that resulted from the Gansler Commission have increased the effectiveness of contingency contracting support on the battlefield and have alleviated the strain on the Air Force CCO workforce.

You send a contracting officer in who has not been trained to actually write a contract and doesn't understand their rules well enough and is uncertain on what they can do or not do, well, you're going to do some dumb stupid stuff. I mean, you don't send a rookie into a fight, right? (Interviewee M)

In contracting...we don't teach people to be contracting leaders...we just teach how to be a contracting officer and the rest of it you figure out as you work in contracting. (Interviewee L)

Look what is behind the certification because if someone is Level 2 DAWIA certified, that means they spent a year in school and a year in training...I want to see what experience is behind that. (Interviewee R)

The majors, captains, Navy lieutenants and GS-12s are solving unprecedented problems every day, and we ought to hang medals on all of them. But if we make their successors solve the same problems, all of us senior folk ought to be fired! (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 8)

In addition to having qualified CCOs, the DoD must look at the COR structure currently being utilized. Contracting out a requirement may result in a decreased need to maintain organic capability for the mission; however, it does not alleviate the need to provide the appropriate oversight. CORs were often assigned the responsibility of contract oversight as an additional duty and rarely had the appropriate expertise to provide oversight on the contracts assigned. There have been efforts to improve this process, but options must continue to be explored for future operations.

There are still a lot of problems where we've got somebody as the COR on the contract and he's doing eight other things and it's just a part-time responsibility. So you can assign a COR against every contract and look good on paper and you may not be covering the waterfront in terms of having the right number of resources on it. (Interviewee I)

Institutionalize contracting officer representatives. (Interviewee B)

The weakest link we have to ensuring adequate performance on a contract is the COR situation. (Interviewee D)

**7. Facilities: The DoD's Property, Installations, and Industrial Facilities That Support our Forces to Conduct Contracting During Contingencies**

There no findings to present regarding facilities.

**8. Policy: The DoD's Existing Policy That Supports (or Doesn't Support) the Current Practices**

We would be remiss in our report if we did not identify the fact that every interviewee responsible for contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan stated the support received from the DPAP was outstanding. We received very limited feedback on the need to address policy changes, with one exception. Per 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2012) operation and maintenance funds cannot be used for unspecified military construction

projects over \$750,000. With reconstruction and stability operations, this proved to be problematic at times. This is an area to be considered for future operations.

Unless it is prohibited in statute, DPAP has done everything possible to give the commander all the tools they need to execute. (Interviewee D)

## **9. Six-Phase Contract Management Process**

Because our research did not focus specifically on the execution of contracting during operations due to the expansive amount of research available on that topic, we only identified trends associated with three of the six phases: procurement planning, contract administration, and contract closeout.

### ***a. Procurement Planning***

The lack of proper procurement planning amongst all major DoD stakeholders within the overall planning process was cited as the most common and overarching theme of lessons learned. The lack of procurement planning resulted in poorly written requirements and, ultimately, poorly written contracts. Ensuring the future leaders recognize this and address it during planning is key to ensuring the integrity of the contracting system. Proper procurement planning would have revealed the size, scope, and effect that a contracted workforce would have during all phases of the operation.

It was pretty much known that the CCOs were working for each of the separate organizations. They were basically autonomous, and they were responding to the local command's priorities, as you would expect. Contracting Official (Interviewee S)

Let's see all the requirements at the same time. We have never gotten to that and that is the one thing that I would love to be able, if I could rewrite the script, is have some way to track visibility of all requirements at all times to know that we are getting repetitive requests for the same things over and over. That then tells you that ... maybe there is a better way. (Interviewee D)

Another concern regarding procurement planning was requirements definition. There was little guidance on what could be procured, and shifting priorities made it difficult for management boards to keep a handle on which requirements were

valid. There was not a standard of service, standard process, or single approval authority. This led to cases of fraud, waste, and abuse, whether intentional or unintentional.

***b. Contract Administration***

Ensuring that a contractor's performance met the contractual requirement was another common theme derived from our interviews. Requirements generators did not have the required number of assigned or trained CORs to support their purchases. Contracting officers were not inspecting COR compliance, which only further perpetuated the issue. Major contracting incidents like security contractor oversight and failed reconstruction efforts were the forcing function for commanders to provide proper contractor oversight. After nine years of combat operations, the Army Chief of Staff implemented a policy in 2009 that mandated the number of trained CORs a unit must deploy with. As operations began to mature, oversight of contractors improved, and contracting command's increased internal controls of COR oversight ensured that contract administration was properly executed.

JCC-I/A was an effective contracting organization, but it didn't have the capability or the manning to perform post award contract oversight and execution. Frankly, that was the biggest challenge that I faced. Contracting Official (Interviewee A)

We have got to get after contract management and oversight...Contract management is administration through closeout. We took total unacceptable risk in those areas. It also gets back into COR management. It is not enough just to appoint CORs. It is not enough to do DAU training. What is missing is the technical subject-matter expertise bringing to bear on the commodities, more importantly, the services and the functional areas. ... But, we have got to come up with models on COR management. (Interviewee F)

You have got to have organic capability. So if you are going to use Defense Contract Management Agency as a combat support agency [they must have the capacity to oversee the required volume of contracted support] If not, are you going to tell the services to have the organic capability? Right now, none of us have the organic capability. The Air Force has more, but it is tied to their critical support structure, their bases ... you can't just rip that out. The Army has very little progress in terms of developing a deployable, organic capability. ... If we want to be expeditionary and go back to the tent and in very austere conditions, great.

If we want to take Iraq and Afghanistan and build up, then we have got to change the whole contract management and oversight. (Interviewee F)

*c. Contract Closeout*

The issue of contract closeout was a common theme by almost all contracting executive leaders. Because contracting was executed in a “reaction mode” for the first few years of operation, emphasis was placed on the bare minimum of contract execution. By the time the JCC-I/A established internal controls for monitoring contract closeout, over 10,000 contracts required closeout. Interviewees cited that early emphasis must be placed on executing contract closeouts to ensure that the government received the product/service, the customer verified the quality, vendors are paid, and remaining funds are deobligated.

I was really trying to get my hands around contract closeout. Closeout is one of those things that has really bedeviled the command and its reputation for years and years. Contracting Official (Interviewee D)

**D. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS**

Motivation to conduct this research was to identify not only *what* and *how* these identified events occurred but also *why* they happened. Identifying a root cause of the issues stated in the previous sections would prove critical in preventing similar occurrences from happening during future contingencies. We conducted a root cause analysis in hopes of identifying a specific workable corrective measure that prevents them from happening in the future. It was important for us to discover and put forth our efforts in creating recommendations that would resolve the root cause of the issues and not expend energy on the symptoms of the greater issue. The identification of a root cause enabled us to further direct this research towards a focused analysis and to make feasible, acceptable, suitable, and complete recommendations.

Based on our evaluation, the root cause that lies at the heart of these findings is the lack of planning during Phase Zero. Contingency contracting has predominantly been a reactive function and rarely fully integrated into OPLANS. Contributing to this is the lack of qualified senior-level contracting officials on the Joint and combatant command staffs. The evolution of theater contract support requires a significant shift in business as

usual for the DoD. Further analysis of the integration of contracting into the joint operation planning process is presented in Chapter V.

## **E. SUMMARY**

Through the analysis of our data, we were able to partially answer our research questions. Interviewing the commanders of C-JTSCC and conducting our literature review provided us with the historical evolution and adaptation of the organization, answering our secondary research question. Through applying our frameworks of DOTmLPF-P and the six-phase contract management process, we were able to identify common themes in our data to present our lessons learned findings.

Through a root cause analysis, we were able to determine that the absence of contracting integration and planning during the early phases of joint operation planning for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was the root cause of the vast majority of findings. All interviewees acknowledged the relevance that contracting brought to operations as a non-kinetic weapon, and how contracting enables the ground commanders and executive leaders to achieve effects on the battlefield like no other weapon. This finding highlights the need to appropriately plan for future contingency contracting operations.

Chapter V provides a detailed analysis of ongoing efforts to integrate contingency contracting and OCS into joint operation planning.

## **V. ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION OF CONTRACTING AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTO JOINT PLANNING**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

We recognized early in our research that the scope of findings we would encounter when attempting to answer our primary research question would be expansive. After conducting 35 interviews with key senior leaders associated with contingency contracting and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one common theme took precedence over all others; contracting must become fully integrated early in the planning process to effectively support any type of contingency response. Contracting can no longer serve as a reactive administrative function. Not only has contract support as part of the total force become critical to the success of military operations, contracting has been recognized as a non-kinetic weapon that commanders can use to shape the battlefield. In this chapter, we analyze the efforts to institutionalize operational contract support and integrate contingency contracting into the joint operation planning environment.

### **B. DOTMLPF-P ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING INTEGRATION**

#### **1. Introduction**

As discussed in Chapter II, multiple commission and oversight agencies have evaluated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and identified areas of improvement for the DoD in regard to contingency contracting. These reports have sent a strong message to the Department that a change was needed. The following quotes from these reports reflect the strong demand for a change.

Contractors represent almost half the workforce the United States has employed to achieve its objectives in the Iraq and Afghanistan contingency operations. Despite the extent of this reliance, and despite the additional stress this reliance has placed on the contingency-contracting function, agencies have in too many cases continued to operate using their existing peacetime acquisition processes, organizational structures and

resources. Supplementing the contingency-contracting function with ad hoc solutions has proven to be ineffective. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a, p. 27)

The Army must fix the cause of such failures, and the symptoms will subside. The cause is a culture that does not sufficiently value or recognize the importance of contracting, contract management, and contractors in the expeditionary operations. Without the necessary contracting leadership, the necessary change cannot be achieved. (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 9)

[DASD (PS)] officials stated that taking the discussion of operational contract support beyond the logistics community will require a fundamental cultural change for DoD. ... [findings]identified regarding the oversight and management of contractor support to deployed forces stem from DoD's reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of the total force. (GAO, 2010a, p. 22)

Without a culture change at DoD that supports more thorough planning, sharper doctrine, better training, and improved coordination, future contingences will bring repetitions of hasty, improvised, poorly defined, and wasteful use of contracting that DoD has said it relies upon in major operations. Our troops, our taxpayers, and our national interest cannot allow that to happen. (Joint Staff J4, 2012)

In response to the demand signals, the DoD began significant efforts to integrate contractors into the total force. While these efforts are commendable, based on our analysis of the interviews with senior leaders involved with contingency contracting planning, execution, and oversight, there remain significant concerns regarding the effectiveness of the DoD's current direction for the integration and synchronization of OCS. In this section, we provide the major areas of concern, organized under each DOTMPF-P category based on analysis of the data and literature.

## **2. Doctrine**

The current focus being placed on the new realities of contractor support to the DoD in contingency operations provides the perfect opportunity to utilize recent and relevant lessons learned to realign doctrine. However, ensuring that the doctrine is aligned correctly is the cornerstone to ensuring the changes are institutionalized throughout the DoD.

JP 1–02 (Joint Staff, 2010) defines doctrine as, “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (p. 99). It further defines joint doctrine as, “Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures” (p. 169). Ultimately, doctrine is the foundation of how the military Services will proceed. In regard to contracting, JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) provides the foundation for the way ahead regarding contractor support and contingency contracting.

During the course of our interviews, we identified one constant theme regarding OCS: It spans all staff directorates and functional elements, and will require a “team effort” to be successful. While all interviewees are in agreement on that point, there remains a serious disconnect regarding the interpretation of what OCS is between those charged with managing it and those responsible for executing it. In interviews with contracting leaders, there was unanimous agreement that it is imperative to institutionalize the integration of contracting planners in the deliberate and crisis action planning processes and, ultimately, to operationalize contracting. Opinions are not necessarily shared among those responsible for OCS management and planning.

Well OCS is ... getting the material and the services downrange to where they need to be. It is how we implement contingency contracting. Contingency contracting is actually writing the contract and putting in the proper clauses and all of that good stuff and having people with the proper warrants to provide the oversight. But OCS is the actual practical means so that we get the support to the warfighter that [they need] to have. That is kind of the umbrella process. (Interviewee AL)

Officials responsible for the overall plan writing process at one combatant command did not see much value in placing contractor-related information in operation plans because they believed contractor issues will be addressed by the logistics community once a plan is being executed. (GAO, 2010a, p. 21)

JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) creates a clear divide between contingency contracting and OCS, as does SECDEF and JCS guidance assigning OCS responsibilities. The inclusion of OCS as a Tier II joint capability area under Logistics further supports the

divide, with acquisition residing as a Tier II JCA under Corporate Management and Support. The fact that there is a difference between OCS and contingency contracting is not the primary concern. Rather the division of roles and responsibilities does not appear to support the need to recognize contingency contracting as a line of effort.

Integrating OCS into the DNA of the DoD will require a significant effort on the part of all staff directorates and commanders to understand that contracting, regardless of the type, is their business. Current doctrine identifies OCS as the overarching planning and management of all things contract support related, and contingency contracting as the execution of theater support contracts. This reinforces the idea of relegating contracting as a reactive administrative function. This thought process contributed to the significant challenges faced in current operations and many of the major oversight findings. While the DCCH clearly states that CCOs are not responsible for determining requirements, there is an expectation CCOs will act as business advisors to organizations during the requirements development process. As business advisors and experts on the nuances of contracting, CCOs should be there to assist commanders with understanding how contracting efforts can support their mission. Current doctrine and guidance are silent on how to operationalize contracting in order to help commanders understand how to use contracting as an enabler.

Money is my most important ammunition in this war—MG David Petraeus, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division Air Assault (CALL, 2009, p. 1)

Contracting is the nexus between our warfighters' requirements and the contractors that fulfill those requirements ... in support of critical military operations[;] contractor personnel must provide timely services and equipment to the warfighter; and the Army contracting community must acquire those services and equipment effectively, efficiently, and legally. (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 2)

It is not a point of contention that contracting involves multiple agencies. Figure 34 depicts the typical contracting process and who is involved at each step of the process. This figure reflects the need to incorporate the user into the contracting process and inculcate the importance of contracting and the surrounding requirements throughout the DoD, but the important thing to note is that contracting officers are specifically involved

with the majority of the process, to include helping users develop requirements definitions. Who is better to lead the DoD in the cultural paradigm shift than those that have been executing the mission? Contracting officers understand the nuances of a contract and provide business advice to the warfighter to adequately plan for contractor support.




Figure 34. Contracting is More than Writing Contracts  
(From Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 94)

Contracting is not limited to the process of drafting and executing contracts in a contracting activity. It involves everything from a warfighter identifying a need that must be filled, through contracting, through delivery and acceptance of the supplies or services from a contractor, to contract closeout. The Operational Army, or warfighter, plays a large and active role in “contracting.” (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 20)

[Regarding the Army reorganization] ... that was all because of [the Gansler, the operational G side of the military; a big deal, a real big deal—policy, operations, field operations. That was a big move ... that operationalized contracting for the Army. (Interviewee H)

One consistent theme among senior contracting leaders responsible for the execution of operations for the past 11 years is the level of effort required and given to integrate their organization into the operational planning of the units they supported in order to operationalize contract support. COIN operations emphasized the fact that money is a weapon system, and its use on the battlefield has serious implications to the success of missions.

And then as [Speaking of a Supported Commanding General] put it, we arrived at a point that he was convinced that contracting was its own line of effort and that it was the single platform by which all other operations could determine success or failure, so it's a huge enabler. (Interviewee R)

The concept of integrating non-kinetic operations with kinetic operations is not a new concept. As discussed in Chapter II, Maj Gen (USAF Ret.) Darryl Scott pioneered the principle of effects-based contracting (EBC). The basic foundation of EBC is inserting the CCO early in the planning process, at appropriate locations within the unit's battle rhythm, from the corps to the battalion level.

The first time I actually had this made most clearly to me was [Maj Gen] Darryl Scott talking about what he called kinetic contracting [EBC]. It was that at the end of the day when you're going to go in with an operation and kick the door down and you want the door replaced that afternoon because you really don't want the people that are in that village to be irritated because their door is not replaced for three weeks. If you're telling me you want the door replaced this afternoon and I'm getting asked that question at noon, it's not going to happen. On the other hand, if you bring me into the planning cell and I know two weeks in advance or a month in advance that you're going to do this operation and I need the ability to replace those doors, we can find a way to get that done. ... I cannot respond instantaneously to that requirement, so you've got to include me in the front end in your planning process. (Interviewee M)

As I said, it is a line of effort. It has to be a line of effort. Most field plans rely heavily on contracting as a force enabler so that they can put more guys on the trigger and less guys doing the support functions and they contract that out. That is a reality that we will face in a future battle-space. (Interviewee R)

EBC has since been recognized throughout the operational community through the integration of EBC into COIN operations. Brig Gen Casey Blake made significant

strides in shifting the culture of contingency contracting during his assignment as the Senior Contract Official-Afghanistan (SCO-A). He utilized the concept of integration cells to put a team into the customer's operation centers to shape and influence outcomes. These teams were comprised of a program manager, contracting officer, local national business advisor, and contractor support. His initiatives laid the groundwork to inculcate the importance of integrating contracting into the battle rhythm of supported commanders, and how this type of cell could ultimately be integrated into the deliberate and crisis action planning process at the combatant command level.

As the maneuver force [in Afghanistan] demobilizes and repositions, contracting will be a "key enabler" in achieving the desired COIN effects. In this capacity, contracting cannot abdicate its roles and responsibilities to better integrate the kinetic and non-kinetic battle-space; it is the catalyst for success. (Blake, 2012, p. 22)

We've raised a generation of operational leaders now, if you think about it. Every officer ... we have now up to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, knows nothing but war. And they also know this, "I don't know exactly what those contracting people do, but I want them right here next to me. (Interviewee H)

Joint doctrine and guidance have laid the foundation to integrate OCS considerations into the planning process across all staff directorates and have mandated the inclusion of OCS requirements in all levels of planning products. All interviewees agree that each directorate must plan for the use of contractor support and manage those requirements accordingly. However, the consensus of our interviews with both contracting and non-contracting military leaders is this; you need to have contracting involved in the deliberate and crisis action planning process to provide the business advice to other staff elements for effective OCS planning. The division of responsibilities implemented by joint doctrine and DoD guidance sets a precedence that those responsible for executing the plan will be removed from those planning and managing the plan.

As previously outlined, the recent OCS Manpower Study does not place heavy emphasis on the need for acquisition experience. However, based on the responsibilities listed in Appendix E, many of the functions expected from these planners require more than a basic understanding of contracting, they require the ability to act in the business

advisor capacity to assist other staff directorates with understanding how to integrate contractors and potential contract needs into their plans. The success of Brig Gen Blake's integration cells in Afghanistan should prove the need to have experienced contracting officers involved in the planning process.

JP 4-10 (Joint Staff, 2008) recognizes the fact that the contract terms and conditions establish the legal relationship between the government and the contractor; however, they place little emphasis on including those knowledgeable of the legal contract requirements on the planning teams (p. IV-2). DoD plans for the future of OCS identify the need for a team approach, which all contracting leaders interviewed agree with, but there is significant concern regarding the lack of emphasis on having an experienced contracting officer involved on the team that will create the plan contracting will ultimately execute. The OCS Manpower Study places emphasis on skill sets associated with planning, logistics or other JCA, and operations, with acquisition experience as a "nice to have," specifically stating acquisition certification is not required. While the senior leaders we interviewed agree you need a mix of skill sets in the OCS planning cell, the lack of emphasis on having a contracting officer/planner as a member of the OCS planning staff causes great concern for the contracting leaders that have led operations for the past 11 years.

The fact that almost all of them are logisticians bothers me every time I see them ... they're great and they've gotten better over time, but I do absolutely think that they should have, as a minimum, acquisition experience so they understand the nuances of the processes, the rules, and the strategies that have to be in place. The best would be that they would actually have combat contracting experience. (Interviewee Q)

I go back to if you're going to deliver the capability through a contractor, somebody better understand those pieces. (Interviewee Q)

Include contracting and procurement personnel at all phases of planning for contingency operations. Contracting plays a central role in the execution of contingency operations, and thus it must be part of the pre-deployment planning process. Whether for stabilization or reconstruction operations, contracting officials help provide an accurate picture of the resources necessary to carry out the mission. (SIGIR, 2006, p. 98)

To complement the efforts spawned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a body of research exists exploring the addition of a fifth phase to the phases of contingency contracting: Phase Zero. Phase Zero was introduced in the NPS Joint Applied Project NPS-AM-08-127. The authors researched a joint EBC execution system to be utilized during the new Phase Zero contingency contracting phase, which aligns with the Shape (Phase 0) of the CCDR's planning (Poree, Curtis, Morrill, & Sherwood, 2008). This concept was further discussed in the report NPS-COM-10-160 in which the author explored the implications of the lack of an integrated structure and construct at the joint strategic level (Yoder, 2010). Multiple other projects have been conducted on how to improve contingency contracting, many requiring a strategic approach through the integration of contracting officers in the early phases of planning at all levels.

Outside of the DoD, commercial firms have already recognized the benefits of involving purchasing in the creation of strategic goals and objectives. Many use a five-step process that is similar to what Brig Gen Blake did through his integration cells. The five steps are the following: (1) purchasing ascertains the priorities of user departments; (2) a mutual priority of targets is developed; (3) a joint plan of attack is made; (4) the work is done jointly; and (5) the "limelight" is shared with the user departments (Cavinato, 1987). These types of commercial best practices are infiltrating industry because every dollar saved via the purchasing department is a dollar earned towards profit. Companies recognize that purchasing is an enabling capability that when synchronized with their overall strategy results in improved success. While not identical, these five steps are similar in nature to the iterative planning process that takes place within the DoD during deliberate and crisis action planning.

Based on our interviews, the culture shift that the DoD is pursuing in regard to OCS is a necessary step; however, there appears to be a gap in those efforts, and that is operationalizing contracting and integrating contracting officers into the OCS planning cells responsible for deliberate and crisis action planning. Changes in business as usual are required to shift the culture of the DoD to properly manage contractors as part of the total force, and both contracting and non-contracting leaders recognize the need to get it right the first time. But if the resulting DoD "DNA" fails to institutionalize the

appropriate foundation, the DoD will continue to face the same challenges regarding contingency contracting response in the future.

We need to be operating not as if we have been here [discussing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan] one year eleven times, but as if we've been here eleven years. (Interviewee R)

### **3. Organization**

Organizational structure provides the formal division, grouping, and coordination of tasks. As discussed in Chapter II, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provided the foundation for today's DoD organization, which was based on a military landscape that was very different than the landscape of today's military. Organizational culture is significantly impacted by organizational design, and ensuring the design supports the desired organizational culture is imperative (Robbins & Judge, 2012).

The current DoD initiatives related to OCS are intended to help make the needed culture shift to institutionalize OCS into the "DNA" of the DoD. There is agreement among all interviewees that this paradigm shift requires all members of the military to embrace and understand that contractors are now part of the total force and, therefore, must be planned for and integrated as the *fifth force*. Joint doctrine, guidance, policies, and new organizational structures are being implemented to support this shift in culture.

It is important that a significant culture change occur, one that emphasizes operational contract support throughout all aspects of the department, including planning, training, and personnel requirements. (GAO, 2010b)

The fact that the DoD is placing emphasis on OCS and the appropriate management of contingency contracting is a move in the right direction. However, rather than identifying an organization that owns the brunt of the responsibilities for OCS and contingency contracting together, the roles and responsibilities have been spread throughout multiple areas. This separation of management and execution could ultimately make integration and synchronization less effective.

So, technically, if you're going to ask the question who's in charge, well, Secretary Panetta, but is there really one person that is accountable or responsible? Tell me exactly what you want to know and yeah there's someone in charge. But from an OCS perspective, is there one? No. The

Joint Staff does stuff, the Comptroller does stuff. [USD]AT&L does stuff. Inside [USD]AT&L, [DPAP] does stuff. [DUSD(PS)] does stuff, [Deputy Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain Integration)] does stuff. ... [T]here is also a complex relationship between [USAID] and [the Department of State]. ... [I]t's a complex labyrinth of issues. (Interviewee M)

Based on the data collected during our interviews, there remains disagreement among senior leaders associated with OCS as to whether the current approach is appropriate to obtain the intended results for the DoD. The primary areas of concern are the appropriateness of placing contracting and operational contract support under the logistics directorate (J4) on the Joint and CCDR staffs, and the organization, placement, and mission of JCASO.

As Joint Publication 4–10 states, planners often develop a mind-set that contracting is inherently a combat service support function. However, contract support for military operations not only includes logistics, but also may include combat support functions such as engineering, intelligence and signal/communications. (GAO, 2010a, p. 22)

*a. Placement of Contracting*

Many interviewees, contracting and non-contracting, believe the organizational direction being taken by the DoD will result in the same challenges in the future by not having the appropriate organizational structure in place. While contractor-to-military ratios have risen to nearly 2:1 in Iraq and Afghanistan and the utilization of contracting as a non-kinetic weapon has increased, the DoD continues to perpetuate the view that contracting, and what is now OCS, is merely a sub-function to logistics, and, more concerning, that contingency contracting is merely the execution arm of contract support, while the commission reports have called for acquisitions and contracting to become a DoD core competence.

Agencies must fully accept contracting as a core function if only because of the sheer numbers of contingency contracts, their value, and the adverse financial, political, and operational impacts of failure. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 114)

Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported

and, most important, under-valued. (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 21)

Applying commercial best practices to the DoD is not always successful due to the statutory regulations and considerations imposed on the DoD that are not applicable to industry; however, there are some practices that could prove to be very useful. One practice industry is embracing is the elevation of purchasing within the organizational structure and the creation of the Chief Procurement Officer that reports directly to the CEO. The CPO has access to the other executive-level officials and increased access to other units within the organization that support the success of the purchasing department. Industry has recognized the need for an “executive champion” and that the position itself is not what is critical; rather the visibility and resources associated with such a position send a clear message throughout the organization that purchasing is on par with other functional executives (Trent, 2004).

The current organizational structure with contracting subordinate to the J4 or Logistics community dates back to pre-World War I, when contracting was very limited in nature and scope. The CWC Second Interim Report made the recommendation to remove contracting from J4 and create a new contingency contracting J10 directorate, citing that the current organizational structure is antiquated and no longer supports the reality of today’s military force structure. The new directorate would be led by a flag officer with contracting experience (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).

Despite contractors’ constituting almost half the total force deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD contingency-contracting matters have been mixed together with the J4 logistics directorate. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a, p. 27)

The placement of contracting within J4 reflects outdated thinking that contracting is only a method to achieve logistical support—not a full spectrum of operational contract support. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 120)

And too many logistics officers who rise to flag rank lack contracting experience and are unfamiliar with the broad range of roles contractors play in supporting military operations. Contracting should no longer be subordinate to logistics. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, pp. 119–120)

As a senior combatant command logistics (J4) director told the Commission, “I would like ... contracting to be a separate directorate. ... Two CENTCOM planners are not enough. ... They are flying the airplanes as they build it.” (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 115)

Acquisition officials have become more knowledgeable and vocal about the extent and nature of the problems in contingency contracting, yet agencies are slow to change. Meaningful progress will be limited as long as agencies resist major reforms that would elevate the importance of contracting, commit additional resources to planning and managing contingency contracting, and institutionalizing best practices within their organizations. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 7)

During the course of our interviews, it became obvious that the CWC was not alone in this opinion. The majority of contracting officials interviewed, and approximately half of the non-contracting officials, agreed that keeping contracting nested within the J4 is not the appropriate organizational structure to support the needed culture shift within the DoD.

We needed to be able to coordinate pretty much on an equal footing with all the other staff sections. Now, I’m contracting, so it’s not surprising that I’d have that opinion, but I’m a little weary when I see contracting nested up under the J4. (Interviewee I)

A number of our contracts, security, surveillance, dogs, and translators were not J4 related. So J4s are great and we need them, but they have a narrower focus than the contracting people who do all these other things. So, I don’t think it’s appropriate to nest contracting staff under the J4. If you have to, that would be the best place to put it, but I wouldn’t do that by routine. (Interviewee AF)

It can’t be just consumed by logistics, although much of contracting is logistics related, it is not logistics by design. It is so much more than that. ... So, yeah, I agree they ought to set up a J10. (Interviewee R)

The Joint Staff did not adopt the recommendation and stated that the DoD

did not believe that a new organizational construct would enhance the current effort to institutionalize operational contract support, and that command and control is strengthened by using established, well-understood staff structures. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p.120)

During the course of our interviews, we were able to conclude that the DoD’s intent for the future is that through doctrine, training, and education, OCS will

infiltrate throughout the DoD, to include outside the acquisition community. The vision is that OCS will become so ingrained in the culture that contingency contracting commanders will no longer have a need to manage OCS. The expectation is that operational leaders will manage their own OCS requirements, leaving contracting to only have to execute contracts. Based on our research and interviews, a change of this nature will require significant senior executive-level support, and a senior executive responsible for integrating all aspects of OCS, to include the execution of contingency contracting.

The message sent by the Joint Staff's response to the concept of a J10 is that contingency contracting is merely an execution activity that is subordinate to logistics and the increased reliance on contract options does not justify addressing the status quo. The conclusion that contingency contracting will not demand an experienced executive-level champion to integrate, synchronize, and manage OCS fails to put the required emphasis on the initiatives to support the needed cultural change throughout the organization. Lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan prove there is a need for upward movement of contingency contracting within the organization. Based on our interviews, every commander of C-JTSCC was expected to provide management of all contracting efforts within the area of operations, regardless of the fact they did not maintain command and control over those agencies. While the purpose of the JTSCC should not be to act as the single focal point for all things contract related, there should be an integrator at the JTF, CCDR, and Joint staffs that is responsible for providing the oversight and management required for contingency contracting. The fact remains that the need to manage and integrate OCS is a result of a contract action, regardless of where that contract is written. Contracting officers have been providing the needed expertise to operational commanders for matters related to contracts, not the J4 community.

As the use of contract support in operations has grown, so too has the realities of what contingency contracting entails. As such, contingency contracting has far outgrown logistics, and it is time the organization adjust to support the growth of this function within the DoD.

***b. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office***

The John Warner FY07 NDAA, Section 854 called for focus and organizational movement in three specific areas: requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting. In addition, multiple reports, including reports from the GAO, CWC and Gansler Commission, have called for a programmatic approach to contingency contracting. The creation of the DUSD(PS) and JCASO were in response to these recommendations and facilitate the current plans to institutionalize OCS. While the creation of these organizations often is attributed as a result of the multiple commission and oversight reports, our analysis of the data received points to a possible misinterpretation of the demand signals.

The majority of the interviewees support the premise of the JCASO; however, there remains concern regarding the current state of the organization. First, many are unsure of the purpose of JCASO and view the continued evolution of the organization as a way to find relevance. Second, there is disagreement as to what the organization should be utilized for. And third, there remains concern with the placement of the JCASO within the DLA.

From the initial draft concept papers through to the most recent overview on the JCASO website, the organization has evolved significantly. Based on the draft concept paper on the Contingency Acquisition Support Office (CASO) we obtained that was created by the DUSD(IP; 2006), the original mission of the CASO was to be “the direct application of the economic instrument of national power towards meeting the objectives of the supported joint force commander” (p. 2). The emphasis of the organization was to expand from contingency contracting to contingency acquisition. The following list identifies the key considerations for the proposed CASO organization.

- Organized under a Joint Acquisition Command (JAC) under U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
- Staffed with the full set of acquisition skills such as requirements definition, contracting, program management, and financial management. Staff would have also included experience planners and liaison officers from other DoD and executive branch agencies.

- Comprised of 50–60 permanent staff (active duty military, government civilian, and contractor support) and a joint reserve unit of 150–200 reserve members (program managers, contracting officers, and financial officers all trained and certified for contingency acquisition operations).
- Would have been comprised of forward deployed elements providing acquisition support to the JFC.
- The military Services were to retain Title 10 responsibilities, including in-theater weapons systems logistics support.
- In-theater oversight of acquisition activities would fall under JAC to promote unity of effort.
- JFCOM would have been delegated Executive Agent for contingency acquisition with the CASO director designated as the HCA.
- In-garrison the CASO would have primarily focused on planning, coordination, and readiness functions, and the joint reserve unit would have supported joint exercises. (DUSD[IP], 2006)

The majority of the contracting senior leaders interviewed agree with the original premise of the CASO. However, with the new doctrinal foundation of OCS, the approach taken for the JCASO is different than initially intended for the organization, leaving many senior leaders wondering exactly how the new organization will fit within the current acquisition force structure. In CJCS Notice 4130.01 (CJCS, 2011c), the DLA JCASO “is an on-call enabling capability providing operational contract support coordination and integration during peacetime and contingency operations” (p. 1). At the time of the notice, the JCASO was organized in two divisions: Operations and Policy. The Operations division contains deployable Mission Support Teams (MSTs) and planners embedded at the combatant commands. The Policy division assists those responsible for OCS policy, doctrine, and lessons learned. In reviewing the roles and responsibilities of the JCASO, a significant portion of the in-garrison assigned roles and responsibilities for the JCASO relate to integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating OCS efforts during planning efforts. This includes the development of the Annex Ws, establishing guidance for the lead service for contracting and participation in strategic forums on the topic of OCS. In-theater support includes functions such as deploying an MST temporarily until a permanent OCS structure is in place such as a JTSCC, advising the CCDR on the lead service for contracting construct and facilitating communication

between the lead service for contracting, Services, Defense Agencies, and other WOG partners. Additional responsibilities include advising on processes and procedures for contingency contracting, and advising with the development of economic strategies (CJCS, 2011c). This is not an inclusive list of roles and responsibilities. The full list can be found at Enclosure A of CJCSN 4130.01, dated December 20, 2011 (CJCS, 2011c).

During our interviews none of the information and data collected stated that the JCASO would be responsible for execution of contingency contracting. In fact, we were assured during the course of our interviews that JCASO does not do contingency contracting. However, the most recent information paper available on the JCASO website (August 2012) reflects the addition of a third division, Contingency Contracting. The overview states that the CCDR may designate the JCASO as the head of contingency contracting, and the JCASO assets will provide temporary support until a JTSCC is in place and operational. While this evolution of the organization appears to move the organization closer to the original concept, there are significant differences in organizational structure and personnel that make it difficult to understand why the organization would evolve to include a contingency contracting capability. With the stand-up of the Army's Expeditionary Contracting Command and the Air Force's unit type code packages, the capability within the JCASO seems to be a duplication of effort and the organization not appropriately staffed to provide the appropriate experience required to establish a JTSCC and contingency contracting policies and procedures.

In our interviews, we asked the question, how do you see the JCASO fitting within the DoD contingency acquisition community? The responses scaled from, who is the JCASO, to they are appropriately placed and manned for their mission. With that said, there were a significant number of interviewees that provided answers somewhere in the middle. Many of the interviewees agree that the vision they have for the JCASO is similar to what the original intent was for the CASO, and that they should be staffed accordingly to provide the contingency acquisition skills and expertise needed to provide contingency contracting effectively. However, this viewpoint underscores the difference of opinion between the "OCS community" and the "contracting community" regarding the direction the DoD needs to take to fully integrate contractor support into the

planning and execution of operations. In general, all interviewees agree that there should be a joint agency responsible for coordinating the planning efforts across all CCDRs and ensure that OCS is integrated. There remains a split between senior leaders as to what that organization should look like spanning both ends of the spectrum. One consistent point of agreement is that the JCASO should be responsible for capturing joint lessons learned and ensuring those are disseminated throughout the community and incorporated into training at all levels.

The final area of concern raised in regard to the JCASO is the placement of the organization with the DLA. The DLA provides the full spectrum of combat logistics support. The organization provides logistics, acquisition, and technical services as requested by military departments and federal agencies (DLA, 2012a). The very fact that the DLA focuses primarily on logistics support is of concern for the same reasons discussed in the previous section regarding the placement of contracting within the logistics community. However, the other concern is that the support provided by the JCASO is at the discretion of the DLA. Embedding the JCASO within the DLA does not support the idea that contingency acquisition planning must increase in significance and should be readily available to the joint force on a day-to-day basis. At this time, the support must be specifically requested. The JCASO has no authority to direct action throughout the combatant commands and must obtain contracting authority through the DLA. If used to establish a preliminary JTSCC, the supporting manpower to provide contingency contracting support would deploy with contract authority from their assigned Service, and since lead service for contracting is generally given to one of the Services, unity of command and effort for contingency contracting will be impossible.

#### **4. Training**

Joint exercises and rehearsals are critical to ensuring that planning has been conducted effectively and provide an opportunity to identify gaps in the plans to address prior to future execution of the plan. While our research questions did not focus specifically on joint exercises, the topic came up in the majority of interviews. The primary issue identified with training is the fact that joint exercises rarely go through

Phases IV and V of an OPLAN. While contingency contracting support will begin in Phase I, the management requirements associated with OCS generally will not arise until the later phases of an operation. The condensed nature of joint exercises make it difficult to validate that commanders are appropriately planning for and executing their plans associated with contractor support. Some success has been found in performing table-top exercises that walk through the later phases of execution, but those still do not account for the contractors. Contractor support personnel are not typically included in the joint exercises for multiple reasons, but primarily the cost associated with contractor personnel.

While it was recognized that it is difficult to exercise later phases of an OPLAN, there were positive commendations made regarding the efforts of the JCASO to assist and participate in joint exercises to ensure that commanders are planning for and executing OCS plans.

## **5. Materiel**

Materiel solutions were not the focus of our research; however, one trend found among the interviews is the need for a centralized requirements development tool for requiring agencies. There are on-going efforts to develop business tools to support contingency contracting and OCS, but in-depth research was not conducted in this area and will be recommended for further research.

## **6. Leadership and Education**

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 created joint billet coding, and with those billets came the requirement for individuals to obtain Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). JPME provides the education needed to complement training and experience to produce the most professionally competent individuals possible. All interviewees agree it is imperative to force OCS training into the military school systems at the appropriate levels to educate the force on how to manage contractors as part of the total force.

It is obviously difficult to add training requirements to the already full curriculums of the many training and education programs within the Services. However, the only way to fully inculcate the need to manage contractors appropriately is to ensure that every member of the DoD understands that contractors are now part of the total force and should be planned for and supported just as any other member of the total force. Training must focus on the limitations and constraints of command and control in regard to contractors. Ensuring this training is provided at all levels consistently will help to reinforce the needed culture change with the DoD in regard to OCS.

Honestly I think we need to start at the academies all the way up through ... the senior war colleges [to provide] a discussion on how you manage a workforce on a battlefield that is comprised of military, civilian, and contractor employees. (Interviewee AF)

During the course of our interviews we were able to determine that the Joint Staff J4 OCS Division and the DUSD(PS) have successfully created and integrated OCS training modules at the company grade, field grade, and flag officer level. This is a significant step in the right direction.

## **7. Personnel**

The intent of the personnel component is to ensure that there are appropriately trained and qualified personnel available to support joint capability requirements. Having the right personnel at the appropriate level, in the right place, and at the right time is critical to ensuring the success of any operation.

Based on our interviews, oversight findings, and commission reports, the DoD began contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in a very ad hoc manner with little to no centralization of command and control. Oversight was assigned based on necessity, not planned and integrated. One key component in ensuring future success is ensuring the DoD has the appropriate personnel available to support contingency contracting operations. During the course of our interviews and literature review, three primary themes were identified. First, having the appropriate level of authority and experience available to the JTF commander is critical. Second, ensuring contracting officers have the appropriate skill set to effectively integrate with operational

units sets the stage for success. And finally, there must be a programmatic approach used during the execution of contingency operations.

*a. Personnel Authority Level and Experience*

One theme that became very evident during our interviews is the need to have an experienced senior leader positioned appropriately to gain access to the “big table.” Planning and integration take place at many different levels. Based on our interviews, regional contracting centers were able to “link in” with operations at the tactical level with some success. However, obtaining access and acceptance into the senior-level staff and command-level planning efforts, proved difficult in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In order to make it a core capability in the DoD environment, you have got to put stars on somebody’s shoulders. (Interviewee AE)

While the commanders of C-JTSCC were all a minimum of a one-star general officer, they were responsible for synchronizing and managing the oversight of two areas of operation and were not available on a consistent basis to sit at the table with the other general officers responsible for the multiple facets of operations in each country. As such, the responsibility to obtain that access was left to the senior contracting official, which until recently was a colonel. In 2011, the first brigadier general took the position of senior contracting official since the establishment of C-JTSCC. Additionally, the commander, which had been a one-star general officer since 2008, is a two-star GO. This change seemed to be critical to obtaining access at all of the appropriate levels to fully integrate contingency contracting activities with those of the operational community.

It is unlikely that an Army contracting corps with an adequate number of General Officers would have been so ill-equipped to serve the Operational Army in expeditionary operations. These flag officers would have been “at the table” planning and supporting the operations. (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 5)

The results of our interviews appear to support the recommendations made by the CWC regarding the need to “elevate and expand the authority of military officials responsible for” (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 129).

You need a general officer. You know, I had to revise my opinion because I thought, hey, we can get rid of the contracting guys. But [contracting] really should be the last person [out]. (Interviewee AF)

There’s no doubt about it. We have senior leaders that are, for lack of a better expression, looking out for contracting, but [contracting was not] able to engage at [the flag officer/general officer] level ... not only does it lend credibility, but you are in the different forums you needed to be able to help educate and be able to engage. (Interviewee I)

In addition to the interviews, there is a body of research at the Naval Postgraduate School regarding the subject contingency contracting personnel, specifically, the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2010). In his research, published in 2004, Yoder presents a personnel model comprised of three tiers. Figure 35 outlines each tier and the functions, experience, and benefits and drawbacks associated with each.

**Table 9. The Yoder Three-Tier Model**  
 (Source – "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting")

<b>Model Tier Level &amp; Model Title</b>	<b>Functions/Education/Rank</b>	<b>Highlights and Drawbacks</b>
<b>Ordering Officer—Tier One</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• basic ordering</li> <li>• some simplified acquisitions</li> <li>• training: DAU CON 234</li> <li>• DAWIA Certified CON Level I or II</li> <li>• junior to mid-enlisted, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9, 1102 series civilians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• simple buys</li> <li>• little integration</li> <li>• no operational planning</li> <li>• no broad liaison functions</li> </ul>
<b>Leveraging Contracting Officer—Tier Two</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• leverages to local economy</li> <li>• reduces "pushed" material support</li> <li>• training/education: DAU CON 234, recommended higher education</li> <li>• DAWIA Certified CON Level II or III</li> <li>• senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• better local operational planning</li> <li>• some integration</li> <li>• more capability for the operational commander</li> <li>• no planned theater integration</li> <li>• no broad liaison functions</li> <li>• may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops</li> </ul>
<b>Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• highest level of planning and integration—joint linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5</li> <li>• creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy</li> <li>• provides direction to tier two and one</li> <li>• links operations strategically to theater objectives of COCOM</li> <li>• education: Master's degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II</li> <li>• DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc)</li> <li>• senior officers (O-6+), senior civilians, GS-13+ or SES</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN</li> <li>• link between COCOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations</li> <li>• coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support</li> <li>• can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets</li> <li>• includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater</li> </ul>

Figure 35. Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations  
 (From Yoder, 2005, p. 17)

Of particular interest to our research is Tier Three—the integrated planner and executor (IPE). Our interviewees agree that having a joint qualified general officer/flag officer with contingency contracting experience is critical to successful integration into operational planning. Rank and authority provide access to other senior leaders. The key to gaining momentum on changing the culture of the DoD regarding contingency contracting is helping operational commanders to understand and embrace their role in the process. Having an IPE provides the conduit to helping those commanders understand how contracting can be used as an enabler and, ultimately, assists in operationalizing contingency contracting.

While the contracting officials interviewed unanimously agreed it is important to have the appropriately placed senior leaders to plan and execute contingency contracting operations, the opinion was not necessarily shared among all non-contracting officials. The primary disagreement we observed is that more general officers will increase overhead, not effectiveness. This opinion fails to recognize the truth within the DoD that to obtain access to certain forums, the appropriate rank is a must. From an operational commander perspective, as long as the contracting is done in a timely effective matter, the rest is irrelevant. This opinion supports the status-quo DoD culture and is likely due to the “zero-sum game” of personnel actions. If additional general officers are added for contracting billets, there will be a decrease in general officer billets in another functional area. This is a commitment that will generally not be supported by the communities that may be impacted by reductions. The DoD has come to a pivotal point and must decide to recognize acquisitions as a true core competency due to the fact that half of those required to respond to contingencies are contractors, or continue to treat the function as administrative and reactive. The second option will result in very little change in the culture and will likely lead to the same challenges during the next large contingency operation.

(1) Experienced Contingency Contracting Officers. The need for experienced, knowledgeable personnel does not apply only at the strategic leader level. Having those senior leaders appropriately placed provides an invaluable asset to all contingency contracting officers. Setting the stage to have experienced joint qualified

leaders to mentor young officers and non-commissioned officers creates a foundation of contingency contracting officers that understand how to make themselves relevant to the operational community. This foundation sets the precedence for each generation of leaders following, which helps to shift the culture of the DoD in the appropriate direction.

Each Service brings a unique set of skills and experience to joint contracting operations. The primary source of contingency contracting officers comes from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force, both of which have strengths and weaknesses. With the Army's reorganization of the contracting community, the Service is setting the stage to operationalize contracting. Contingency contracting officers spend the early part of their career in an operational functional area, moving into contracting as a senior captain or non-commissioned officer. This model provides the knowledge necessary to understand staff coordination and planning efforts, which, when coupled with contracting experience, is the foundation for leaders that understand how to integrate and synchronize contingency contracting planning. On the other hand, the Air Force recognizes contracting as a primary career field and recruits officers and enlisted members into the career field directly out of initial training, though a portion of the active duty cadre cross-train from other career fields. What the Air Force lacks is the experience in other staff elements such as operations and planning, skills that should be addressed to operationalize contingency contracting.

(2) Programmatic Approach to Contingency Contracting Execution. The movement of OCS efforts within the DoD are intended to support the need to apply a programmatic approach to contingency contracting. The efforts have focused significantly on how to manage current operations and how to plan for the future command and control elements of the next contingency contracting operations. What has been neglected is how to appropriately manage the personnel requirements for execution. Brig Gen Blake's integration cells provide a good framework for how to approach execution and lay the framework for a modified program office needed to manage contingency contracting.

Contingency contracting is not a program in the sense that a program manager should be responsible for operations. For example, regional contracting centers should continue to be led by contingency contracting officers with the appropriate experience. Execution is the responsibility of contingency contracting officers. However, having a cell on the JTF staff comprised of a contingency contracting officer, program manager, engineers, finance officers, and intelligence analysts, all responsible for managing contingency contracting operations, provides the commander with the needed expertise to fully integrate and synchronize contingency contracting operations.

The traditional program management side doesn't have enough knowledge about contracting. They don't understand [how] ... the [fiscal side of the house] and contract law intersect together. So to me, the lead is still a seasoned contracting [person]. (Interviewee F)

Treating contingency contracting as a typical acquisition program is a mistake that should be avoided. Doing so will result in repeat challenges and fragmented operations.

## **8. Facilities**

Our research did not identify any areas for analysis regarding facilities.

## **9. Policy**

As discussed in Chapter II, contingency contracting operations pose a unique challenge in that contracting authority does not follow the same path as command authority. In addition, there are multiple agencies with contracting authority within a given area of operation, all providing contract support. Consideration must be made for this fact early in planning and interagency coordination must be conducted for OPLANS to ensure that the designated lead Service for contracting is provided, at a minimum, coordination authority with other DoD agencies. Coordination of contract support becomes even more challenging during stabilization and reconstruction operations as other departments and non-governmental organizations perform operations alongside the DoD.

A significant challenge that had to be addressed during the creation of JCC-I/A was command and coordination authority. The JCC-I/A commander was provided OPCON over all forces receiving contracting authority through ASALT. In November 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent for contracting in Operation NEW DAWN (OND)/Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Kuwait and Pakistan. In the memo the Commander, C-JTSCC was appointed as the HCA for all contracting activities with the combined/joint operations areas (CJOAs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the exception of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2010). Serious consideration should have been given early in operations as to the relationship between C-JTSCC, USSOCOM, and USACE. Coordination taking place early in operations was coordinated through informal relationships that were only as effective as the personality-driven cooperation at any given time.

I will go to my grave believing that is wrong. [Regarding the exception of USACE from the authority of the Commander, J-TSCC]. (Interviewee C)

In order to effectively synchronize theater contract support, the HCA must be given, at a minimum, coordination authority with all contracting activities within the CJOA. Thorough consideration and planning for command and coordination authority should be conducted during Phase Zero to ensure effective support from day one of execution.

## **C. SUMMARY**

In this chapter, we provided an analysis of the integration and synchronization of OCS and contingency contracting within the joint planning process for each DOTmLPF-P area. The DoD has taken the initial steps to integrating contractors into the total force and are moving towards changing the DNA of the DoD so that it becomes common practice to fully integrate, synchronize, and manage contractor support in operational

planning. With that said, the changes being implemented seem to be virtually silent on how to operationalize contracting and give the appropriate focus to the function responsible for executing the OPLANS.

Based on the data collected by interviewing multiple senior contracting and non-contracting leaders, we have been able to formulate recommendations that we feel will further the success of OCS efforts and achieve the required end state of integration, synchronization, and management of contractor support in addition to increasing the unity of effort of contingency contracting activities during execution.

## **VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous two chapters, we provided our findings regarding and analysis of contingency contracting operations and the integration of OCS. In this chapter, we provide recommendations we received during the course of our interviews and recommendations resulting from our research.

### **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS**

During the course of our interviews, we specifically asked each interviewee what the DoD's next step should be toward improving contingency contracting operations. Being that our interviewees are comprised of previous or current senior leaders within the DoD, we feel identifying the responses is relevant to our research. There are four general areas of improvement for the DoD based on the responses received from our interviewees. The complete list of recommendations can be found in Appendix I.

First, the DoD must address organization structure to accurately support the military landscape of today's operational environment. Considerations must be made for how to most effectively provide theater contract support, how to properly align contracting personnel, and how to effectively manage contract oversight. The DoD has 11 years of lessons learned that should be codified before the corporate knowledge disappears.

Second, the DoD must consider how to create accountability and transparency with the contracting system to ensure operational missions are being supported by the contracting activity taking place within an area of operations. Operationalizing contracting and providing a framework supported by the intelligence and finance communities are imperative to supporting future operations relating operating across multiple elements of national power.

Third, the DoD must evaluate administrative roles and responsibilities, and lines of command and control, and address the issues of contracting authority. Contingency

contracting is challenging when clear lines are not planned for and enforced. There must be a focal point to act as the integrator between the multiple contracting activities to provide commanders with a common operating picture regarding contracting and contractors.

And, finally, the DoD must incorporate OCS and contingency contracting throughout the school systems of the military. Education regarding working with and managing contractors should be provided to all DoD employees that will potentially support contingency operations. Basic, primary, intermediate, and advanced military education programs must contain a block of instruction that enforces the need to view contractors as part of the total force. Until this happens, it will be difficult to change the culture of the DoD.

## **C. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH**

### **1. Introduction**

The primary purpose of our research was to determine what conclusions and recommendations could be derived from assessing strategic lessons learned from contingency contracting operations in OIF, OND, and OEF. After initial analysis of our interview findings, the predominant theme we identified was the need for integration and synchronization of contingency contracting in joint operation planning. We recognized that effective planning and integration of contingency contracting could have prevented a significant number of challenges faced by contracting and operational commanders during the past 11 years. As such, we focused the remainder of our analysis on the current efforts to integrate OCS and contingency contracting into the joint operation planning process. Based on that analysis, we have formulated five recommendations we believe will help to change the culture of the DoD to support improved contingency contracting operations for future operations.

### **2. Recommendation 1: Operationalize Contracting by Recognizing it as a Line of Effort**

Contracting can no longer be viewed as an administrative execution function. Operations increasingly rely on non-organic capabilities that must be procured via

contracting officers. While many commissions and oversight committees have recognized this fact, the DoD continues to perpetuate the assumption that contingency contracting is merely the process of writing a contract.

In order to effectively support operations, commanders must recognize and understand how contracting supports operations as an enabler. A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose. Contracting is often the link between operational and strategic objectives and links military operations with other instruments of national power. As long as the DoD continues to disregard this, the efforts taken by leaders such as Maj Gen (Ret) Scott and Brig Gen Blake to integrate contracting into the daily battle rhythm of operational commanders will be lost.

Ensuring the operational community embraces this change will require support from senior leadership and will take time, effort, and constant focus. In addition to working with the operational community, the contracting community must understand how to integrate contingency contracting operations at the appropriate time and place to support the assigned mission. The Army reorganization has effectively operationalized contracting with the creation of the ECC; however, the Air Force must work to ensure their highly skilled cadre of contingency contracting officers receives exposure to and experience in planning and integration.

Deepening the operational community's understanding of how to use contracting as a line of effort and an enabler will provide the foundation for the institutionalization of OCS. Regardless of how it is viewed, the requirement to manage OCS is a result of a contract award. Additionally, ensuring that contingency contracting officers fully understand their role in integrating contracting operations into the overall mission will provide the foundation for full integration of contingency contracting.

### **3. Recommendation 2: Do Not Treat Operational Contract Support as a Separate Distinct Function**

Consistently among our interviews, we heard the adage, “if it had contract in it, it became a contracting issue.” Unfortunately, this perspective is engrained in the culture of the DoD. Operational commanders have not been held responsible for managing

contractors until recently, and even with those efforts, the DoD has a tall hill to climb in changing that part of its culture. Current OCS integration initiatives are intended to change this view, but we feel these efforts are misdirected to eradicate this viewpoint. We believe by doctrinally creating OCS as a distinct function, separate from contracting, the DoD is setting the stage for this issue to be perpetuated.

During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, J-TSCC became the default option for accounting for, integrating, and managing contractors. The commissions and oversight committees have cited a need for program management of contingency contracting; however, creating a specific directorate within the J4 and associated doctrine for OCS will create an environment for commanders to continue placing reliance in “someone else” to perform the duties that should be inherently theirs.

Contractors have been identified as part of the total force and, as such, should be managed accordingly. Active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel are managed by the current system; with few exceptions, contractors should be managed in the same system. We recognize there are special command and control considerations regarding contractors. But educating the entire force on those boundaries addresses that. When creating an OPLAN, personnel (J1) should manage ALL personnel, logistics (J4) should manage ALL equipment, operations (J3) should integrate and synchronize the execution of the plan, and so forth. Identifying an organization that is responsible for OCS only provides a focal point for other directorates to defer to when it comes to planning for OCS.

To truly shift the DoD culture to effectively integrate, synchronize, and manage contractor support during operations will require all planning elements to account for and manage their own requirements with the assistance of contingency contracting experts that provide the business advice as directed by regulation.

**4. Recommendation 3: Ensure the Appropriate Personnel Are in the Right Place at the Right Time to Integrate Contingency Contracting Into Joint Operation Planning**

It is extremely important to recognize the importance of having experienced contingency contracting personnel involved in the joint operation planning process. In segregating contracting from OCS, there has been a foundation laid that will result in future challenges that could have been avoided. The DoD must plan to integrate contingency contracting operations with the operation plan. The focus at the combatant commands is being directed on what is now OCS, not on integrating contingency contracting. Allowing the Annex W to be written by planners with no contracting experience is a mistake that will likely result in continued challenges in effective contingency contracting execution.

This issue becomes a question of who should be planning, at what level should they be positioned, and what experience should they have. Through our analysis, we have determined it is imperative to have contracting experts create the Annex W. This recommendation feeds into the previous recommendation of not making OCS a distinct function. If the appropriate personnel are available at the combatant commands that understand contracting, they will act as the liaison for other staff directorates to provide the needed support for all Annexes to address OCS issues, forcing operational commanders to own the responsibility of OCS management.

Not only should seasoned contingency contracting officers be embedded at the combatant commands, positions related to contingency contracting should be filled by individuals with the appropriate level of experience and expertise. The Yoder Three-Tier Model provides a framework for leveraging the contracting officer and integrated planner and executor (IPE). We recommend ensuring positions are created at the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Service staffs that are to be filled with individuals meeting these requirements

Having the experienced personnel on staff will provide a conduit to educate the other staff directorates in contracting considerations, planning, and integration. Planners and logisticians do not have the expertise to act in an advisory capacity for contingency

contracting matters, nor should they be required to gain that expertise. The responsibilities outlined in the Joint Staff J4 OCS Manpower Study require a contingency contracting officer, yet none of the current planners have contingency contracting experience. We also recommend filling the JCASO Director position with a joint qualified contracting flag officer/general officer that meets the profile of the IPE.

The contracting planners should be augmented with program managers. During the execution of contingency operations, program managers should be incorporated into the contingency contracting structure to provide oversight and management of identified areas pertaining to contract support. As stated, the management of people and equipment should already be managed through typical DoD channels, but contractor oversight during execution should have a programmatic approach that includes program managers, engineers, and quality assurance personnel. We recommend codifying Brig Gen Blake's integration cell concept for application during contingency contracting execution.

The placement of appropriately positioned and experienced personnel will also support the evolution of joint exercises that adequately rehearse contingency contracting execution and the integration, synchronization, and management of contractor support.

## **5. Recommendation 4: Reorganize the DoD to Acknowledge and Elevate the Importance of Contingency Contracting**

### ***a. Introduction***

As previously discussed, organizational change is not always the answer to addressing change. However, when the organization no longer effectively supports the new culture, organizational restructuring may be the key to influencing a paradigm shift. We recognize organizational change will meet resistance from the DoD in the face of force reductions and a diminishing budget, but based on our analysis, it is time for the DoD to seriously consider restructuring to fully integrate, synchronize, and manage contingency contracting and contractor support, especially in light of the fact that approximately 50% of the deployed forces are contractors, a fact that is unlikely to change for future contingency responses. In this section, we offer two recommendations. Recognizing our primary recommendation will meet resistance; we offer a second

recommendation that we believe is a useful compromise that partially addresses the challenges we have outlined through our analysis, while not completely reorganizing the current structure.

***b. Create a J10 Directorate***

We concur with the CWC recommendation for the DoD to create a J10, Contingency Contracting directorate. Removing contracting from the J4 and establishing a separate directorate with a flag/general officer billet as the director places the appropriate emphasis on contingency contracting needed to influence a change in the DoD culture. Change requires an executive-level champion with the authority and influence to drive the direction of the organization.

While there are contending views on the issue, the majority of our interviewees, including non-contracting officials, agree with this recommendation. While approximately 80% of contracts supporting Iraq and Afghanistan are for logistics-related requirements, the fact that logistics is the largest customer does not support the placement of contracting within the logistics community. Contracting supports all capabilities across all tier one joint capability areas and is utilized by all requiring agencies in the same manner. When a requirement is identified that cannot be fulfilled organically or through existing means, the determination is made to contract for fulfillment of that requirement. Logistics is a requiring activity to contracting, on par with any other function that requires contract support. Generally speaking, contracting organizational structures are configured to ensure the requiring activity does not have direct control over the acquiring activity to avoid organizational conflicts of interest.

Interestingly, though contracting falls within the J4, there are no permanent contracting positions on the combatant command staffs to support joint operation planning. This leaves logisticians to answer contracting specific inquiries, or the deferment to the associated Service contracting points of contact. There must be a home for contracting on the Joint, combatant command, and Service component staffs to effectively integrate contingency contracting into planning.

The new directorate would be the focal point for contingency contracting planning and integrating the contracting strategy with operations under the direction of a joint qualified contracting flag/general officer. The staff should be comprised of personnel with the ability to provide the needed expertise to plan contingency contracting operations, to include contract management and oversight. It is difficult to ascertain the specific staff requirements without identifying the complete list of responsibilities; however, based on our assessment the organization would need, at a minimum

- Contracting expertise,
- Forensic finance and intelligence expertise,
- Defense agencies liaison capabilities,
- Inter-agency liaison capabilities (i.e., USAID, Department of State),
- Acquisition-related expertise (i.e., program managers, quality assurance, engineering), and
- Planning expertise.

We recommend there be an OCS planner within each of the other directorates. This planner would be responsible for acting as the liaison with the J10. This planner will create the OCS portion of their assigned Annex and will coordinate with the J10 for guidance and ensure J10 has the appropriate information to complete the Annex W. This would place the planning for OCS requirements back in the hands of the owning commanders and organizations, and force them to take responsibility for the contract support needed to perform assigned missions.

The J10 would also be responsible for providing input to the combatant command on the establishment of a lead service for contracting or JTSCC. Ideally, the J10 would have the capability to perform historical and market analysis to determine if strategic sourcing efforts would be appropriate to support OPLANS. While no contracting authority resides within the combatant command, having a central element evaluating the need for ready on the shelf contracts would provide focused guidance to the Services for action.

As the J10 structure filters down through the organization structure of the DoD, the responsibilities would include obtaining and updating market intelligence for

assigned areas of operation to support operation planning. The J10 structure also would provide the common operating picture during execution of an operation. The J10 director could be dual-hatted as the head of contracting activity during execution and stand up of a J-TSCC. Because the J10 concept would trickle down to the JTF staff, there would be a contracting liaison official to coordinate with the combatant command J10, JTSCC, and other government contracting activities operating in the area of operations. The JTF J10 would act as the business advisor to the JTF commander and the integrator of contingency contracting operations.

Creating the J10 directorate at the Joint and combatant commands and filtering that organizational structure down to the subordinate and Service commands will provide the foundation to institutionalize OCS where it should be, at the operational commander level. Having a “seat at the big table” is important to influencing an organization. The current lack of contracting personnel on commanders’ staffs and the placement of OCS deep within the J4 structure precludes contracting representation, which is critical in today’s military landscape.

***c. Begin Filling the Deputy Director J4 Positions with Contracting Personnel***

Recognizing the DoD will not likely undergo a reorganization of the current staff directorates, we offer a secondary recommendation. If contracting is to remain a responsibility of the J4, we recommend ensuring that the J4 Deputy Director is filled by an experienced contracting official. This will provide the required expertise within the J4 to engage with other staff directorates to push OCS planning throughout the organization. While not ideal, this will still elevate the position of contracting as discussed in the previous recommendation.

Ideally, the individual filling the Deputy Director billet will meet the requirements of the YTTM IPE. Under this construct, the OCS division would become the contingency contracting section and report directly to the Deputy Director. The contingency contracting section should be responsible for the functions outlined for the J10 and requires similar staffing expertise, as previously outlined. OCS planners should

shift from the J4 to the other directorates and coordinate with the contingency contracting J4 staff for input into the Annex W, and provide business advice and guidance on developing requirements and contract solutions.

The structure of this organization would be very similar to the J10 concept with the exception of having a dedicated directorate and flag/general officer. While this compromise will provide the needed expertise on the commanders' staff for effectively integrating contingency contracting into planning, this option will likely require additional time and senior leader support to shift the culture of the DoD. The reality facing the military is that if something is important, there will be a senior leader responsible for ensuring it is accomplished. Without the rank and authority associated with a separate directorate, the Deputy Director will be required to rely heavily on the buy-in of the J4 Director for support. While not impossible, cultural change will likely come slower and potentially not as easily under this construct.

#### **6. Recommendation 5: Ensure the Military School Systems Incorporate OCS Education**

Every member of the military is indoctrinated into the culture of the DoD through military training and education. The training curriculum supports those areas the DoD believes important for all members to embrace and understand. Understanding the elements of the total force should be required at all levels. Curriculum should be tailored for each level to address management issues as necessary.

These requirements should apply to all Service and Joint military education. The military of today is a leaner force relying heavily on contractor support when called to respond to a contingency. As such, the force must understand how contractors fit within the organization, how to integrate them, manage them, and support them. This is imperative to changing the culture of the DoD and institutionalizing OCS.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

In this chapter, we provided five recommendations for the DoD to improve contingency contracting operations and support the institutionalization of OCS into the culture of the DoD. We believe these recommendations are in line with the commission and oversight committee recommendations outlined in our literature review and support the call to manage contingency contracting and contractor support more effectively and efficiently.

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## **VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, we provide a summary of our research, conclusions drawn from the study, and areas highlighted for further research. As a learning institution, it is imperative for the DoD to not only capture the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, but institutionalize the needed changes to ensure the same challenges are not repeated in future operations. In this study, we sought to capture lessons learned from contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this report, we provided the background and purpose, the research questions developed, the methodology for answering the research questions, a comprehensive literature review of the issues associated with contingency contracting, a discussion of the lessons learned from strategic leaders, a focused analysis on the integration of contingency contracting in joint planning, a presentation of recommendations as a result of our analysis, conclusions from our study, and finally, areas for future research.

### **B. SUMMARY**

The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and reductions left many capability gaps and the increased need for contracted support. OIF, OND, and OEF only magnified the DoD's reliance on contracted support, and forced needed focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of contingency contracting activities. The evolution of contingency contracting has not only been in scope, but in the expectations placed on contingency contracting officers, the use of contingency contracting as a battlefield enabler, and the recognition of the need to manage contractors as part of the total force.

The purpose of this research was to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the senior leaders responsible for current DoD initiatives to institutionalize OCS. Our research served two primary purposes. First, to document the

history and evolution of C-JTSCC, and second, to use the consolidated lessons learned from senior leaders to shape recommendations to improve future contingency contracting operations.

In this study, we focused on senior-level leadership within the DoD, both from the acquisition and non-acquisition communities to capture strategic-level lessons learned. We utilized two frameworks to analyze our data, depending on whether the data was contracting execution related. For contract execution-related data, we categorized the findings using the six-phase contract management process. For non-contract execution-related data, we utilized DOTmLPF-P to categorize the findings.

## **C. CONCLUSION**

In this section, we will conclude our research by referring back to our research questions stated in Chapter I. We assessed the following primary research question:

- What conclusions and recommendations can be derived from assessing strategic lessons learned from contracting operations in OIF, OND, and OEF to improve contingency contracting operations in the future?

Based on our interviews, we were able to identify several lessons learned that should be addressed by the DoD and considered in planning for future operations. Through the application of our two frameworks, we were able to identify 25 trends within the data that should be addressed by the DoD. Upon completing our initial analysis, we conducted a secondary root cause analysis on the findings to determine if there was one cause that could be attributed to these challenge areas. Based on that analysis and further review of our data, we determined that the lack of planning for and integration of contingency contracting during Phase Zero contributed to the challenges faced during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The DoD is taking steps to integrate and plan for contractor support through OCS initiatives. However, we identified a fundamental difference of opinion between the organizations responsible for the institutionalization of OCS and the organizations responsible for executing contingency contracting. Doctrine and organizational structure fail to support the integration of contingency contracting into the joint planning process

and do not address the issue of integrating and synchronizing contingency contracting as identified by multiple commission and oversight committees.

To fully integrate contingency contracting into joint operation planning while institutionalizing OCS will require experienced senior-level contracting leaders positioned appropriately to ensure that the operational community takes ownership of their OCS responsibilities. Contingency contracting officers should be acting as the business advisor to the operational commanders, to assist in planning for the integration, management, and synchronization of contractors in contingency operations.

In Chapter 4, we answered our secondary research question:

- How did the organization and operations of C-JTSCC evolve since its inception in 2004?

We were able to interview commanders assigned to C-JTSCC between 2005 and 2012. These interviews, combined with our literature review, provided an accurate depiction of the challenges faced as the organization grew. The establishment and evolution of C-JTSCC provides the framework necessary to address organizational structure for future large-scale operations. Ensuring the JTSCC construct is appropriately planned for, to include personnel, authority designations, command relationships, coordination authorities, and responsibilities, is paramount to not reliving the challenges of the past.

#### **D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

During the course of this study several areas were identified for further research. The following list represents our recommendations for areas of further research.

- For each combatant command, collect and assess contingency contracting and required contract support data from operations for each contingency response over the past 10 years (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan) to determine the 80% solution for a) the level of contract support needed for any given OPLAN, b) the projected contingency contracting requirements, c) the projected contingency contracting officer manning and experience requirements, and d) the most likely theater contract support arrangement.
- Conduct an assessment of the use of mentorship in the contracting community to determine if contingency contracting officers are receiving

the appropriate level of mentorship to promote individual professional development.

- Create a model to estimate the contracting officer representative requirements for a given OPLAN.
- Conduct an analysis of the military school systems to determine the training gaps regarding OCS and contingency contracting.
- Evaluate the current policies associated with the designation of executive agent versus head of contracting activity to determine if it is appropriate for the DoD to reconsider the current delegation flow of contract authority.
- Develop a means to adequately and accurately assess the OPLANS for OCS and contingency contracting functions during joint exercises, placing particular focus on a means to evaluate operations in Phases 4 and 5.
- Conduct an analysis of the objectives associated with the allocation of funding to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine if the desired effects were obtained via that influx of resources.
- Conduct an analysis of CJITF-Shafafiyat to establish a model to incorporate into joint doctrine to ensure transparency and accountability in future contingency operations.

# APPENDIX A. DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROGRAM SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENT SECTION 854 OF THE JOHN WARNER NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FY 2007



## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

OCT 1 2007

### MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM SUPPORT)


SUBJECT: Designation of Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) (ADUSD(PS)) to Implement Section 854 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007

Section 854 of the John Warner NDAA for FY 2007 requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop joint policies for contract requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations.

You are hereby designated to assume the responsibility, in conjunction with the Chairman's representative, to meet the congressionally mandated timeline of 18 months to develop joint policies addressing contract requirements definition and contingency program management during combat and post-conflict operations. The DUSD(A&T) remains responsible for developing contingency contracting policy during combat and post-conflict operations and will support your efforts in conjunction with the Joint Staff.

The joint policies shall provide for the identification of appropriate individuals to act as heads of requirements definition and coordination, program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.

DoD Instruction 3020.41, "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces," paragraph 5 (Responsibilities), will be amended to reflect the above designation of the ADUSD(PS) as the OSD focal point for leading efforts to improve contingency program management and oversight.

  
John J. Young  
Acting

cc:  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G-4, U.S. Army  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics,  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, U.S. Air Force  
Deputy Commandant, Installations, and Logistics, U.S. Marine Corps  
Director, Defense Logistics Agency



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## **APPENDIX B. SECDEF MEMORANDUM, *STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT (OCS) AND WORKFORCE MIX* (SECDEF, 2011)**



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 24 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF  
FINANCIAL OFFICER  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS  
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and Workforce Mix

The Department of Defense has been, and continues to be, reliant on contractors for operational support during contingency operations. The degree of this dependency was most recently illustrated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Task Force on Contractor Dependency April 2010 report. At the height of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, contractor numbers well exceeded the military footprint; a similar situation is occurring in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. I do not expect this to change now or in future contingency operations.

Although there is historic precedent for contracted support to our military forces, I am concerned about the risks introduced by our current level of dependency, our future total force mix, and the need to better plan for OCS in the future. This memorandum addresses mitigating those risks through better planning at the strategic and operational levels for contracted support and leveraging the emerging capabilities of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW).

Based on the CJCS Task Force's report findings and recommendations on contractor dependency, I consider it prudent to focus attention on OCS as an emergent capability area and direct the Department to undertake the following actions regarding force mix, contract support integration, planning, and resourcing.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

- Assess how total force data (including OCS and CEW, documented in manpower databases as required by DoD Strategic Total Force Management policy) can be used to support and inform joint force assessments, adaptive planning, and the Department's force planning scenario development in coordination with the USD(AT&L), USD(P), the USD(C), USD(P&R), and Director of CAPE.



- Assess opportunities for in-sourcing contracted capabilities that represent high risk to the warfighter, consistent with budget and force-mix policy in support of the Department's force planning scenario development.
- Support the USD(AT&L) and the Joint Staff in assessing and updating current and emerging OCS business systems used in execution to integrate OCS planning capabilities. Ensure linkage and interoperability to joint planning and execution systems.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

- Collaboratively develop procedures and automated tools to support OCS and CEW adaptive/Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) planning, including contractor support estimates and visibility of contractors accompanying the force in coordination with the USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(P&R). Integrate into existing adaptive/JOPES planning systems the same level of fidelity in planning for OCS and CEW as for that of our organic forces.
- Sustain ongoing efforts and initiate new efforts to institutionalize processes, tools, and doctrine that facilitate and strengthen OCS and CEW planning and, by extension, joint-OCS/CEW training, exercises, and execution. As directed, organize and manage cross-cutting OCS and CEW-related task forces.
- Determine the non-acquisition community OCS capability requirements, and recommend appropriate resourcing required to improve OCS planning and execution in coordination with the USD(AT&L), the Military Departments, combatant commands, and Defense agencies.
- Provide OCS subject matter expertise to force-mix analysis, automation, and planning initiatives in coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and Director of CAPE.
- Ensure that OCS and CEW requirements are considered in the Department's force planning scenario development and joint force assessments, and assess Service plans for in-sourcing military capabilities that may represent high risk to the warfighter consistent with budget and force-mix policy, and in coordination with the USD(P), USD(P&R), USD(C), Director of CAPE; and the Military Departments.
- Assess existing strategic and operational guidance, key performance parameters, and supporting automated tools for opportunities to enhance and improve guidance and tools to seamlessly integrate OCS and CEW planning and execution equities.
- Integrate OCS elements and issues into strategic planning documents in coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and USD(P&R).
- Assess existing and emerging business systems to improve and integrate OCS and CEW planning and execution equities in coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the Military Departments.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall:

- Coordinate with appropriate Department staff and Agencies, Military Services, the Joint Staff, and combatant commands to determine acquisition community OCS planning capability requirements in accordance with guidance provided by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and recommend appropriate resourcing as part of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund.
- Assess and update current and emerging OCS business systems to improve and integrate OCS and CEW planning capabilities consistent with policy contained in DODD 3020.49, DODI 3020.1, and DODI 1100.22 in cooperation with the Joint Staff, USD(P&R), and the Military Departments. Ensure linkage and interoperability to joint planning and execution systems. Ensure data recorded in contracting systems provide an adequate historical record for subsequent joint capability and force-mix analysis and planning.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

- Provide policy guidance regarding planning for a contracted support component and a CEW component in force planning scenario development in coordination with the Joint Staff and USD(P&R).
- Identify capability areas of high risk and trade offs, and recommend capabilities that may need to be brought back or increased in the active/reserve organic military force inventory or provided for by the CEW in coordination with the Joint Staff, USD(P&R), and Director of CAPE.
- Integrate OCS equities into strategic planning documents in coordination with the USD(AT&L), USD(P&R), and the Joint Staff.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall:

- Inventory and identify the critical civil service skill sets that may augment or substitute for contracted or military personnel in contingencies in coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD(C), Director of CAPE, and the Joint Staff. Partner with the Joint Staff to develop complementary planning procedures, tools, and processes to make CEW appropriately interchangeable with contracted support and military personnel for planning purposes.
- Provide support to force planning scenario development to include integrating and/or accounting for the CEW.
- Develop a process for reporting and certifying CEW readiness for critical civil service capabilities that may augment or substitute for contracted or military personnel in contingencies.

My intent is twofold: to initiate action now, and to subsequently codify the initiatives begun by this memorandum in policy and through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facility changes and improvements. The time is now -- while the lessons learned from recent operations are fresh -- to institutionalize the changes necessary to influence a cultural shift in how we view, account, and plan for contracted and CEW support in the contingency environment. I ask that you keep me informed on progress on the critical initiatives outlined above.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized initial "R".

cc:  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

**APPENDIX C. CJCS MEMORANDUM, IMPLEMENTATION OF  
SECDEF MEMORANDUM ON STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL  
PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT AND  
WORKFORCE MIX**



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM 0380-11  
1 June 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR FOR MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL  
DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE  
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS  
DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS  
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY  
DIRECTOR FOR JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT  
DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES,  
AND ASSESSMENT

Subject: Implementation of SecDef Memorandum on Strategic and Operational  
Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and Workforce Mix

1. On 24 January 2011, the Secretary of Defense directed his staff and the Chairman to focus attention on OCS as an emergent capability area and to undertake actions regarding contract support integration, planning, and resourcing (Enclosure).

2. A number of these actions cross multiple Joint Staff directorates. Accordingly, I am assigning the Chairman's tasks to Directors in "lead/support" fashion. The Director for Logistics (DJ-4) will provide coordination, develop a methodology for tracking action items, and consolidate semi-annual reporting of progress to the Chairman. DJ-4 will also continue to represent the Chairman's OCS equities in OSD-level forums. Other J-directorate lead/support responsibilities follow:

a) Lead: J-4 Support: J-1, J-3, J-5, J-8 In coordination with the USD(AT&L), USD(P), and USD(P&R), collaboratively define and develop the process and procedures to integrate OCS and Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) into the joint forces' current operations, crises action planning, and deliberate planning.

b) Lead: J-3, Support: J-4, J-5, J-8 Integrate OCS and CEW requirements into existing JOPES to allow for the same level of fidelity in planning and execution for contracted support and CEW as for that of our Military forces. This includes such detail as contractor support estimates and visibility of contractors accompanying the force.

c) Lead: J-5, Support: J-3, J-4, J-8 Ensure future technological planning systems accommodate the same level of fidelity in planning for contracted support and CEW as for that of our Military forces; including such detail as

contractor support estimates and visibility of contractors accompanying the force.

d) Lead: J-5, Support: J-3, J-4, J-8 Make OCS a special interest item during IPR C's to ensure OCS and CEW requirements are included in concept development and approval. Make OCS a special interest item during IPR F's to ensure final plan includes fidelity for contracted support and CEW equal to that of our Military forces.

e) Lead: J-4, Support: J-3, J-5, J-7 Sustain ongoing efforts and initiate new efforts to institutionalize processes, tools, and doctrine that facilitate and strengthen OCS and CEW planning and, by extension, OCS/CEW -related training in Joint exercises and operations. As directed, organize and manage crosscutting OCS and CEW related task forces.

f) Lead: J-4, Support: J-1, J-3, J-5, J-8 In coordination with the USD(AT&L), the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies, determine the non-acquisition community OCS capability requirements and recommend appropriate resourcing required to improve its planning and execution.

g) Lead: J-4, Support: J-8 In coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and Dir (CAPE), provide OCS subject matter expertise to force mix analysis, automation, and planning initiatives.

h) Lead: J8, Support: J-3, J-4, J-5 In coordination with the USD(P), USD(P&R), USD(C), Dir (CAPE), and the Services, ensure that OCS and CEW requirements are considered in the Department's force planning scenario development and joint force assessments and assess Service plans for insourcing military capabilities that may represent high risk to the warfighter consistent with budget and force mix policy.

i) Lead: J-3, Support: J-4, J-5 Assess existing strategic and operational guidance, key performance parameters, and supporting automated tools for opportunities to enhance and improve guidance and tools to seamlessly integrate OCS and CEW planning into the current execution systems.

j) Lead: J-5, Support: J-3, J-4 Ensure future strategic and operational guidance, key performance parameters, and supporting automated tools integrate OCS and CEW planning.

k) Lead: J-4, Support: J-3, J-5 In coordination with the USD(P), USD(AT&L), and USD(P&R), integrate OCS elements and issues into strategic planning documents.

1) Lead: J-4, Support: J-3, J-5 In coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the Services, assess existing and emerging business systems to improve and integrate OCS and CEW planning and execution equities.

3. Applicable directorates, whether in a lead or supporting role, will provide GO and O-6 level points of contact for each of these actions to DJ-4 no later than two weeks from the date of this memorandum. The Chairman will receive an initial report from DJ-4 in the Fall 2011 with subsequent reports due every 6 months thereafter.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM E. GORTNEY  
VADM, USN  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

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## **APPENDIX D. DODI 3020.41, DECEMBER 20, 2011, ENCLOSURE 4 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011)**

### **RESPONSIBILITIES**

1. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) shall develop, coordinate, establish, and oversee the implementation of DoD policy for managing OCS.

2. DIRECTOR, DPAP. The Director, DPAP, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall:

a. Oversee all acquisition and procurement policy matters including the development of DoD policies for contingency contracting and the coordinated development and publication of contract prescriptions and standardized contract clauses in Reference (e) and associated contracting officer guidance in Reference (y). This includes working collaboratively with OSD Principal Staff Assistants, CJCS representatives, and the DoD Component Heads in the development of OCS related policies and ensuring that contracting equities are addressed.

b. Develop contingency contracting policy and implement other OCS related policies into DFARS in support of applicable contingency operations.

c. Ensure implementation by contracting officers and CORs of relevant laws and policies in References (d), (e), and (y).

d. Propose legislative initiatives that support accomplishment of the contingency contracting mission.

e. Improve DoD business processes for contingency contracting while working in conjunction with senior procurement executives across the DoD. Assist other OSD Principal Staff Assistants, CJCS representatives, and DoD Component Heads in efforts to improve other OCS related business processes by ensuring contracting equities and interrelationships are properly addressed.

f. Support efforts to resource the OCS toolset under the lead of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (DASD (PS)) pursuant to subparagraph 3.f.(2) of this enclosure.

g. Coordinate activities with other Government agencies to provide unity of effort. Maintain an open, user-friendly source for reports and lessons learned and ensure their coordinated development and publication through participation on the FAR Council.

h. As a member of the Contracting Functional Integrated Planning Team, collaborate with the Defense Acquisition University to offer education for all contingency contracting personnel.

i. Participate in the OCS Functional Capability Integration Board (FCIB) to facilitate development of standard joint OCS concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, plans, programs, tools, reporting, and training to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

j. In concert with the supported Combatant Commander, coordinate in advance of execution Executive Agency for Head of Contracting Activity requisite OPLANS, CONPLANS, and operations, where a lead service or a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) will be established.

3. DASD (PS). The DASD (PS), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) through the ASD(L&MR), is responsible for oversight and management to enable the orchestration, integration, and synchronization of the preparation and execution of acquisitions for DoD contingency operations, and shall:

a. Coordinate policy relating to field operations and contingency contractor personnel in forward areas and the battle-space. In cooperation with the Joint Staff, Military Departments, and OSD, serve as the DoD focal point for the community of practice and the community of interest for efforts to improve OCS program management and oversight.

b. Co-chair with the Vice Director, Directorate for Logistics, Joint Staff, (VDJ4) the OCS FCIB to lead and coordinate OCS with OSD, Military Department, and Defense Agency senior procurement officers in accordance with the OCS FCIB Charter (Reference (bj)).

c. Ensure integration of joint OCS activities across other joint capability areas and joint warfighting functions.

d. Provide input to the Logistics Capability Portfolio Manager and the CJCS in the development of capability priorities; review final capability priorities; and provide advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) in developing the Quadrennial Defense Review (Reference (bk) and defense planning and programming guidance, as appropriate.

e. Serve as the DoD lead to:

(1) Develop a programmatic approach for the preparation and execution of orchestrating, integrating, and synchronizing acquisitions for contingency operations.

(2) Establish and oversee DoD policies for OCS program management in the planning and execution of combat, post-combat, and other contingency operations involving the Military Departments, other Government agencies, multinational forces, and non-governmental organizations, as required.

f. Improve DoD business practices for OCS.

(1) In consultation with the USD(P&R); the Director, DPAP; and the CJCS, ensure a joint web-based contract visibility and contractor personnel accountability system (currently SPOT) is designated and implemented, including business rules for its use.

(2) Lead the effort to resource the OCS toolset providing improved OCS program management, planning, OCS preparation of the battlefield, systems support, and theater support contracts, contractor accountability systems, and automated contract process capabilities, including reach back from remote locations to the national defense contract base (e.g., hardware and software).

g. In consultation with the Heads of the OSD and DoD Components, provide oversight of experimentation efforts focusing on concept development for OCS execution.

h. Serve as the DoD lead for the oversight of training and education of non-acquisition, non- contracting personnel identified to support OCS efforts.

4. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA). The Director, DLA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through the ASD(L&MR) shall,

through the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), provide enabler OCS support to CCDR OCS planning efforts and training events, and, when requested, advise, assist, and support JFC oversight of OCS operations. Specifically, the Director, JCASO, shall:

a. Provide OCS planning support to the CCDR through Joint OCS Planners embedded within the geographic Combatant Command staff. Maintain situational awareness of all plans with significant OCS equity for the purposes of exercise support and preparation for operational deployment. From JCASO forward involvement in exercises and operational deployments, develop and submit lessons learned that result in improved best practices and planning.

b. When requested, assist the Joint Staff in support of the Chairman's OCS responsibilities listed in paragraph 10 of this enclosure.

c. Facilitate improvement in OCS planning and execution through capture and review of joint OCS lessons learned. In cooperation with United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Military Services, other DoD Components, and interagency partners, collect joint operations focused OCS lessons learned and best practices from contingency operations and exercises to inform OCS policy and recommend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTmLPP-P) solutions.

d. Participate in joint exercises, derive OCS best practices from after-action reports and refine tactics/techniques/procedures, deployment drills, and personal and functional training (to include curriculum reviews and recommendations). Assist in the improvement of OCS related policy, doctrine, rules, tools, and processes.

e. Provide the geographic CCDRs, when requested, with deployable experts to assist the CCDR and subordinate JFCs in managing OCS requirements in a contingency environment.

f. Practice continuous OCS-related engagement with interagency representatives and multinational partners, as appropriate and consistent with existing authorities.

g. Participate in the OCS FCIB to facilitate development of standard joint OCS concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, plans, programs, tools, reporting, and training to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

5. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA). The Director, DCMA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through the ASD(Acquisition), plans for and performs contingency contract administration services in support of the CJCS and CCDRs in the planning and execution of military operations, consistent with DCMA's established responsibilities and functions.

6. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I), as the Principal Staff Assistant for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security in accordance with DoDD 5143.01 (Reference (bl)), shall:

a. Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD security programs and guidance for those contractors covered in DoDI 5220.22 (Reference (bm)).

b. Assist the USD(AT&L) in determining appropriate contract clauses for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements.

c. Establish policy for contractor employees under the terms of the applicable contracts that support background investigations in compliance with subparts 4.1301, 4.1303, and 52.204–9 of Reference (d).

d. Coordinate security and counterintelligence policy affecting contract linguists with the Secretary of the Army pursuant to Reference (ab).

7. ASD(HA). The ASD(HA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), shall assist in the development of policy addressing the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical support received by contingency contractor personnel in applicable contingency operations.

8. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR READINESS (DASD(READINESS)). The DASD(Readiness) under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), shall develop policy and set standards for managing contract linguist capabilities supporting the total force to include requirements for linguists and tracking linguist and role players to ensure that force readiness and security requirements are met.

9. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT DATA CENTER (DMDC). The Director, DMDC, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), through the Director, DoD Human Resources Activity, shall:

a. Serve as the central repository of information for all historical data on contractor personnel who have been issued CAC and are included in SPOT or its successor, that is to be archived.

b. Ensure all data elements of SPOT or its successor to be archived are USD(P&R)-approved and DMDC-system compatible, and ensure the repository is protected at a level commensurate with the sensitivity of the information contained therein.

10. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (USD (C))/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The USD(C)/CFO shall develop policy addressing the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical support received by contingency contractor personnel in applicable contingency operations.

11. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities shall incorporate this Instruction into applicable policy, doctrine, programming, training, and operations and ensure:

a. Assigned contracting activities populate SPOT with the required data in accordance with Reference (bb) and that information has been reviewed for security and OPSEC concerns in accordance with paragraph 3.c(2)(e) of Enclosure 2.

b. CAAF meet all theater and/or JOA admission procedures and requirements prior to deploying to or entering the theater or JOA.

c. Contracting officers include in the contract:

(1) Appropriate terms and conditions and clause(s) in accordance with subpart 252.225–7040 of Reference (e) and Reference (y).

(2) Specific deployment and theater admission requirements according to subpart 252.225–7040 of Reference (e), Reference (y), and the applicable CCDR websites.

(3) Specific medical preparation requirements according to paragraph 3.h. of Enclosure2.

(4) The level of protection to be provided to contingency contractor personnel in accordance with paragraph 4.e. of Enclosure 2. Contracting officers shall follow the procedures on the applicable CCDR websites to obtain theater-specific requirements.

(5) Government-furnished support and equipment to be provided to contractor personnel with prior coordination and approval of theater adjudication authorities, as referenced on the applicable CCDR websites.

(6) A requirement for contractor personnel to show and have verified by the COR, proof of professional certifications/proficiencies as stipulated in the contract

d. Standardized contract accountability financial and oversight processes are developed and implemented.

e. Requirements packages are completed to include all required documentation (e.g., letter of justification, performance work statement, nominated COR, independent Government estimate (IGE)) are completed and funding strategies are articulated and updated as required.

f. CORs are planned for, resourced, and sustained as necessary to ensure proper contract management capabilities are in place and properly executed.

g. Assigned contracting activities plan for, and ensure the contractor plans for, the resources necessary to implement and sustain contractor accountability in forward areas through SPOT or its successor.

h. CSIPs and CMPs are developed as directed by the supported CCDR.

i. The risk of premature loss of mission-essential OCS is assessed and the mitigation of the loss of contingency contractor personnel in wartime or contingency operations who are performing essential contractor services is properly planned for.

j. Assigned contracting activities comply with theater business clearance and contract administration delegation policies and processes when implemented by CCDRs to support any phase of a contingency operation.

k. Agency equities are integrated and conducted in concert with the CCDR's plans for OCS intelligence of the battlefield.

l. The implementation of a certification of, and a waiver process for, contractor-performed deployment and redeployment processing in lieu of a formally designated group, joint, or Military Department deployment center.

m. Support the effort to resource the OCS toolset under the lead of the DASD (PS) pursuant to subparagraph 3.h.(2) of this enclosure.

12. CJCS. The CJCS shall:

a. Where appropriate, incorporate program management and elements of this Instruction into joint doctrine, joint instructions and manuals, joint training, joint education, joint capability development, joint strategic planning system (e.g., JOPES), and CCDR oversight.

b. Co-chair with the VDJ4 the OCS FCIB to lead and coordinate OCS with OSD, Military Department, and Defense Agency senior procurement officers in accordance with Reference (bj). Provide the OCS FCIB with input and awareness of the CJCS functions and activities as defined in sections 153 and 155 of Reference (k).

c. Perform OCS related missions and functions as outlined in the Joint Staff Manual 5100.01 (Reference (bn)) and the Chairman's authorities as defined in Reference (k).

13. GEOGRAPHIC CCDRS AND CDRUSSOCOM. The geographic CCDRs and the CDRUSSOCOM (when they are the supported commander) shall:

a. Plan and execute OCS program management, contract support integration, and contractor management actions in all applicable contingency operations in their AOR.

b. Conduct integrated planning to determine and synchronize contract support requirements to facilitate OCS planning and contracting and contractor management oversight.

c. In coordination with the Services and functional components, identify military capabilities shortfalls in all the joint warfighting functions that require contracted solutions. Ensure these requirements are captured in the appropriate CCDR, subordinate JFC, Service component and combat support agency CSIP or other appropriate section of the CONPLAN with TPFDD, OPLAN or OPORD.

d. Require Service component commanders and supporting Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities to:

(1) Identify and incorporate contract support and operational acquisition requirements in supporting plans to OPLANs and CONPLANs with TPFDD, and to synchronize their supporting CSIPs, CMPs, and contracted requirements and execution plans within geographic CCDR OPLANs and CONPLANs with TPFDD.

(2) Review their supporting CSIPs and CMPs and identify funding strategies for particular contracted capabilities identified to support each OPLAN and CONPLAN.

(3) Develop acquisition-ready requirements documents as identified in CSIPs including Performance Work Statements, IGEs, task order change documents, and sole source justifications.

(4) Ensure CAAF and their equipment are incorporated into TPFDD development and deployment execution processes in accordance with Reference (s).

(5) Ensure financial management policies and procedures are in place in accordance with DoD 7000.14-R (Reference (bo)) and applicable service specific financial management implementation guidance.”

e. Develop and publish comprehensive OCS plans. Synchronize OCS requirements among all Service components and Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities operating within or in support of their AORs. Optimize operational unity of

effort by analyzing existing and projected theater support and external support contracts to minimize, reduce, and eliminate redundant and overlapping requirements and contracted capabilities.

f. Ensure OCS requirements for the Defense Agencies, multinational partners, and other Governmental agencies are addressed and priorities of effort for resources are deconflicted and synchronized with OCS to military forces.

g. Ensure policies and procedures are in place for reimbursing Government-furnished support of contingency contractor personnel, including (but not limited to) subsistence, military air, intra-theater lift, and medical treatment, when applicable.

h. Ensure CAAF and equipment requirements (regardless if provided by the Government or the contractor) in support of an operation are incorporated into plan TPFDDs.

i. Review Service component assessments of the risk of premature loss of essential contractor services and review contingency plans to mitigate potential premature loss of essential contractor services.

j. Establish and communicate to contracting officers theater and/or JOA CAAF admission procedures and requirements, including country and theater clearance, waiver authority, immunizations, required training or equipment, and any restrictions necessary to ensure proper deployment, visibility, security, accountability, and redeployment of CAAF to their AORs and/or JOAs. Implement Reference (z).

k. Coordinate with the Office of the USD(P) to ensure special area, country, and theater personnel clearance requirements are current in accordance with Reference (z), and coordinate with affected agencies (e.g., Intelligence Community agencies) to ensure that entry requirements do not impact mission accomplishment.

l. Determine and distribute specific theater OCS organizational guidance in plans, to include command, control, and coordination, and HCA relationships.

m. Develop and distribute AOR/JOA-wide contractor management requirements, directives, and procedures into a separate contractor management plan as an annex or the appropriate section of the appropriate plan.

n. Establish, staff, and execute appropriate OCS-related boards, centers, and working groups.

o. Integrate OCS into mission rehearsals and training exercises.

p. When contracts are being or will be executed in an AOR/JOA, designate and identify the organization responsible for managing and prescribing processes to:

(1) Establish procedures and assign authorities for adjudicating requests for provision of Government-furnished equipment and services to contractors when such support is operationally required. This should include procedures for communicating approval to the requiring activity and the contracting officer for incorporation into contracts.

(2) Authorize trained and qualified contractor personnel to carry weapons for personal protection not related to the performance of contract-specific duties.

(3) Establish procedures for, including coordination of, inter-theater strategic movements and intra-theater operational and tactical movements of contractor personnel and equipment.

(4) Collect information on and refer to the appropriate Government agency offenses, arrests, and incidents of alleged misconduct committed by contractor personnel on or off-duty.

(5) Collect and maintain information relating to CAAF and selected non CAAF kidnappings, injuries, and deaths.

(6) Identify the minimum standards for conducting and processing background checks, and for issuing access badges to HN, LN, and TCN personnel employed, directly or indirectly, through Government-awarded contracts.

(7) Remove CAAF from the designated operational area who do not meet medical deployment standards, whose contract period of performance has expired, or who are noncompliant with contract requirements.

(8) Designate additional contractor personnel not otherwise covered by personnel recovery policy for personnel recovery support in accordance with Reference (av).

(9) Ensure that contract oversight plans are developed, and that adequate personnel to assist in contract administration are identified and requested, in either a separate contractor management plan as an annex of plans and orders and/or within appropriate parts of plans and orders.

(10) Develop a security plan for the protection of contingency contractor personnel according to paragraph 4.e. of Enclosure 2.

(11) Develop and implement theater business clearance and, if required Contract Administration Delegation policies and procedures to ensure visibility of and a level of control over systems support and external support contracts providing or delivering contracted support in contingency operations.

q. Enforce the individual arming policy and use of private security contractors in accordance with Reference (aq) and DoDD 5210.56 (Reference (bp)).

r. Establish a process for reviewing exceptions to medical standards (waivers) for the conditions in section 11 of Enclosure 3, including a mechanism to track and archive all approved and denied waivers and the medical conditions requiring waiver. Additionally, serve as the final approval/disapproval authority for all exceptions to this policy, except in special operations where the TSOC commander has the final approval or disapproval authority.

s. Establish mechanisms for ensuring contractors are required to report offenses alleged to have been committed by or against contractor personnel to appropriate investigative authorities.

t. Assign responsibility for providing victim and witness protection and assistance to contractor personnel in connection with alleged offenses.

u. Ensure applicable predeployment, deployment, in-theater management, and redeployment guidance and procedures are readily available and accessible by planners, requiring activities, contracting officers, contractors, contractor personnel and other interested parties on a webpage, and related considerations and requirements are integrated into contracts through contract terms, consistent with security considerations and requirements.

v. Ensure OCS preparation of the battlefield is vetted with intelligence agencies when appropriate.

w. Integrate OCS planning with operational planning across all primary and special staff sections.

14. FUNCTIONAL CCDRS, EXCEPT CDRUSJFCOM WHEN A SUPPORTED CCDR. The functional CCDRs utilizing OCS shall ensure their Commands follow the procedures in this Instruction and applicable operational-specific guidance provided by the supported geographic CCDR.

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## **APPENDIX E. OCS ANALYST AND PLANNER SKILL SETS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (FROM JOINT STAFF J4, 2012)**

Analyst and planner skills are very similar. Any differences are related to the level of subject matter expertise and experience in either planning or acquisition. The OCS analyst must possess significant contracting expertise and be conversant and knowledgeable in operations and planning. The OCS planner must possess extensive knowledge and experience in operations and planning and be a functional subject matter expert in logistics, communications, engineering, or some other field. The mutual skill set for both planner and analyst includes knowledge in the following areas:

- Planning
- Acquisition<sup>1</sup>
- Logistics (or other Joint Capability Area)
- Operations

Responsibilities of the OCS analyst and planner are shared and accomplished by OCS supervisory and non-supervisory analysts and planners alike. This further illustrates the great variety of tasks that OCS personnel are required to accomplish on a daily basis.

Where there is a complete lack of OCS personnel within a headquarters, none of these responsibilities are being accomplished. In such situations, ad hoc arrangements are being made to meet OCS requirements. Those arrangements usually include personnel that have no previous experience with either OCS or contracting.

Analysts and planners alike must be ready to take on the following responsibilities:

- Act as single command point of contact for OCS within the supported activity.
- Develop and update OCS-related command guidance, instructions, and policy.
- Adjudicate contract support among Service components when planning and conducting active operations to ensure a fair share of available contracting capability.
- Manage and develop agendas for periodic command logistics procurement support boards (CLPSB).
- Access and use information contained in the SPOT system, and be able to train others in the use of that system.
- Manage and conduct periodic OCS-related working group meetings to coordinate CLPSB issues, and provide input to the periodic command CLPSB.

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<sup>1</sup> OCS does not require acquisition certification, but some level of acquisition knowledge is recommended in all OCS- related positions. Basic acquisition knowledge because the OCS planner may at times advise supported commands and staffs on how to best close an operational gap or implement a course of action with a contracting solution.

- Participate in component joint acquisition review boards (JARBs) as an observer and subject matter expert.
- Maintain the common operating picture of contracting activity within the staff, component, interagency, international organization, and non-governmental organization areas of responsibility.
- Assist offices of security cooperation and security cooperation office defense attaches (SCO/DAT) in the development of contract requirements and the tasking of contracting support activities to meet those requirements.
- Ensure OCS is included in headquarters and component exercise scenarios and story lines, and document exercise mission scenario events.
- Provide OCS-related training and staff assistance (statements of work, independent cost estimates, etc.) to HQ staff and components.
- Engage with JCASO for additional technical and operational support to potentially stand up the JTSCC or lead Service for contracting.
- Represent CCDR in Joint Staff J4, OSD (DPAP and [DASD (PS)]), and interagency OCS- related coordination and forums.
- Coordinate with Department of State representatives to mitigate contracting issues that involve embassy support of DoD personnel and DoD programs.
- Coordinate with all CCMD HQ staff to assist in the review and analysis of CONPLANS, OPORDs, etc., and to evaluate contract solutions for force structure shortfalls in operational planning.
- Coordinate with interagency command representatives on support requirements.
- Capture and document OCS lessons learned.
- Document OCS in OPORDs, EXORDs, CONPLANS, and OPLAN Annex Ws.
- Monitor command use of SPOT, The Officer Projection Specialty System (TOPSS), and JAMMS. Act as the command's SPOT program point of contact for coordination of database parameters, program report formats, and similar programmatic issues.
- Provide subject-matter expertise to the Joint Staff and OSD concerning OCS-related issues.
- Assist with periodic CCMD contracting conferences, including facility selection, agenda preparation, announcement preparation, guest speaker coordination, attendee management, conduct, documentation of lessons learned, and post-conference activities.
- Attend and participate in periodic plans, security cooperation, and exercise conferences as participant and presenter.
- Maintain contractor theater entrance requirements for the command.
- Participate in operational planning team meetings.
- Monitor and provide OCS-related audit review and GAO and DoD Inspector

General assistance.

- Attend (as participant and presenter) JCS OCS conferences, community of interest meetings, and JCS J4 OCS meetings and conference calls.
- Participate in daily command update briefings.
- Conduct component and component contracting support activity coordination and staff visits.
- Research, interpret, and analyze applicable federal and DoD acquisition regulations as staff SME.
- Coordinate with the J3 requests to use private security contractor support with the appropriate command operations and legal staffs, and monitor approval process for use of private security companies and private security company personnel by DoD activities in the AOR.
- Coordinate with DCMA for contract administration support when necessary.
- Understand, and in some cases coordinate, the use of acquisition cross-Service agreements as an alternative to contracting.
- Monitor ongoing humanitarian assistance construction project coordination involving the engineer and logistics staff activities, and assist with the designation of component support for projects and compliance with completion schedule.
- Develop and synchronizes OCS objectives, scenarios and events to train personnel to combat readiness standards and to test new concepts in an exercise environment.
- Remain knowledgeable of the chain of command from the National Command Authorities to the individual Military Service headquarters and to the unified commands, including the primary missions and responsibilities of the combatant commands.
- Understand joint plan development and the review cycle, including component supporting plan development, CCDR plan development, and JCS review and approval.
- Develop an in-depth knowledge of OCS policies, directives, doctrine, laws and the ability to apply them in an operational setting.
- Understand military campaign planning and execution as it passes through progressive stages of operations.

The following are among the general OCS analyst and planner skills, knowledge, and experience requirements:

- Knowledge of sources and means to resolve problems
- Skill in personal relations
- Skill in contract support integration and contractor management in operations
- Leadership experience initiating needed programs or analysis

- Ability to originate new ideas, projects, studies, and methodologies
- Ability to execute projects or studies within established financial and time constraints
- Ability to develop and utilize appropriate data collection techniques
- Ability to apply analytical tools to solve complex, real-world problems
- Knowledge of cost and economic analysis principles, techniques, and practices
- Ability to communicate well, both orally and in writing
- Ability to plan and organize work
- Ability to gather, analyze, organize, and present data and supporting analysis
- Ability to lead and organize special study teams and task forces with members from different organizations and commands
- Ability to identify problems and develop innovative solutions
- Ability to develop, prepare, coordinate, staff, and implement policies, procedures, programs, and directives
- Knowledge of regulatory requirements, policies, and special procedures
- Ability to independently draft military messages, warning and execute orders, fragmentary orders, command policy letters and executive level correspondence.

## APPENDIX F. OCS COMPETENCY MODEL (JOINT STAFF J4, 2012)

### OCS Competency Model

#### CORE COMPETENCY

Competencies are defined in a way that is appropriate for the expectations of the position and the work environment. This core competency model identifies behaviors and skills the workforce must demonstrate to carry out the mission and goals of the organization to which he or she is assigned. The descriptions that follow are general and allow for flexibility in how criteria are applied.

*OCS core competency:* Orchestrate and synchronize provision of integrated contract support and management of the contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area.

*OCS strategic (national level) competencies:*

- Institutional mission support—capacity development (OSD, Joint Staff)
  - Develop strategy and guidance for OCS (includes governance and reporting).
  - Develop policy and performance measures for OCS program management that enable the timely achievement of OCS mission objectives at all echelons.
  - Develop DOTMLPF solutions for OCS.
  - Integrate OCS in training exercises across joint functions and with joint and mission partners.
  - Provide oversight and resources to facilitate execution at lower levels.
  - Provide metrics that enable visibility and accountability; promote issue resolution and OCS process improvement.
  - Collect OCS lessons learned and redeployment (Phase V) lessons learned.
- Strategic (theater)—OCS through range of military operations
  - Provide operational support—mission resources and capabilities.
  - Develop OCS plans (Annex Ws, CSIPs, CMPs, CMIWG, etc.).
  - Facilitate whole-of-government (WoG) and multinational (MN) collaboration and cooperation.
  - Support OCS CCDR Logistics Procurement Board (CLPSB).
  - Provide OCS oversight and integration.
  - Provide contracted support by performing five tasks: planning, requirements determination, contracting development and execution, and contract closeout.
  - Participate in and support exercises.
- Operational support (CJTF commander/command)
  - Prepare and publish orders (e.g., OPORD and FRAGOs).
  - Assist with WoG and MN coordination.

- Manage and define set requirements (head of requirements definition).
- Support the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB).
- Contract integration (WOG, MN coordination)
- Contingency contracting (head of contingency contracting, or HCC)
- Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB).

#### OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT TASKS

To validate the skill sets and core competencies noted above, the following OCS key support tasks are provided. These tasks are derived from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)–approved *OCS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)* (19 July 2011):

- *Integrate OCS into operations.* OCS must be integrated with mission planning, deployment, execution, and command decisions. OCS delivers strategic, operational, and tactical outcomes that, when responsive to contingency battle rhythms, provide commanders flexible options to include non-military force capabilities and achieve operational outcomes.
- *Institutionalize OCS.* OCS must be integrated with DoD processes and staff functions. OCS UJTLs should drive reporting, force development, and resourcing for this core DoD capability. Readiness reporting for OCS capabilities will improve the understanding and application of this capability in training and contingency operations.
- *Staff for OCS.* The total force mix is driven by strategic planning, but refined by operational requirements. Developing and maintaining OCS capabilities at all levels includes recruiting and retaining personnel (e.g., contracting officers, OCS planners, requirements developers, and CORs) who perform the functional roles of OCS, including all tasks for institutional/ capacity building, contract support integration, rapid deployment, combat system integration, and contractor management. These personnel must then be trained to proficiency (individually and collectively), developed, and deployed to support operations.
- *Plan for OCS.* OCS planning continues to evolve, but it is a task pursued by a coalition of the willing. OCS is not programmed, resourced, nor integrated sufficiently as a core capability. OCS must be integrated across staff functions for phase 0 during contingency and crisis action planning. OCS planning requires consideration of roles and coordination between the Services' and partner contracting organizations, deployment and in-theater contractor support, contract oversight, entrance and exit processing and procedures, and reporting.
- *Monitor OCS.* Personnel, processes, and tools should provide battle-space awareness of OCS solutions (i.e., contracts) as well as capacity for generating solutions (rules, tools, and processes). Efforts to monitor OCS should also satisfy legal and regulatory requirements associated with visibility and accountability of contracted solutions.
- *Lead OCS.* Leading OCS is a function of command. It may involve the JFC's J4 staff as lead or designation of a lead Service for contracting to foster coordination and collaboration among various organizations (including organizations external to the theater). This task requires definition of a theater acquisition strategy that includes OCS objectives in support of mission requirements and performance measures to guide future decisions.

OCS leadership must assess and advise the CCDRs on risk, opportunity, resources, communication, transition, improvement, and issues among multiple JOAs.

- *Integrate common contract support.* Integrating common contract support requires awareness of OCS capabilities, limitations, and restrictions among partner organizations to preclude competition between requiring activities, leverage economies of scale, minimize redundancy, and improve effectiveness. This task capitalizes on best-of-breed solutions and promotes unity of effort among partners.
- *Conduct contingency contract administration services.* Requiring activities and contracting offices must be involved in the conduct of CCAS. Requiring activities must ensure sufficient assigned and trained personnel (i.e., CORs and receiving officials) are available to assist in contract oversight. The JFC and Service component commands are responsible for ensuring adequate contract administration is available to meet operational requirements. Under certain circumstances, this may include establishment of a theater-wide contract administration (TWCA) process to implement optimal CCAS solutions at the contract level, formally define the roles of key TWCA CCAS players, and standardize reporting and oversight.
- *Develop requirements package.* Development and coordination of requirements packages remains a non-standard, manual practice that is not well defined, understood, or implemented. Lack of proficiency causes delays and errors in generating contracted support to meet operational requirements. Requiring activities must maintain proficiency in generating acquisition-ready packages. Ad hoc requirements must be rapidly coordinated to enable integration of common contract solutions and delivery in a timely manner.
- *Manage contractors.* Management of contractor personnel and equipment is a major task that requires significant coordination among multiple staffs and organizations. A key challenge is the lack of a single primary or special staff officer responsible to lead CM planning and integration. Such responsibilities cross all primary and special staff functional lanes. Contractor management subtasks include verifying clearances, coordinating deployments, maintaining contractor accountability, establishing base access and security controls (currently not standardized across geographic locations), providing force protection, coordinating movement control, providing government-furnished support (GFS), establishing standards and procedures that ensure contractor discipline, defining rules for the use of force, investigating incidents involving contractors, disciplining contractors, and controlling government-furnished equipment and contractor-acquired, government-owned material.

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## APPENDIX G. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

1. Adams, Douglas L., Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army  
Date: 28 Sep 2012                      Location: Ft. Shafter, Hawaii  
Command Sergeant Major, 413th CSB, Present
2. Acquisition, Logistics & Technology – Integration Office Staff, USA CASCOM  
Date: 29 Jun 2012                      Location: Ft Lee, Virginia
3. Bass, Joseph L., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 3 Aug 2012                      Location: Washington DC  
Commander, Expeditionary Contracting Command, Aug 2011 - Apr 2012  
Commander, 408th CSB, Jun 2007 - Jun 2008  
Deputy Commander, ICO / PARC-I (OIF), Mar 2007 – Jun 2007
4. Blake, Casey D., Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 11 Sep 2012                      Location: VTC, NPS  
Senior Contracting Official – Afghanistan, Apr 2011 - May 2012
5. Brown, R. Mark, Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 4 Oct 2012                      Location: VTC, NPS  
Commander, C-JTSCC, Present
6. Cottrell, Daniel T., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Date: 30 Jul 2012                      Location: Redstone Arsenal, AL  
Senior Contracting Official – Afghanistan, May 2009 - Jun 2010
7. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy - Contingency Contracting Staff  
Date: 2 Aug 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.
8. Dussault, Kathleen M., Rear Admiral (Upper Half), U.S. Navy  
Date: 25 Jun 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.  
Commander, Task Force 2010, Mar 2009 – Aug 2009  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2008 - Feb 2009
9. Ginman, Richard T.,  
Date: 3 Aug 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.  
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Present
10. Harrison, Theodore C., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 30 Jul 2012                      Location: Redstone Arsenal, AL  
Commander, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command, Present  
Chief of Staff, JCC-I/A, Feb 2005 - Feb 2006

11. Henke, Robert J.  
Date: 2 Jul 2012 Location: Washington D.C.  
Commissioner, Commission On Wartime Contracting, 2008 – 2011
12. Installation Directorate, Contracting Division (A7K) Staff, Pacific Air Forces  
Date: 27 Sep 2012 Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, Hawaii
13. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office Staff, Defense Logistics Agency  
Date: 27 Jun 2012 Location: Ft Belvoir, VA
14. Kalathas, Nicholas T., Rear Admiral (Lower Half), U.S. Navy  
Date: 28 Jun 2012 Location: Washington D.C.  
Commander, JCC- I/A, Mar 2011 - Feb 2012
15. Lyons, Stephen R., Major General, U.S Army  
Date: 4 Sep 2012 Location: VTC – NPS  
Deputy Chief of Staff – ISAF J4, Oct 2009 - Apr 2011
16. MacLaren, Ron J., Rear Admiral (Lower Half), U.S Navy  
Date: 27 Jun 2012 Location: Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
Director, JCASO, Mar 2010 – Present
17. Masiello, Wendy M., Major General U.S Air Force  
Date: 20 Jul 2012 Location: Phone–NPS  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant  
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition  
PARC-I/A, Jul 2005 - Jan 2006
18. McLeod, Mark M., Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 27 Sep 2012 Location: Camp Smith, Hawaii  
Director, USPACOM J4, Jun 2012 – Present
19. McMaster, Herbert R., Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 31 Aug 2012 Location: Phone–NPS  
Commanding General, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence,  
Present  
Commander, CJITF-Shafafiyat, ISAF Jul 2010 – Mar 2012  
Regimental Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, May 2004 - Jun  
2006
20. Motsek, Gary J.  
Date: 13 Sep 2012 Location: VTC-NPS  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense - Program Support, Present

21. Newell, Peter A., Colonel, U.S. Army  
Date: 7 Sep 2012 Location: VTC-NPS  
Director, Rapid Equipping Force, Present  
Commander, 4th Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division, Jun 2008 – Jul 2010
22. Nichols, Camille M., Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 5 Sep 2012 Location: VTC-NPS  
Commanding General, U.S. Army Contracting Command, Present  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Dec 2009 - Mar 2011  
Commanding General, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting  
Command, Jan 2008 – Dec 2009
23. Operational Contract Support and Services Division, Joint Staff J4  
Date: 31 Jul 2012 Location: Washington D.C.
24. Pasquarette, James F., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 3 Aug 2012 Location: Washington D.C.  
Deputy Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Oct 2010 - Oct 2011
25. Petraeus, David H., General, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Date: 1 Aug 2012 Location: Langley, VA  
Commander, ISAF, Jul 2010 - Jul 2011  
Commander, USCENTCOM, Oct 2008 - Jul 2010  
Commander, MNF-I, Feb 2007 - Oct 2008  
Commander, MNSTC-I, May 2004 - Sep 2005  
Commander, 101st Airborne Division, Mar 2003 - Feb 2004
26. Phillips, William N., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Interview Date: 26 Jun 2012 Location: Washington D.C.  
MILDEP / Director, Army Acquisition Corps, ASA-ALT, Present  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Feb 2009 - Jan 2010
27. Richardson, Renee M., Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 27 Sep 2012 Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, HI  
A7K, Pacific Air Forces, Present
28. Rogers, Tommie W., Chief Master Sergeant, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 27 Sep 2012 Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, HI  
Senior Enlisted Advisor, A7K, Pacific Air Forces, Present
29. Schinasi, Katherine  
Date: 2 Jul 2012 Location: Washington D.C.  
Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2010 – 2011

30. Scott, Darryl A., Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired)  
Date: 26 Jun 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2006 - Jan 2008
31. Shofner, Robert, Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Retired)  
Date: 5 Oct 2012                      Location: VTC-NPS  
Chief of Operations – J3, JCC-I/A, Aug 2008 – May 2009
32. Simpson, James E., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 3 Aug 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.  
Senior Contracting Official – Iraq, Apr 2011 - Feb 2012
33. Spoehr, Thomas W., Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 31 Jul 2012                      Location: Washington D.C.  
Deputy Commanding General, USF-I, Jul 2011 - Dec 2011
34. Urias, John M., Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Date: 21 Sep 2012                      Location: VTC-NPS  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2005 - Jan 2006
35. USPACOM J46 Staff - Operational Contracting Support,  
Date: 26 Sep 2012                      Location: Camp Smith, HI
36. Vollmecke, Kirk F., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 3 Jul 2012                      Location: Fort Sam Houston, TX  
Commander, Mission and Installation Contracting Command, Present  
Director for Contracting, ASA – ALT, Aug 2010 – Mar 2012  
Commander, DCMA Iraq/Afghanistan, Jun 2007 - Jun 2008
37. Westermeyer, Roger H., Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 30 Aug 2012                      Location: Phone-NPS  
PARC-I, Jun 2008 - Jun 2009
38. Willey, Jeffery D., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Date: 28 Aug 2012                      Location: Phone-NPS  
PARC-A, May 2008 - May 2009
39. Zybur, Martin A., Colonel, U.S. Army  
Date: 28 Sep 2012                      Location: Ft. Shafter, HI  
Commander, 413th CSB, Present
40. 413th CSB Staff, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command  
Date: 28 Sep 2012                      Location: Ft. Shafter, HI

## **APPENDIX H. LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

### Contracting Personnel:

1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position?
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced?
3. What major changes did you implement?
4. What best practices did you observe while in your position?
5. How do you envision the future of C-JTSCC will be?
6. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD contracting structure?
7. In your opinion, in the absence of a JTSCC, who should maintain command and control of contracting responsibilities during phase 1 of operations for future contingencies?
8. What do you believe your greatest contribution has been to the improvement of operations?
9. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan?
10. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be toward improving contingency contracting operations?
11. Were the Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) trained sufficiently to perform required duties in theater?
12. Were reach-back capabilities effectively utilized?
13. Were policies associated with local sourcing effectively implemented and did they support the intended local economic growth?
14. Moving forward, what policy changes could be implemented during a contingency to allow for more effective contracting support?
15. What are the primary policy challenges in regard to contingency response?

JCASO:

1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position?
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced?
3. What major changes have you implemented/plan to implement?
4. What best practices have you observed while in your position?
5. What do you believe your greatest contribution has been/will be to the improvement of operations?
6. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD contracting structure (currently and for future ops)?
7. In your opinion, is JCASO properly positioned within DoD and provided the appropriate authority levels to effectively conduct its mission?
8. In your opinion, are the JCASO planners assigned to COCOMs able to effectively influence the planning process to ensure appropriate emphasis is placed on contracting operations for a given contingency?
9. What is the reachback plan for JCASO?
10. What do you envision the future of C-JTSCC will be?
11. In your opinion, in the absence of a JTSCC, who should maintain command and control of contracting responsibilities during phase 1 of operations for future contingencies?
12. In your opinion, should JCASO be a part of the scalable joint capability packages deployed by the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) to support Combatant Commanders?
13. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan?
14. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be toward improving contingency contracting operations?
15. Moving forward, what policy changes could be implemented during a contingency to allow for more effective contracting support?
16. What are the primary policy challenges in regard to contingency response?

COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING:

1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position?
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced?
3. Did the original objectives of the commission remain unchanged, or did they evolve over time?
4. Were there any trends that were not included in the report that should have been?
5. In your opinion, how receptive was DoD of the commission's recommendations?
6. In your opinion, has DoD taken the appropriate steps to address the 15 recommendations found in the final report?
7. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be toward improving contingency contracting operations?
8. In your opinion, looking back would you have done anything differently or looked at any additional areas?

### SUPPORTED COMMANDERS:

1. Upon assuming your position in Iraq or Afghanistan, what was your opinion of contracting and operational contracting support (OCS)?
2. Was contracting and OCS integrated into the planning process?
3. What were your biggest challenges with the acquisition process?
4. Did your view of contracting/OCS change throughout your assignment?
5. How could contracting have better supported your mission?
6. Since the inclusion of contracting into COIN doctrine, do you believe commanders at all level have internalized money as a weapon system and how contracting can help shape the battlefield?
7. What is your opinion regarding the:
  - a. Recommendation of the Gansler Commission report to increase the number of USA general officers in Contracting?
  - b. Recommendation of the Commission on Wartime Contracting to remove contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate within the joint staff?
8. If you were reorganizing the current staff model, what would the model look like to fully integrate contracting/OCS into the joint planning process?
9. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be to improve contingency contracting support to the warfighter?

DPAP:

1. Based on requested support from theater, what did you perceive were their biggest challenges were?
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced in supporting C-JTSCC?
3. What areas of relief were requested the most?
4. What major changes were implemented as a result of operations in CENTCOM?
5. What DPAP led initiatives have resulted from operations over the past 11 years?
6. What future plans/programs are ongoing within DPAP in regard to contingency response?
7. How do you envision the future of C-JTSCC?
8. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan?
9. What is your opinion on the recommendation of the Commission on Wartime Contracting to remove contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate?
10. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be toward improving contingency contracting operations?

### PROGRAM SUPPORT:

1. In your opinion, what is operational contract support and who should be responsible for it?
2. What are the biggest challenges regarding OCS?
3. What major changes have been implemented regarding OCS?
4. In your opinion, does the separation of OCS roles and responsibilities complicate oversight?
5. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD OCS structure (for current and future ops)?
6. In your opinion, is JCASO properly positioned within DoD and provided the appropriate authority levels to effectively conduct its mission (for current and future ops)?
7. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency contracting/OCS in Iraq/Afghanistan?
8. What is your opinion on the Commission on Wartime Contracting's recommendation to remove contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate within the joint staff?
9. Are there current efforts in place to fully integrate the intelligence community with OCS oversight to enable contracting transparency?
10. In your opinion, what changes are needed to encourage commanders at all levels to take responsibility for OCS?
11. In your opinion, what should DoD's next step be toward improving contingency contracting operations and OCS management?

## **APPENDIX I. INTERVIEWEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DOD**

- The DoD must address and answer the questions of: are planners strictly planners or should contracting be planners as well? This is imperative to get right because if it gets codified incorrectly there is a bad trickledown effect.
- The DoD must determine where contracting is going to be fit into the structure and organization.
- The DoD must codify the hard lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The DoD must understand that before they go into an operation the organizational structure has to be set up in a way that manages the battlespace as a portfolio.
- Contracting and contractor management must be fully integrated into the school systems of the DoD for both civilian and military personnel.
- Define transition points between contingency contracting phases and ensure operations move to the next phase when those definitions are met.
- Learn from the past. Write about it, teach about it, and execute it. Research is only good if the results are applied to doctrine, organization, and policy.
- Implement the recommendations already made by commissions and oversight committees.
- The Services need to define their contract needs in terms of peacetime operations and contingency operations, and rationalize that definition and resource properly to provide the required support to joint operations.

- The J1, personnel community should take on the responsibility of tracking and accounting for contractor personnel, no different than any other individual performing service under the U.S. flag during contingency operations.
- The DoD must take ownership of the value chain and integrate the chain fully, which includes intelligence and forensic finance. The DoD must provide appropriate management, and the knowledge management tools to support the value chain that will allow commanders to make informed decisions regarding contract support. “Right now we can’t see ourselves.”
- OCS/contracting planners must be present at the Service level, not just the combatant command level.
- The DoD must find ways to be more efficient in terms of contingency policy and contingency response.
- The DoD must establish procedures and policy that provide adequate transparency and accountability in contingency expenditures
- The DoD must get the automated tools out to the field to bring themselves into the 21<sup>st</sup> century (i.e., biometrics, automated COR reports, etc.)
- OCS training must become part of the normal training process, not as a separate function or responsibility.
- Doctrine must catch up with everything else and must capture the lessons learned not only from Iraq and Afghanistan, but from all contingency responses over the past ten years.

- The DoD must reassess the gaps between Service and Defense Agencies' capabilities, then reshape and then conduct directive training, education and exercising as it relates to filling those gaps.
- Future contracting commands must be provided the authority and coordinating responsibility over other agencies performing contracting activities within an area of operations.
- Consideration should be given to establish a standard of service to avoid each forward operating base having different levels of service for base operations support services.
- The DoD should address the issuance of executive agent for all combatant commands.
- Contracting should have a permanent residence on the commander's staff.
- The DoD needs a central organization reviewing contingency contracting operations.
- Joint exercises must include contingency contracting and OCS scenarios.
- The DoD should work to increase the minor construction limit of \$750,000 for operations and maintenance funds for contingency operations.

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